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The chapters in this book are based on presentations made at the forty-
eighth annual Werner Sichel Economics Lecture Series, hosted by the Depart-
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Donald J. Meyer 
Western Michigan University 
Securing good health is vitally important for each of us individually, 
as well as for our society as a whole. In fact, maintaining an acceptable 
level of health is necessary to adequately function in our daily lives. 
Health brings us happiness with the ability to feel good, to be pain-free, 
and to enjoy life. We yearn to have a rich, fulfilling life, and good health 
is the vehicle for being able to do so; it allows us to function produc-
tively in our jobs and reduces our number of sick days, which results in 
additional income and a higher standard of living. 
The importance of good health extends to our overall economy as 
well. Health care makes up about 17 percent of our national economy 
and thus greatly affects our macroeconomy. Rising health care costs 
have presented challenges for the national budget, and incentive issues 
due to health uncertainty and asymmetric information have important 
market implications for our health economy. Furthermore, the obesity 
epidemic in our country is an alarming situation, contributing to dete-
riorating health, premature death, and escalating health care costs. 
The passage and recent implementation of the Patient Protection 
and Affordable Care Act (ACA) has been extremely controversial. 
Important components of this historic act include the contentious per-
sonal mandate, the newly established state exchanges, and Medicaid 
expansion. Although the purpose of this book is not to critique the 
ACA, several chapters in this volume do evaluate how specific aspects 
of the ACA affect our economy. 
When addressing or modeling health, economists typically posit a 
utility function U(C,H), where consumers derive utility from consum-
ing various goods and services (C), as well as from the level of health 
(H) they possess. Health can be thought of as an economic good that 
consumers work to acquire, similar to a stock or consumer durable, 








time and consider investments made to our health stock over our life-
times. Utility maximization requires a trade-off between investing our 
scarce time and money into the acquisition of health or the consumption 
of other goods and services. 
A significant aspect of the market for health is that the health level 
to be consumed must be produced by the same individual—that is, none 
of the health we wish to consume can be purchased as such in the mar-
ketplace. This is a very atypical situation in our economy; generally, 
consumers do not produce the good, they purchase it in the market-
place. It is similar to a family farmer who can eat only the vegetables 
that he grows himself. This leads to less specialization in production 
and more generalization. 
Thus it becomes important to consider how one best produces an 
acceptable level of health for present and future consumption. Two sig-
nificant inputs into the production of health are medical care and life-
style choice or self-care. Doctor visits, medical procedures, and phar-
maceuticals help improve our health; many of us receive these services 
through health insurance coverage that we purchase or obtain through 
our employers. Personal choices, such as the amount of physical exer-
cise we get, our alcohol consumption, and calorie intake also influence 
our health. Other inputs that affect our health include education level, 
random health shocks, and the environment in which we live. 
Uncertainty pervades over health determination, as our health status 
even one or two years into the future is highly unknown or uncertain. 
Our attitude toward the risk is very important in determining how we 
manage it. Buying insurance is one response to facing a random loss 
due to illness or disease. Health insurance is central to one’s insurance 
portfolio, but other types of insurance can help in the events of becom-
ing disabled, getting hurt on the job, or requiring assisted living. One 
can also invest in self-protection or self-insurance through a healthier 
lifestyle, including eating better food, exercising, and limiting alcohol 
and tobacco consumption. 
Health markets are also heavily subject to situations of asymmet-
ric information—when one party knows more information than another 
party about some health aspect. Adverse selection, nonrepresentative 
risk pools, and death spirals can result when individuals know more 
about their health risks than the insurance companies. Moral hazard, 





take on more health risks or overpurchase health insurance. The agency 
problem involves the challenge of hiring doctors or other health profes-
sionals to investigate our health issues and make decisions that are in 
our best interests. 
This book contains six chapters that address various aspects of 
health. Charles E. Phelps begins the volume with “We Have Met Our 
Enemies and They Are Us.” This provocative title refers to the fact that 
many of us in the United States do not make good lifestyle choices. 
Phelps cites a study that shows that poor choices regarding tobacco 
usage, eating, activity, and alcohol consumption make up the leading 
causes of death in the United States. He suggests working to improve 
the educational system, as education rates are generally positively cor-
related with making healthier lifestyle choices. 
Phelps finds a direct relationship between medical spending and 
both income and life expectancy, but an inverse relation between medi-
cal spending and infant mortality. The extent to which the United States 
is a major outlier is surprising; we spend far more on medicine than any 
other country and have health results that are far from what our health 
expenditures would predict. 
Chapter 3, “Do Medical Care and Self-Care Compete or Comple-
ment in Health Production?,” by Donald J. Meyer, focuses on two of the 
primary input categories in one’s health production function, medical 
care and self-care. He asks whether these two input types function more 
closely as substitutes or complements. Loosely speaking, are medical 
care and self-care more often used in combination with each other, or 
do individuals more likely choose one over the other? Meyer reviews 
arguments for each of these ideas, the complementarity relations that 
competing risk models indicate and the basic substitution effect based 
on relative prices and productivities. 
Meyer first notes the two basic definitions in neoclassical produc-
tion of two inputs having a complement or substitute relation. He then 
argues that this issue is more appropriately viewed in the context of sig-
nificant uncertainty, a primary characteristic of the health setting. Acom-
mon response to decision making under uncertainty is the attainment of 
market insurance and/or the practice of undertaking self-insurance or 
self-protection, two categories of self-care. Meyer reviews much of the 
literature in which researchers have debated whether these uncertainty 









He recognizes and discusses the close link that exists between medi-
cal care and health insurance, thus enabling a more enriched definition 
of complements and substitutes between medical care and self-care in 
the health context. He then reviews three articles that have examined 
whether medical care and self-care are better described as complements 
or substitutes, and he offers his own opinions as well. 
The next three chapters deal with some aspect of the Patient Pro-
tection and Affordable Care Act (ACA). John H. Goddeeris’s chapter 
is entitled “Payment Reform and ‘Bending the Curve.’” The “bend-
ing the curve” phrase has been attributed to President Barack Obama, 
who in 2009 said, “It is important for us to bend the cost curve . . .
because the system we have right now is unsustainable . . .” This refers 
to the challenge of keeping health care costs under control and limiting 
the rate of annual increase of the costs. Goddeeris considers one such 
possible curve—health care costs as a percentage of gross domestic 
product—which has been growing consistently over the last 50 years 
and has reached a level of about 17 percent. 
Goddeeris then addresses ways in which health care providers are 
paid, which he argues is a critical component of bending the curve. He 
examines aspects of paying for output rather than inputs, managed com-
petition, and bundling by episode. Goddeeris argues for a more global 
payment method regarding some specific defined population versus a 
traditional fee-for-service plan. He discusses in detail the idea of an 
Accountable Care Organization and how this might better function in 
terms of incentives for receiving care and controlling costs. 
Marcus Dillender’s chapter is entitled “The Potential Effects of the 
Affordable Care Act on Disability Insurance and Workers’ Compensa-
tion.” Disability insurance covers people who are unable to work for 
over a year due to health concerns, and workers’ compensation insur-
ance pays medical costs for people who get injured while working 
on the job. These two types of insurance that relate to how the risk of 
health deterioration affects one’s earning or income potential are some-
times overlooked by individuals who are concerned about addressing 
health risks in general. 
The two main sections of the chapter examine basic program infor-
mation for disability insurance and workers’ compensation and how the 
ACA affects the likelihood of filing a claim for these types of insurance. 





more generally, which can then indirectly spill over to the two types of 
insurance. 
Edward C. Norton considers the issue of long-term care in his chap-
ter, “The Economic Challenges of the The Community Living Assis-
tance Services and Supports Act.” The CLASS Act was a major compo-
nent of the original ACA, but it ultimately was not supported and was 
struck from the act that passed in 2010. It would have created a market 
for long-term care with a number of interesting features. He reviews the 
expenditure needs of the typical elderly individual and notes that long-
term care offers the greatest variance in out-of-pocket expense and thus 
is the riskiest issue facing the elderly. 
Norton discusses why the CLASS Act was dropped from the ACA
legislation, and he suggests that the proposed act faced many significant 
economic challenges. One challenge was adverse selection and moral 
hazard, present in all insurance markets but even more pronounced 
in the elderly long-term care market. Another challenge was inflation 
risk—claims made for long-term care insurance are often made decades 
into the future, when the purchasing power of your benefit amount is 
subject to years of inflationary erosion. Norton also suggests that the 
long-run viability of the program was in question due to the financial 
instability of funding the program long term. 
Chapter 7, by M. Kate Bundorf, is entitled “The Role of Private 
Health Insurance in the Medicare Program.” Bundorf introduces her 
topic by laying out the basic Medicare system in the United States. 
Parts A and B make up traditional Medicare originating in 1965 and 
cover hospital, physician, outpatient, and other standard forms of health 
care services. Part D was added under the Medicare Modernization Act 
of 2003 and adds outpatient prescription drug benefits. 
Bundorf then focuses on two forms of private insurance that inter-
act with the Medicare system. The first is Medicare Part C, or Medicare 
Advantage, which allows beneficiaries to enroll in a private plan that 
replaces traditional Medicare (parts A and B). The second is Medigap, 
a private policy that supplements existing Medicare. Medigap policies 
reduce deductibles and cover copays, reducing personal cost liability. 
This tends to accentuate moral hazard, as Bundorf notes. She evaluates 
the two different programs and how they have both increased Medicare 
spending over the years and then discusses how future Medicare reform 
may be differentially affected by the two plans. 
 
6 Meyer 
Good health is a characteristic that is crucial to all of us individu-
ally and collectively as a country. The United States is challenged 
in its world ranking in health statistics, which is likely to become an 
even larger challenge as its population ages over the next few decades 
(Phelps discusses this in Chapter 2). Education in general appears to 
be an ally for good health and for becoming better informed about our 
health system, and it helps reduce uncertainty and aids in better deci-
sion making for all of us. The chapters in this volume contribute to this 








We Have Met Our
Enemies and They Are Us 
Charles E. Phelps 
University of Rochester 
HEALTH CARE SPENDING AND OUTCOMES—
AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 
Many critics (and even some proponents) of the U.S. health care 
system note two things: 1) we spend a lot of money on health care, far 
more than any other country in the world; and 2) we don’t get the best 
health outcomes in return. 
Let’s first look at health care spending. Figure 2.1 shows U.S. 
spending per capita against per capita gross domestic product (GDP), 
with other countries’ incomes and spending standardized to U.S. dol-
lars using appropriate exchange rates. These data (from the Organisa-
tion for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD]) show a 
remarkable pattern—as per capita GDP rises, medical spending rises 
at a very predictable rate (at about 1.5 × the rate of per capita GDP).1 
One remarkable feature is how close to the best-fit line we can find 
countries with incredibly different health care systems, including Great 
Britain (with a socialized health care system), Canada (with a socialized 
health insurance system but private production of health care itself), 
Germany and Japan (with private production but mixed insurance sys-
tems), Sweden (with county-level government health plans), and Aus-
tralia (with a system not much different from that in the United States). 
All of these nations, despite the differing roles of government in their 
health care structure, have essentially the same spending on health care 























Figure 2.1  Income and Medical Spending in OECD Countries 
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The United States looms as an outlier on the regression line fitted 
from other nations’ data points. We are wealthier than other countries, 
but our medical spending far outstrips the level predicted from the best-
fit regression line. We have demonstrably profligate spending habits for 
health care. 
When looking at our health outcomes, a gloomier picture emerges. 
The United States again sits as an outlier but clearly in the wrong direc-
tion. Figure 2.2 shows how life expectancy at birth and per capita medi-
cal spending correlate. The pattern is not nearly as tight as that between 
medical spending and per capita GDP, but a recognizable (albeit fuzzy) 
link exists between medical spending and health outcomes. In general, 
countries that spend more have better longevity. Japan looms large as a 
happy outlier—it has the highest life expectancy in the world, despite 
relatively middle-of-the-road medical spending. Genetics likely plays a 
role, but dietary choices have a large effect. When first-generation Japa-
nese move to Hawaii, they maintain their Japanese longevity if they 
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retain traditional Japanese dietary patterns, but if they acquire Ameri-
can dining habits, they also acquire American mortality rates (Kolonel, 
Hinds, and Hankin 1980; Tanabe, n.d.). 
A clearer picture emerges when looking at infant mortality rates, 
as shown in Figure 2.3. Here the pattern is crisper than with life expec-
tancy at birth, but once again we can see that more medical spending 
generally reduces perinatal mortality; the United States has far-worse 
outcomes than the best-fit line would predict. We in fact have perinatal 
mortality rates normally associated with countries with about one-third 
of our medical care spending rate, including Portugal and the former 
Warsaw Pact state of the Slovak Republic. The United States has about 
triple the infant mortality rate that the best-fit regression line would 
predict. 
This gloomy portrait of our health care system has many root 
causes, some of which I explore later in this chapter. Before moving 
to that, however, we need a quick peek into the future. Here’s a hint: 








Figure 2.3  Infant Mortality vs. Medical Spending in OECD Countries 
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THE LIGHT AT THE END OF THE TUNNEL IS A TRAIN 
COMING AT US 
Demographers show the age mix of a country’s population using 
what they used to call “population pyramids.” The horizontal bars in 
these graphs represent age groups, older as one moves up the pyramid. 
The left side shows males, the other shows females. They are called 
pyramids because they are wide at the base (youngest age groups) and 
narrower at the top (older age groups), reflecting increased mortality as 
we get older. 
Over time, however, these pyramids can change shape, and in very 
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that brings new entrants into the population (babies). Figures 2.4A, 
2.4B, and 2.4C show current projections from the U.S. Census Bureau 
for the population that embeds predictions about future age-specific 
mortality rates and also birth rates. The 1950 chart shows a typical 
pyramid, pinched in at the bottom, however, both for losses to military 
deaths and lower fertility rates during World War II. It also shows the 
baby boom at the end of the war (the wide band for 0–4-year-olds) that 
has important consequences for later years’ forecasts. Now, skip ahead 
to the 2000 pyramid. These data are also known with certainty. The 
baby boom of the 1945–1950 era (and nearby cohorts) has now moved 
into middle age, and the pyramid shows a hefty “middle-aged spread,” 
not unlike that of a lot of the actual baby boomers. Note also the lop-
sided and enlarged age mix at the top. The pyramid no longer comes 
to a point, and it is very decidedly female. Women outlive men in the 
United States by about five years, mostly owing to the effects of earlier 
cigarette smoking. Very large fractions of our nursing home populations 
are women who were widowed many years earlier in their lives. 
Skipping ahead to 2025 and 2050 involves making projections 
about the future, which demographers do using models to forecast age-
specific mortality rates and also to forecast birth rates. The 2025 fore-
casts show an increasingly top-heavy age distribution, and by 2050, the 
pyramid turns into a shape like a graduation cap—it has far more people 
in the 80+ age group than any other five-year interval, and the ratio of 
working age to retired has become very unfavorable. Some pundits now 
call this the “Silver Tsunami.” 
Health care spending rises rapidly with the number of chronic con-
ditions (see Figure 2.5), which are closely linked to age as our bodies 
wear out faster and faster. It does not take a complex computer program 
to tell us that the combination of an aging population and the increased 
rate of medical spending with age and its associated increase in chronic 
conditions will inevitably lead to increasingly higher health care spend-
ing. Unless something dramatically changes, U.S. spending could eas-
ily exceed one-fourth—perhaps even one-third—of GDP on health care 
by 2050. Spending rates will inevitably rise over time. Our only mean-
ingful goal is to somehow cut down the rate of growth. Health care pun-
dits call this “bending the curve.” Subsequent sections in this chapter 
discuss ways to do this that lie outside the realm of health care reform. 
12 Phelps 
Figure 2.4  Age Profiles for U.S. Population, 1950–2050 
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Figure 2.4  (continued) 
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Figure 2.5  Average Health Care Spending per Capita, by Number of 
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We Are Our Own Worst Enemy 
Most people in the United States don’t understand the true causes of 
death and the large medical costs that arise as we try to stave it off. We 
read about and witness deaths from heart disease, cancer, and stroke, 
but these are just the natural consequences of the true causes of death. 
The brutal truth is that, for many, personal choices are often the primary 
true causes of our illness and death. 
In a powerful study combining epidemiologic studies and mortality 
data, McGinnis and Foege (1993) look at the excess mortality arising 
from various lifestyle choices and combine that with death certificate 
data to come to an astonishing conclusion: the leading cause of death 
in the United States is our own behavior. To see how this works, sup-
pose that last year 1,000 people died of Disease X—the death certifi-
cate would show that disease is the cause. Now, suppose that of those 
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the U.S. population smokes, tobacco users are overrepresented among 
those who died of Disease X by a factor of three. If the disease were 
unrelated to tobacco use, we would expect to find only 250 tobacco 
users among the 1,000 who died of Disease X, but we actually saw 750. 
So, we attribute 500 excess deaths from Disease X to tobacco. 
Now, do the same thing for other diseases, such as lung cancer, 
many other types of cancer, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, 
heart attack, heart failure, and stroke, and then add up the excess deaths 
attributed to tobacco. When you finish that list, tobacco, it turns out, is 
the leading cause of death in the United States. Mokdad et al. (2004) 
redid the original study 10 years later using data from 2000. The results, 
shown in Figure 2.6, are quite stunning. These nine causes of death 
account for about half of all deaths, and most of these—surely we 
would include tobacco, diet/inactivity, alcohol, motor vehicle accident, 
firearms, sexual behavior, and illicit drug use—are wholly matters of 
human behavior and choice. One could easily include toxic agents in 
the list as well (primarily consequences of air and water pollution), but 
that may be more of a societal issue rather than an individual choice. 
Let’s look at the most important of these in more detail. 





























Despite the enormous mortality burden from tobacco, the problem 
is actually lessening. Some of the decline comes from improved cancer 
treatment (arising in part from NIH research), but much of it is attrib-
uted to reduced smoking rates. Americans now smoke at about half the 
rate they did in 1965. Figure 2.7 shows per-adult cigarette consumption 
patterns from 1900 to 2010. 
Many things converged to cause this sea change. Most importantly, 
a 1964 report from the U.S. surgeon general greatly shifted patterns 
of tobacco use over time and spurred many cultural and legal changes 
(U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare 1964).2 
Warning labels appeared on cigarette packages. Television ads for 
tobacco were banned, and antismoking ads were aired instead. Local 
and state governments banned smoking in restaurants. Smoking was 
no longer permitted on airplanes and in most airports. Cigarette taxes 











SOURCE: Warner (1989) and author’s calculations using data from the U.S. Centers 
for Disease Control and Prevention. 
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increased dramatically. The smoking culture changed. Before the sur-
geon general’s report, cigarette smoking was a standard Hollywood 
sign of sophistication. Ayn Rand praised smoking extensively in The 
Fountainhead (1943). People smoked in restaurants, in homes, in the 
park, on trains, in hotel rooms—everywhere, both public and private. 
Now the public perception of smoking is quite different: it is widely 
considered a sign of ignorance and/or irrational behavior. 
Over time, many antismoking laws have been passed, and many 
jurisdictions (both in the United States and worldwide) have made 
smoking illegal not only in most indoor public settings but in many 
outdoor places as well. And it is certainly considered ill-mannered for 
people to light up in any private home without permission. All of these 
cultural and legal changes came from one source—a government report. 
Now, instead of nearly half of the population smoking cigarettes, fewer 
than 20 percent do so. By convening the committee to write this report, 
Dr. Luther Terry, the then surgeon general, may have saved more lives 
than any other physician in history. 
Eschewing the Fat? 
The next causes of death I address here are poor diet and lack of 
exercise. It is perhaps politically incorrect to say this, but the evidence 
seems clear: fat kills. Being overly skinny is also unhealthy, but that’s 
generally not the weight problem that affects most people. 
To understand the definition of overweight, we need to define the 
body mass index (BMI), which is widely used to measure obesity, 
defined (in metric measurements) as weight (in kilograms) divided by 
height (in meters) squared.3 
Standard ranges for adults are as follows: normal, 22–24; over-
weight, 25–29; obese, 30–35; and morbidly obese, over 35. An increas-
ing proportion of the U.S. population falls into the obese and morbidly 
obese categories. There is a national epidemic of obesity, yet it draws 
far less attention than do many far less dangerous epidemics of various 
“bugs.” 
First, let’s look at the data on the growth in obesity. Figure 2.8 shows 
data from regular surveys of the U.S. population beginning in 1960. The 
percent of adults classified as “overweight” (BMI between 25 and 30) 
stays essentially flat at about a third of the population throughout this 
18 Phelps 
















SOURCE: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. 
half century, but those who are obese (BMI between 30 and 40) begins 
to climb rapidly after about 1980. The combined group of “obese” and 
“extremely obese” grew from under 15 percent in 1960 to 42 percent in 
the most recent years—a tripling of the rate of obesity and now almost 
half of the adult population. Similar data (not shown) reveal a similar 
pattern for adolescents and children. 
Now let’s look at the effects of obesity on health and consider the 
ultimate indicator of health: survival rates. Figure 2.9 shows the relative 
risk of death (in any single year) by BMI category, separately for men 
and women, using the lowest-risk group as 1. Thus, a relative risk of 1.5 
means a person has a 50 percent greater chance of dying than a person 
in the best BMI group.4 
The width of the bars shows the statistical imprecision (which gets 
worse as the number of people in each group shrinks), but the midpoint 
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For both men and women, the best survival rates appear in the 
groups with a BMI of 23.5–24.9. The relative risk climbs both for peo-
ple with lower and higher weight than this “most-protective” BMI. But, 
as the data in Figure 2.8 show, our problem in the United States is not 
an epidemic of underweight, but rather the opposite—obesity. 
Obesity causes many disorders that degrade the quality of life, and 
its associated diseases reduce people’s ability to do many enjoyable 
things in life. It increases the risk of hypertension (half of all hyper-
tension comes from obesity), heart disease, numerous cancers, sleep 
apnea, abdominal hernias, gout, and varicose veins. For people who 
are obese, the risk of diabetes triples, and with diabetes comes other 
ailments such as vision problems, skin breakdown, and further risk of 
heart disease. Bringing body weight into normal ranges (BMI of about 




Stewart, Cutler, and Rosen (2009) calculate the average quality of 
life people report in different age groups by BMI category and smoking 
status, because of all the chronic conditions brought about by smoking 
and obesity, both have systematic effects on the quality of life people 
report (see Figure 2.10). Where 100 is perfect health, quality scores fall 
as BMI rises, and they also are worse for smokers than for nonsmokers. 
At almost every age, an obese smoker reports about 80 percent of the 
quality of life as the normal-weight nonsmoker. 
Obesity costs a lot of money. The Centers for Disease Control 
pegged the costs of obesity-related diseases at nearly $150 billion per 
year in 2008 (Finkelstein et al. 2009). The average obese person uses 
about $1,500 more—approximately 40 percent—per year in medical 
services than a person of normal weight. This affects tax dollars through 
the funding of Medicare and Medicaid, and the costs of our private 
insurance go up in the same way because obese people pay the same 
premium as nonobese people. 
Alcohol 
To understand the health effects of alcohol, we need to bring two 
concepts into the picture. First, the real health problems come with 
heavy drinking and binge drinking.5 Heavy drinking is known to 
increase the risk of various cancers, liver disease (particularly cirrho-
sis), and heart disease. However, almost ironically, regular moderate 
alcohol use seems to have a series of health-protective aspects, espe-
cially with regard to heart disease, more so when the alcohol of choice 
is wine, and especially so for some red wines with high levels of par-
ticularly beneficial complex chemicals.6 A large study of Danish adults 
(Grønbaek et al. 2000) finds that heavy drinkers of distilled spirits had 
about double the cancer risk of nondrinkers, but those who drank wine 
moderately (not heavy or binge) had a 20 percent lower all-cause mor-
tality rate and almost cut the risk of heart disease in half (compared with 
nondrinkers). 
We Are Fighting the Wrong Drug War 
The official war on drugs focuses on substances such as marijuana, 
cocaine, and heroin, but those drugs account for less than 1 percent of 
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Figure 2.10  Quality of Life by Smoking and BMI Status 
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all deaths in the United States. Tobacco, on the other hand, causes 18 
percent of the deaths in our country every year. Alcohol adds another 
3.5 percent, for a total of 21.5 percent for these two legal drugs. This 
means that tobacco and alcohol account for 30 times as many deaths 
each year as do illicit drugs. Tobacco alone accounts for over 25 times 
the number of deaths as illicit drugs. 
If we were to count obesity as an addictive problem (as some peo-
ple do), we could add another 16.6 percent to the deaths associated 
with addictive behavior—tobacco, calories, alcohol, and illicit drugs. 
Together they total 39 percent of the nation’s deaths. The conclusion 
seems obvious: we are fighting the wrong drug war. The big health issue 
isn’t illicit drugs, it’s tobacco and obesity. 
The European Paradox 
Some people have asked me, “If smoking and obesity are the real 
issues, why don’t the Europeans (or the Japanese) have health costs 
higher than ours, since they smoke at much higher rates than we do?” It 
is an excellent question for which I do not have a conclusive answer; I 
have only a few ideas to help think about the issue. 
First, if people in Europe or Japan smoked less, the smoking/risk 
data almost guarantee that their health costs would fall. Second, we are 
just beginning to reap the benefits of the gradual decline in smoking 
rates in the United States. 
Further, the Europeans mostly have implicit or explicit rationing 
mechanisms in their health care systems that put caps on costs in a way 
that selectively saves costs due to smoking. Part of this comes from 
the observation that smokers die early in their lives, thus precluding 
their incurring some other potentially expensive diseases (Manning et 
al. 1989). But in most European societies, deaths that would involve 
expensive hospitalization in the United States, cancer treatment, and 
intensive care do not get treated the same way. For example, half of 
all deaths in the United States involve intensive care, whereas in Great 
Britain, only 1 in 10 does (Wunsch et al. 2009). 
Intensive care unit use for cancers is three to four times higher in the 
United States than in Britain and eight times higher for strokes, two of 
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Finally, many Europeans regularly follow what is now known as 
the “Mediterranean” diet, which emphasizes plant-based foods, such 
as fruits and vegetables, whole grains, legumes, and nuts. In a large-
scale randomized trial in which people were assigned to follow either 
the Mediterranean diet or a low-fat diet, two important things emerged 
(Estruch et al. 2013). First, the Mediterranean diet improved health and 
longevity (versus the low-fat diet). Second, because our bodies seem to 
be “wired” otherwise, people didn’t adhere to the low-fat diet, so the 
study became a comparison of the Mediterranean diet versus a stan-
dard diet. The study had such large differences in the primary outcomes 
of cardiac- or stroke-related death that the research was stopped early 
because it became unethical to continue to forbid the low-fat group 
from switching to the Mediterranean diet. 
THE LONG-RUN “FIX” 
Complicated problems seldom have simple solutions. The burdens 
that our lifestyle choices place on our lives and our health care costs 
cannot be solved with a magic bullet. However, there are some practical 
ways to help fix these problems. 
Focus on the Underlying Health Risks 
To address the problem, we almost surely need a massive invest-
ment in public and private resources to find biologically based mea-
sures to help people alter their behaviors, most notably tobacco use and 
poor food choices. Urging people to change their ways will not suf-
fice. We have had modest success in reducing smoking through public 
awareness, restricting smoking in public, higher taxes on cigarettes, and 
more readily available smoking cessation products. 
We have had far less success in reducing obesity. The epidemic 
proportions of increasing obesity attest to this problem. So also do the 
countless ads for weight-loss programs, some based on caloric control, 
planned menus, diets low (or high) in carbohydrates, low-fat diets, bal-
anced diets, and group support. Some products hint at effective weight 








“results not typical” next to the before and after photos of someone who 
appears to have lost a lot of weight. Very few FDA-approved medica-
tions are available for weight loss. This highlights the problem: in order 
to claim that a drug helps people lose weight, the FDA requires scien-
tifically valid proof. Most weight-loss programs can’t sustain the losses 
people achieve initially. Herbal and natural remedies are not subject 
to FDA approval; thus, claims made about these diet aids are not as 
controlled as are those for prescription drugs. The FDA has approved 
several weight-loss drugs, one of which (by prescription) affects the 
brain’s hunger signals. The first over-the-counter weight-loss drug was 
approved in 2007 and works by blocking the body’s ability to absorb 
fat. Therein lies the rub: what goes in must get burned or come out. 
Those who take this drug and eat fatty foods often get a very sudden 
reminder that they have recently consumed fat.7 
For the dangerously obese (defined as having a BMI > 40), a rela-
tively new approach called bariatric surgery shrinks or bypasses the 
stomach so that the person feels full after eating less.8 This works well 
for some people, but it has potential side effects such as acid reflux 
(with overeating), nausea, and vomiting. 
There is an old joke among economists: two economists are walk-
ing down the street, and one sees a $100 bill lying in the gutter. As he 
leans over to pick it up, the other economist admonishes him, “If it 
were a real $100 bill, somebody would have picked it up already.” Diet 
aids are like that—if there were one that really worked and kept weight 
off forever, it would dominate the market. Instead, we see herbs and 
spices, various nonprescription drugs, acupressure and acupuncture, 
group therapy, individual counseling, exercise programs, meditation, 
prayer groups, and surgical interventions. Americans annually spend 
$33 billion on weight-loss products, about $150 per adult per year, yet 
we still gain weight (collectively) at an astonishing rate. The lack of 
success provided by existing weight-control methods tells us that we 
need something new. 
Radically Restructure NIH Research Priorities 
Managing the adverse health consequences (death, illness, injury, 
pain, work loss, productivity loss) and associated medical costs of poor 
lifestyle choices will require a massive investment in basic research to 
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better understand the causes, treatments, and prevention of these key 
addictive and behavioral choices—primarily tobacco and obesity, but 
alcohol abuse as well. In 1965, President Lyndon Johnson declared war 
on heart disease, cancer, and stroke, securing massive increases in fund-
ing through the various National Institutes of Health (NIH) to study the 
causes and cures of these diseases. That effort has paid great dividends 
in reductions of death and morbidity from these diseases. The funding 
priorities of the NIH today show just how far behind we are on the 
issues of tobacco and obesity. The NIH budget provides $30 billion 
total for all NIH endeavors. Of this, $5 billion goes to the National Can-
cer Institute (NCI), $3 billion to the National Heart, Lung and Blood 
Institute (NHLBI), and $1.6 billion for the National Institute of Neuro-
logical Disorders and Stroke (NINDS), adding up to almost a third of 
the NIH budget. 
By contrast, NIH funding for the National Institute on Alcohol 
Abuse and Alcoholism rests at $400 million. The National Institute on 
Drug Abuse received $1 billion in funding in 2009. We have no national 
institute to deal with tobacco addiction or obesity. Although some of the 
NCI, NHLBI, and NINDS funds go toward prevention research, these 
agencies’ research agendas are dominated with “cure” approaches. 
I suggest that one of the best ways to reduce federal and private 
health care spending over the next 50 years would be a massive invest-
ment in federal research to find effective ways to eliminate tobacco 
use and excessive caloric intake (obesity). This cannot succeed if done 
half-heartedly. In 2003 the NIH formed an obesity task force that has 
published and regularly updated a strategic plan to deal with obesity. 
It discusses cross-cutting research and emphasizes the need to deal 
with behavioral modification, pharmacologic approaches, and surgical 
approaches. Astonishingly, these reports have no mention of budgets. 
Not a single word appears to suggest allocation of funds toward reduc-
ing obesity. Nobody is in charge. An old dictum (in a particularly inept 
choice of metaphors in this case) says, “If you assign two people to feed 
a dog, it will starve to death.” That is where the NIH is with obesity. 
In 2000, one study looked at every grant issued by the NIH (across all 
institutes) to estimate the research funding directly focused on tobacco 
and nicotine use (Hughes and Liguori 2000). The 1995 total (their most 
recent year of data) showed $92 million in dedicated research on this 







Therein sits the stark contrast: we spend about a third of the NIH bud-
get on curing heart disease, cancer, and stroke, and we spend less than 
half of 1 percent on prevention associated with tobacco use. Exactly 
how much the NIH is currently devoting to obesity research remains 
unknown, but the fact that its strategic plan for dealing with the problem 
utters not a single word about budgetary commitment speaks volumes. 
Improve K–12 Education 
We have another important tool at our disposal—education. I don’t 
mean provision of specific information about healthy lifestyles, but 
rather general K–12 education and postsecondary education. According 
to the most recent OECD data available (OECD 2015), while the United 
States has increased in recent years in the percentage of the popula-
tion with at least a high school diploma, it ranks 21 among the OECD 
nations in student skills as measured by a standard international test. 
And the higher the level of educational attainment one uses, the worse 
the United States ranks—10th in having some postsecondary education 
and 12th in a completed college degree. A major National Academy of 
Sciences report (2007) highlights these issues. The report emphasizes 
the role of education in the ability of the United States to compete eco-
nomically in a world with rapidly expanding educational attainment in 
many other countries, especially China and India (Phelps 2007). Here I 
wish to emphasize a different issue—the role of education in changing 
peoples’ lifestyle choices. 
I present these data with a small caveat: we can readily observe 
strong associations between educational attainment and healthy life-
styles. What we cannot know for sure is the ultimate cause. Using smok-
ing as an example, we can be fairly sure that adult smoking habits do 
not cause lower educational attainment earlier in life. We actually have 
a decent amount of evidence showing that higher education actually 
shifts people’s lifestyle choices. But there remains a third option—that 
some unmeasured individual characteristic leads both to more educa-
tion and improved lifestyle choices (Fuchs 1982). The most obvious 
factor is differences in the time horizon people hold.9 Those with a long 
time horizon will be more apt to invest in more education and also to 
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My survey of that literature leads me to believe that education is 
the causative factor. If true, then improving K–12 education will lead 
people to acquire healthier lifestyles, which will in turn lead to fewer 
chronic illnesses and lower the rate of growth of future health care 
spending. 
Education and Smoking 
First, look at the simple relationship between smoking and educa-
tional attainment. No matter how it is measured, higher education is 
closely linked to lower smoking rates. Figure 2.11 shows the smoking 
participation rates (smoker vs. nonsmoker) by education. 
Perhaps more importantly, Figure 2.11 shows how smoking rates 
changed after publication of the U.S. surgeon general’s report on smok-
ing (U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare 1964). As Fig-
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ure 2.7 shows, smoking rates began to plummet in 1965, but the change 
did not occur equally across educational levels. As Figure 2.11 shows, 
the rates of those with the least educational attainment changed very 
little from 1965 onward. Those with the highest educational attainment 
had the greatest change. Intermediate levels of education show corre-
spondingly intermediate degrees of change in smoking rates. 
This is powerful information: higher education, coupled with the 
new information about the risks of smoking over time, led to far greater 
reductions in smoking among the most highly educated than for others. 
The operative mechanism seems to be that those with higher education 
were able to better understand the new information about smoking risks 
and incorporate that into their lifestyle choices. 
Education and Obesity 
We can see the same relationships between obesity (as measured 
by BMI) and education. Figure 2.12 shows how educational attainment 
and obesity relate. These data show a steady decline in obesity rates for 
women (defined as ≥ 25) as educational attainment increases. For men, 
the data show a slow upward trend in obesity rates until they obtain two 
years of post–high school education and then strong declines in obesity 
levels for those completing college and beyond. At all levels of educa-
tion, obesity rates are higher for men than for women. For women, obe-
sity rates for those who have a college education and above are about 
half the rates for women with less than a high school education. 
Education and Alcohol 
As noted before, alcohol is a complicated drug, with some posi-
tive and some negative effects. These effects depend on both the type 
of alcohol and the way it is consumed. Figure 2.13 shows that overall 
drinking rates increase with educational attainment, seemingly in con-
trast to the overall patterns seen for smoking and obesity. But within 
the finer detail of Figure 2.13 we can see that education reduces the 
rates of alcohol abuse and binge drinking, the types of drinking that 
lead to poorer health outcomes. Further, when we look at the beverage 
of choice, higher education is linked to a much stronger preference for 
wine and less preference for distilled spirits. So, the beverage of choice 
(wines versus distilled spirits in particular) and the drinking patterns 
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(less binge drinking, less abusive drinking) lead us to the conclusion 
that people with higher education have in fact made healthier lifestyle 
choices. 
CONCLUSION 
Taking aim at our lifestyle choices represents only one of many 
things we need to do to make our health care system efficient and suc-
cessful. Many financial incentive problems exist that also need fixing, 
beginning with the tax subsidy for employer-paid health insurance and 
ending with major reforms in the structure of Medicare and Medicaid. 
I address these elsewhere in Phelps (2010). The Affordable Care Act of 
2010 fixed a few of the problems described in that book, exacerbated 
others, and ignored most of the major issues. Moving from that legisla-
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tion to a system with good protection against financial risk while still 
maintaining patient and provider incentives for efficient use of health 
care resources is a subject too broad to cover in this chapter, but it is one 
that will help define the economic future of the United States. 
Notes 
1. In economics jargon, the income elasticity is about 1.5, which (strangely to some 
people) makes health care a “luxury good” by the usual definition—far from a 
“necessity” or a “human right.” 
2. Other factors also come into play, including income, cigarette prices, and even 
wars. As the graph shows, smoking rises dramatically during wartime—that was 
especially true during World War II, when the Red Cross (and others) gave ciga-
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3. For imperial measurements, use weight in pounds, height in inches, and multiply 
by 703 to correct for the differences between the measuring systems; thus, BMI = 
703 × pounds/(inches × inches). 
4. These data come from Calle et al. (1999), a large prospective study of all-cause 
mortality and BMI. Many other studies exist on this topic; you can find one to give 
almost any answer you want. For me, the prospective design of this study makes it 
the gold standard. It began with a fixed group of people and followed their weights 
and mortality outcomes over time. 
5. Heavy drinking is commonly defined as more than 20 drinks per week. Binge 
drinking has a variety of definitions, the most common being five drinks (four for 
women) within a two-hour period. 
6. The key ingredient appears to be procyanadin (see Corder [2007] for details). For 
those who prefer to avoid alcohol, other foods with high levels of procyanadin 
include chocolate, cranberry juice, pomegranates, and certain types of apples. It 
seems that an apple a day may in fact keep the doctor away. 
7. In computerese, we have “garbage in, garbage out.” Here we have “fat in, fat out.” 
8. For example, to have a BMI of 40, a person measuring 5'6" would have to weigh 
at least 247 pounds, and a person 6'0" would have to weigh at least 294 pounds. 
9. Economists examine this issue by looking at the internal discount rate, the rate at 
which things that occur in the future are valued less. Think about savings behavior 
(as a simple investment) and the interest rate banks will pay you. If they pay 1 
percent above inflation, you are not likely to save much, but if they pay 10 percent 
above inflation, you will save much more. Time discounting works similarly (but 
in the opposite direction)—those with a high discount rate save (or invest) less for 
the future. 
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Do Medical Care and Self-
Care Compete or Complement 
in Health Production? 
Donald J. Meyer 
Western Michigan University 
Modern medical care is a major determinant of one’s health. Many 
of us obtain better health from visiting a doctor when we are sick and, 
when necessary, seeking diagnostic laboratory and imaging tests, medi-
cine, hospital care, and outpatient surgery. Our own self-care is equally 
important for maintaining good health, as are preventative measures we 
take that either reduce the probability of sickness, illness, or accident or 
lower the severity of the health event. Dow, Philipson, and Sala-I-Martin
(1999) cite the importance of both of these health inputs: “Resources 
devoted to extending life may be interpreted not only as medical care 
(e.g., hospital and physician services), but also as expenditures on 
dietary needs, home care, physical exercise, or even time transfers from 
children or spouses at old age” (p. 1360). The question of interest for 
this chapter is, do people use these two factor types more in conjunction 
with each other, or do they generally use one in place of the other? 
One argument is that these two inputs are best used together—that 
is, they are complementary. Becker (2007) examines health as a type 
of human capital and looks at how it fits in with other forms of human 
capital. To do this, he uses a survivor risk model of expected utility. The 
uncertainty in the model refers to how long one lives or survives from 
one period to the next. This survivorship probability depends on the 
level of various health inputs, health shock events, and other factors. 
He notes that the health field is full of complementarities such as that 
between various diseases or health conditions. An increase in the prob-
ability of surviving one disease (due to one form of treatment) enhances 





help survive other diseases. Becker also notes similar complementari-
ties between health and education, between age levels, and between 
health and the discount rate. 
A second argument is that these two inputs are used in competition 
with one another—that is, we tend to substitute one input for the other. 
Consider someone who has been diagnosed with a high blood pressure 
condition. This condition may be treated with better lifestyle habits, 
such as losing weight, increasing regular exercise, and limiting sodium 
intake, or with various types of prescribed blood pressure medications 
and pills. If some medications are newly taken, do you respond by exer-
cising less and eating more salt in your diet since the medicine is now 
taking care of the condition? Or, consider someone who previously had 
no health care or health insurance and now obtains it as a part of the 
Affordable Care Act. Does this person rely more on the modern medical 
care system to take care of his health needs and health level determina-
tion and thus worry less about maintaining a healthy lifestyle? 
The United States spends more per capita on health care than any 
other country. We have some of the most advanced health care technol-
ogies in the world. However, we have higher infant mortality rates and 
a lower life expectancy rate than many other countries (Phelps 2010, 
pp. 6–7). Additionally, we have one of the highest obesity rates in the 
world, as well as low levels of exercise. How much are our lifestyle 
choices linked to a substitution effect of experiencing newer and better 
modern medical care? Can we take measures to reduce this offset effect 
on health levels as new technological advances emerge? 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In the next section, I 
provide background information about good health modeling and pres-
ent some traditional ideas about input substitution and complementar-
ity. The third section argues the need to view demand and production 
of health in a model of uncertainty. This uncertainty model framework 
then gets applied to health with some important differences noted from 
the basic model. I then examine the notion of modern care and self-care 
being substitutes versus complements in this context. The section after 
that examines three papers that contribute to this discussion, and the 
final section offers concluding remarks. 
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BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
As consumers, we often do not think regularly about production 
functions and their related concepts. I envision here a health production 
function, H = f (medical care, self-care, education, family genes, envi-
ronment), for which the first two factors receive the focus or attention 
in this chapter. We are more familiar, perhaps, with our preferences and 
demand for the various goods and services that are in our utility func-
tions. A common health formulation for utility is the function U  = U
(H, Z), where utility depends on one’s health level, H, and the amount 
consumed of a composite or a home-produced good Z. Health is an 
interesting and challenging good to model in this way. As Grossman 
(1972) notes in his seminal article, health is part consumption good 
(we enjoy good health), part input into the production or purchase of 
good Z, and part capital stock or durable good. H is a stock for which 
the level increases through investment and deteriorates over time from 
depreciation. 
I do not go into the determination of selecting an optimal level of 
H (and Z) to maximize utility in this chapter, but I do assume that the 
consumer solves this maximization problem. A unique and important 
feature about H is that it cannot be purchased in the marketplace; that 
is, we cannot specialize in producing Z and then trade some of it for H. 
Whatever H level we wish to consume must also be produced. This val-
idates the importance of focusing on health production and the empha-
sis on the two inputs noted in the chapter and the relationship that exists 
between them. 
For a neoclassical, nonstochastic production function, there are two 
traditional ways to classify two factors or inputs as substitutes, comple-
ments, or neither. One definition is to look at what happens to the mar-
ginal productivity of factor 2 when the decision maker uses a greater 
level of input 1. Two factors are complements when an increase in factor 
1 enhances the marginal productivity of factor 2. Two factors are substi-
tutes when an increase in factor 1 reduces the marginal product of factor 
2. Two factors are neither (or neutral) when the marginal productivity 
of factor 2 has no relation to the level of input 1. So, ditch diggers and 
shovels would be complements if the workers became more productive 






self-scanning devices may be substitutes if the productivity of checkers 
falls as self-scanning devices become available for grocery checkout. 
A second definition involves what happens to the demand for factor 
2 if the price of factor 1 were to increase. Two inputs are complements 
when an increase in the price of factor 1 leads to a reduction in demand 
for factor 2. Two factors are substitutes if an increase in the price of 
factor 1 leads to an increase in demand for factor 2. So, looking at the 
same two examples, ditch diggers and shovels are classified as comple-
ments because an increase in the price of ditch diggers would reduce the 
demand for shovels. Grocery store checkers and self-scanners are clas-
sified as substitutes because an increase in the wage of checkers would 
increase the demand for self-scanning devices. 
Now let’s apply these definitions to health and self-care. If your 
employer provides you with a subsidized health club and personal 
trainer membership, then complementarity suggests that your health 
insurance and medical care become more effective. Or, if you obtain 
medical care through the Affordable Care Act, the substitution effect 
suggests you would rely more on medical care and reduce your effort 
with self-care. While this traditional pair of definitions is useful and 
somewhat helpful in thinking about how medical care and self-care are 
related, I argue next that we need to consider health production and 
consumption in a context of uncertainty and model it as such. That is, 
random health events, health losses, or disease outbreak must be con-
sidered to affect H along with the first two inputs and other factors 
already considered. 
UNCERTAINTY CONSIDERATIONS AND CONTEXT
The process of attempting to attain one’s desired health stock is 
subject to much randomness and uncertainty. Health losses are possi-
ble, owing to contracting any one of a number of debilitating diseases, 
or suffering relapses during the recovery process. Automobile or other 
types of accidents can drastically alter one’s health status in a matter 
of moments. How one will respond to prescribed medical treatment 
is never certain. Dardanoni and Wagstaff (1990) note these sources 
of health uncertainty and also the presence of imperfect information 
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regarding assessment of either the effectiveness of medical care or of 
one’s health level itself. Health decision making is subject to random 
influences, and determination of possible outcomes and the associated 
probabilities is certainly a subjective evaluation process. It is essen-
tial that the relation between modern health treatment and self-care be 
examined within the context of this uncertain environment. 
As I address some of the basics for decision making under uncer-
tainty, I will highlight the ideas of risk and risk aversion, and also the 
idea of turning to organized insurance markets as a way to shift risk 
to a third party. I then examine self-care, where I refer to the ideas of 
self-protection and self-insurance. I first review this material in general 
and then apply it to our specific health setting, incorporating some of 
the unique features of health. I will then summarize what is predicted or 
known regarding the substitution or complementary nature of medical 
care and self-care. 
Consider the simple expected utility, additive formulation for a 
risky setting: Wf = W0 + V − L, where Wf is final wealth, W0 is non-
random initial wealth, V is the value of a risky asset, and L is random 
loss associated with V. V could be one’s house, automobile, life or 
earning potential, or one’s health stock. V is subject to losses, L, of 
uncertain magnitude. Wealth at the end of the period reflects whatever 
losses regarding L are incurred. It is generally assumed that one can 
list all possible outcomes for L and the associated probabilities for all 
the outcomes. For simplicity, it has often assumed that losses follow a 
Bernoulli distribution; that is, have loss L1 with probability p or no loss 
with probability 1− p. 
How does one view facing this uncertain value for V? Risk aversion 
is the norm, where risk aversion means a distaste or disutility for the 
randomness one is facing. A risk-averse person is generally willing to 
pay for a reduction in risk; this leads to a basic trade-off between risk 
and return or income. Market insurance is a common way to shift risk 
to an outside agent for a fee or payment. 
The basic insurance contract has two main features: 1) the indem-
nity function, which describes what the insurance company will pay the 
policy holder for various levels of L; and 2) the insurance payment or 
premium. The premium paid directly depends not on the value of L but 
on the expected value of L. Common forms for insurance policies are 





ible or copay rate that is selected by the policy holder. Deductible insur-
ance has the desirable feature of offering greater coverage for high-loss 
values, but it offers less coverage when losses are small and easier to be 
covered by the individual. 
Insurance policies can offer larger or smaller levels of coverage. 
Premiums reflect the level of protection that is selected in the policy. 
The premium paid for a policy is generally equal to or larger than the 
expected loss for L. A premium equal to the expected loss is said to be 
“actuarially fair”—that is, the insurance company will break even on 
average for such policies. The amount collected in premiums will just 
cover what is paid out for losses on average. Premiums are often higher 
than this break-even level to cover overhead and related costs of provid-
ing service. The fundamental theorem of insurance coverage states that 
if offered insurance at an actuarially fair rate, all risk-averse persons 
will choose full or 100 percent coverage. 
Self-care measures can be taken in conjunction with market insur-
ance or when formal insurance is not available in the marketplace. Self-
insurance refers to undertaking an expenditure that lowers the size of 
L, and self-protection refers to undertaking an expenditure to lower 
the probability of incurring a given loss. As Ehrlich and Becker (1972) 
note, some self-care choices fall in the self-insurance category, some 
are of the self-protection variety, and some have aspects of both types. 
Common examples of self-insurance are installing fire sprinklers to 
guard against fire damage, using sturdier building materials in earth-
quake- and hurricane-prone areas, and installing a tracking device in 
a car to make recovery easier when stolen. Self-protection measures 
include installing home security protection to help keep burglars out, 
efforts to reduce the probability of a terrorist attack, or using a steering 
wheel locking device to reduce the chance of theft. Ehrlich and Becker 
suggest that a talented lawyer serves to reduce both the chance of a 
criminal conviction and possibly the severity of the sentencing. 
Ehrlich and Becker (1972) is a highly cited article and is founda-
tional in the self-care literature. The authors look at the market insur-
ance option as a means of risk reduction along with the ideas of self-
insurance and self-protection. They suggest that when addressing the 
need to limit one’s risk position, one should look at all three of these 
together, as each serves to deal with loss reduction or loss likelihood in 
one fashion or another. They also note that both market insurance and 
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self-insurance work to shift income toward the loss state and hence tend 
to be substitutes for each other. 
Self-protection, on the other hand, reduces income in both the loss 
and no-loss state by the cost of the activity, offering the benefit of reduc-
ing the probability of the negative event. It is considerably more com-
plex in its effect on the risk problem and offers less clear-cut results or 
findings. Ehrlich and Becker (1972) find that self-protection and market 
insurance tend to be complementary in nature rather than substitutes, 
with the strength of the complementarity depending on market condi-
tions. Many others have followed up this initial work with a focus on 
self-protection, owing to its more challenging nature and complexity. 
Dionne and Eeckhoudt (1985) explore the relationship between 
increasing risk aversion and self-insurance and self-protection. The 
first idea is expected: as people become more risk averse, their level of 
self-insurance increases. However, the authors find that self-protection 
is not monotonically related to the level of risk aversion. They look for 
conditions that would allow more precise findings about how increased 
risk aversion and self-protection are related, but few clean and intuitive 
results were able to be reached. They did look at the relation for two 
specific utility preferences: a quadratic utility maximizer and a logarith-
mic utility function. For two logarithmic expected utility maximizers 
with different levels of risk aversion, they find that the more risk-averse 
person actually chose less self-protection. 
Briys and Schlesinger (1990) build on these two papers and look 
further at risk aversion and self-protection and self-insurance. They 
broaden the known results for self-insurance by showing that under 
state-dependent utility and in the presence of background risk, self-
insurance and risk aversion continue to be directly related. The authors 
make the revealing observation that self-protection can be broken down 
into a combination of a mean-preserving spread and a mean-preserving 
contraction. The spread occurs at a lower level of the decision maker’s 
income, and the contraction takes place at a higher income level. 
Eeckhoudt and Gollier (2005) apply a different uncertainty concept, 
prudence, to the analysis of self-protection. Prudence, which exists 
when the third derivative of the utility function is positive, differenti-
ates between the risk occurring in the upper versus lower end of the 
income distribution. The authors show that prudence, as well as the 




cial in self-protection determination. Meyer and Meyer (2011) further 
clarify with additional analysis the role that prudence plays for self-
protection. Their findings hinge on the size of the risk increase (in the 
lower end of income distribution) versus the size of the risk decrease 
(in the upper end of income distribution). Meyer and Meyer’s results 
use a risk technique introduced by Diamond and Sitglitz (1974), which 
considerably simplifies the analysis and allows for generalization. For 
example, the loss distribution was allowed to be more general and not 
required to follow the often-assumed Bernoulli distribution. 
Finally, Snow (2011) looks at self-protection and self-insurance 
from a nonexpected utility framework. He integrates the concept of 
ambiguity and ambiguity aversion to his analysis of self-care. Ambi-
guity exists when there is uncertainty about the probability of the loss 
occurring. In the expected utility model, the probabilities concerning 
losses are assumed to be known with certainty. He shows that optimal 
levels of self-protection and self-insurance are higher in the presence of 
ambiguity (than with none) or when people are more ambiguity averse. 
A significant difference between Snow’s and much of the prior results is 
that his findings are similar for both self-protection and self-insurance, 
rather than differing considerably in the literature that uses expected 
utility formulation. 
So what does decision making under uncertainty—in particular, 
market insurance, self-insurance, and self-protection—have to do with 
the relationship between modern medical care and self-care in the health 
setting? The answer lies in considering how these concepts apply to the 
analysis of making decisions under health uncertainty. The particular 
manner in which health markets function turns out to be critical in this 
discussion. First, it is important to recognize the close link between 
health insurance and modern medical care. The typical health insurance 
policy covers a large number of medical health care items and proce-
dures. Health insurance is essentially prepaid medical care, as it covers 
most of your medical expenses. Unlike other forms of insurance, you 
do not receive monetary payment from the insurance company based 
on the health loss that you have experienced. Instead, you seek medical 
treatment for your health issue, and then insurance pays much of these 
medical bills. Self-care undertakings and efforts are typically not cov-
ered by one’s health insurance. Self-protection and self-insurance strat-
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Approximately 50 percent of U.S. residents receive health insur-
ance and medical care through their employers. The roots for this pro-
gram go back to the 1940s, when firms, which were facing both wage 
controls and a shortage of workers in World War II, started offering 
health insurance as a nontaxable employee benefit. The idea was posi-
tively received by workers and has become integrated as part of our 
national health care system. Even so, a sizable percentage of Americans 
have had to do without health insurance. The Affordable Care Act is 
working to reduce this number, as those who previously had no health 
insurance are able to obtain it through their state health exchange sys-
tem or through the Medicaid expansions. 
As an example of a typical health insurance policy and the medical 
care that is covered, I will examine the policy that I have at Western 
Michigan University. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan provides a 
Preferred Provider Organization policy for university employees. This 
type of policy allows one to seek medical care from any provider desired 
but offers a financial incentive to seek treatment from a provider who is 
part of the network or system. My policy covers most types of medical 
care, including primary or specialist care visits, diagnostic or imaging 
tests, prescription drugs, outpatient center and surgeon services, emer-
gency and urgent care treatment, and hospital care. The policy carefully 
gives all the deductibles and copays that must be paid in the different 
situations. Some medical treatments, such as acupuncture, cosmetic 
surgery, and weight loss programs, are not covered by the policy. 
Several features of health insurance work to reinforce this close tie 
between insurance and medical care. First, health insurance typically 
covers routine medical care, such as a doctor’s visit or an antibiotics 
prescription. Most other forms of insurance are more of a “catastrophic 
coverage” nature only and do not cover the routine expenditures. Sec-
ond, the monetary indemnity payment received from non-health types 
of insurance policies is based on the loss that is experienced regarding 
your risky asset. Money payment is sent directly to the person who 
experiences roof hail damage, based on an independent assessment of 
the damage. For health insurance, no such money payment is received; 
rather, the health care provider receives payment for health services 
rendered in treating the health condition. Lastly, the insurance relation, 
in reality, is between the insurance company and the health care pro-
vider—in most loss instances the patient has little direct involvement in 
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the exchange. All of these serve to strengthen the connection between 
health insurance and modern medical care. 
Second, self-care in the health setting—self-protection and self-
insurance—is reflected mainly in wise lifestyle choices that involve eat-
ing, exercise, tobacco and alcohol usage, and stress management. Stick-
ing to a healthy diet and controlling one’s weight reduces the chances 
of coronary disease due to high blood pressure or of developing type 
II diabetes. By exercising and keeping fit, one lowers the chances of 
developing any number of negative health issues and also enhances 
recovery when illness develops or surgery is required. Overuse of alco-
hol or tobacco products has negative effects on your health, and such 
products should be eliminated or used in moderation. Wise lifestyle 
choices can both reduce the likelihood of a bad health event and reduce 
the loss if such an event does occur. 
The primary question of interest for this chapter is whether medical 
care and lifestyle choices (self-care) are more of a complementary or 
substitution type of relationship. The purpose of this section has been 
to prove that this must be examined within a risk and uncertainty con-
text using the related concepts of market insurance, self-protection, and 
self-insurance. This leads to a much richer and more relevant definition 
of substitutes and complements in production of health than the simple 
neoclassical production formulation discussed earlier. 
So, where do I stand on this question? It remains an empirical 
issue—both the substitution and complementarity effects are legitimate 
and are possible in every situation; the size of each effect will depend on 
the particular setting one is in and in how medical or self-care is being 
measured. Both types of care are broad concepts, there is not likely to 
be just a single relationship between them. Substitution between medi-
cal care and self-care is a strong force and is more likely to be readily 
apparent. Complementarity is more subtle and will likely be more dif-
ficult to observe, and its statistical significance is less clear. As Dow, 
Philipson, and Sala-I-Martin (1999) note, “Although complementarity 
induced by competing risks applies very generally, the important ques-
tion for evaluating public health programs is whether its empirical mag-
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A REVIEW OF THREE EMPIRICAL PAPERS 
In this section I review three papers that focus on the relationship 
between some aspect of the modern medical care system together with 
different features of self-care. The first paper looks at implementation 
in developing countries of the Expanded Programme on Immunization 
(EPI) of the United Nations. The expected immunization of children 
against the six deadliest childhood diseases caused mothers to take bet-
ter care of their children in general, which supports the complemen-
tarity effect. The next paper examines the effect Medicare had on the 
health behaviors of new Medicare enrollees in the United States. The 
authors find evidence of ex ante moral hazard, or the substitution effect 
of those receiving Medicare taking less good care of their health. The 
final paper discusses the effect that statin drugs, which are very success-
ful in treating high cholesterol and heart disease, have on the lifestyle 
choices of those using the statins. Strong evidence for substitution is 
noted, as people may feel able to get away with a less healthy lifestyle 
given they have this “get out of jail free card.” Some positive, though 
more uneven, evidence of significant complementarity was also found. 
Dow, Philipson, and Sala-I-Martin (1999) examine household data 
for four African countries—Malawi, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimba-
bwe—for children who are expected to receive vaccinations for mea-
sles, neonatal tetanus, polio, whooping cough, diphtheria, and tubercu-
losis. The authors hypothesize that women will seek better nutrition and 
other health inputs when they believe that their children will be inocu-
lated against these potentially fatal childhood diseases. The researchers 
use birth weight as the indicator of maternal care. 
Using data on the children, ordinary least squares estimates are first 
calculated, followed by estimates from present family fixed effects and 
lagged instrumental fixed effects models, owing to concern for possible 
unobserved heterogeneity in the data. Other safeguards and robustness 
checks are implemented as well. The authors consistently find comple-
mentarity between the care taken by mothers and the expected vaccina-
tions against the diseases. 
Dow, Philipson, and Sala-I-Martin (1999) argue for the significance 
of these complementarity effects in health mortalities programs, such as 
the EPI in developing countries. Treatment for one set of diseases has 
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positive spillover effects on the mortality rates of other health issues. 
If one were to consider the marginal benefit and marginal costs of the 
treatment or programs in isolation from each other, then erroneous con-
clusions would be reached regarding implementation levels of these 
treatments. For this particular health setting or environment, it seems 
that complementarity is evident, real, and sizable, and it needs to be 
incorporated into the health analysis. 
Dave and Kaestner (2009) find strong evidence of substitution away 
from healthy lifestyle choice in response to new availability and lower 
costs of medical provisions from Medicare. They identify direct or ex 
ante moral hazard effect in conjunction with a secondary indirect effect. 
This so-called doctor effect is because increased physician contact from 
Medicare alters information concerning the benefits of self-care leading 
to better lifestyle choices. Dave and Kaestner estimate both of these 
countervailing effects and in general find significance for both. 
The authors look at three lifestyle choice behaviors separately for 
both males and females—exercise, smoking, and alcohol use. Results 
for men are largely statistically significant and show that Medicare led 
to a worsening of healthy lifestyle choices. For the sample of males the 
authors find a decrease in the probability of vigorous physical exer-
cise, higher prevalence of daily smoking along with increased cigarette 
consumption, and an increase in probable alcohol use, including daily. 
The same estimates for women are generally statistically insignificant, 
although Medicare is generally associated with a worsening of lifestyle 
choices. 
Kaestner, Darden, and Lakdawalla (2014) search for both substitu-
tion and complementarity effects on lifestyle choice variables due to 
statin drug use. Statins have been shown to significantly reduce car-
diovascular disease and health complications due to high cholesterol. 
One may be tempted to forgo costly lifestyle choices known to combat 
high cholesterol and related issues while on a statin prescription. The 
complementarity effect, on the other hand, suggests that if statin use 
decreases the problems related to heart disease, one has an increased 
incentive to make healthier choices that reduce the mortality from other 
diseases. 
The substitution effect is seen by an increase in the body mass index 
and the likelihood of being obese, an increase in moderate alcohol use 
by men, and a decrease in exercise rates for women. The authors also 
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find some evidence of complementarity, however, in the form of higher 
physical activity for males and greater use of preventative medicines, 
such as blood pressure medication and aspirin, for both genders. 
Furthermore, Kaestner, Darden, and Lakdawalla (2014) write, 
“There is a general concern that statin use may adversely affect health 
behaviors that substitute for pharmaceutical treatment of hyperlipid-
emia. If there is substitution of statins for a healthy lifestyle, then the 
efficacy of statin use may be compromised and statin use may result in 
a greater incidence of disease that is unrelated to cholesterol, but associ-
ated with a healthy lifestyle (diet and exercise)” (p. 162). 
CONCLUDING THOUGHTS 
There is a need for additional empirical work that looks for the pos-
sible presence and magnitude of both the substitution and complemen-
tarity effects as we continue to gather evidence and sort out the con-
nection between medical care and self-care. Abrokwah, Callison, and 
Meyer (2015) examine the rollout of nationalized health care in Ghana 
in 2004. Tentatively, after the rollout they not only find evidence for the 
substitution toward medical care away from alternative or traditional 
care but also observe complementarity between some specific forms of 
alternative or traditional care and medical care. 
Furthermore, as already noted, complementarities create spillover 
effects due to competing risks in the survival model. As Dow, Philip-
son, and Sala-I-Martin (1999) suggest, the marginal benefit of investing 
in lowering the mortality rate for one disease can increase as the sur-
vival rates for other diseases or health conditions increase. The decision 
maker needs to recognize the private benefit from this positive external-
ity when selecting his or her optimal mix of health inputs. Incorporating 
this on an individual basis will strengthen health as a positive external-
ity for overall society as well. Every one of us benefits as a larger per-
centage of people seek and reach good health status. On the flip side, 
the negative externalities resulting from obesity, excessive spending in 
the last few months of life, and poor lifestyle can affect everyone, too. 
To more fully benefit from these positive spillovers, measures could 




and that limit excessive substitution between the inputs. For example, 
through various forms of media or advertising, people can be encour-
aged to prepare healthy meals or to engage in exercise. Visually por-
traying a group of bicyclists or runners laughing and having a good time 
or showing a family having quality time preparing and eating a meal 
together can strengthen the positive consumption feature that good 
health provides. This would not only increase health levels of individu-
als, but on a larger scale could also help reduce our excessive health 
spending and increase our national health performance measures. 
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and “Bending the Curve” 
John H. Goddeeris 
Michigan State University 
“It’s important for us to bend the cost curve . . . because the system 
we have right now is unsustainable . . .” 
—President Barack Obama, Washington Post, July 22, 2009 
WHAT CURVE AND WHY BEND IT? 
The need to “bend the curve” is a constant refrain in discussions 
of health care policy. President Obama emphasized it as one of his two 
major objectives in promoting health care reform, the other being to 
greatly increase the number of insured. Numerous academic studies, 
newspaper articles, and blog posts have debated whether the Afford-
able Care Act (ACA) will succeed in bending the curve and discussed 
additional steps that could help. Everyone seems to agree that bending 
the curve is something we must do. 
So, what is this curve that everyone wants to bend? Those who use 
the expression are not always explicit about what they mean, but one 
possibility is the curve showing the time trend of the share of gross 
domestic product (GDP) devoted to health care, as in Figure 4.1. This 
curve is not exactly smooth, especially over the last two decades, but 
the long-term trend is upward, with national health expenditures rising 
from 5.2 percent of GDP in 1960 to 17.5 percent in 2014. Clearly there 
is some indication that this curve has already been bent, as the share 
of GDP has been essentially flat since 2009. Nonetheless, government 
forecasters still expect the share to rise to 19.6 percent by 2024 (Keehan 
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It may seem obvious that we should want to see a permanent plateau 
in the curve in Figure 4.1, but not everyone would agree. Economists 
Robert Hall and Charles Jones (2007) have argued that as our standard 
of living improves (they expect, perhaps optimistically, a return to more 
traditional levels of economic growth), it is perfectly natural that we 
would devote a larger share of our resources to longer lives and better 
health. According to their models, 30 percent of GDP devoted to health 
by 2050 may be just what we want. 
Given the nature of our political system, the curve that may need to 
be bent more urgently concerns the part of health care spending financed 
through government. Although the United States arguably has the low-
est level of government involvement in its health care system among 
advanced countries, our government’s share of total health spending 
was already at 47 percent in 2013. 
The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) has for a number of years 
warned about the challenge that health care spending growth poses for 
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as of June 2015 of federal spending (excluding interest on the debt) sep-
arated into components, assuming current law remains in place (CBO 
2015). While the recent slowdown in the growth of health spending 
has had a favorable impact on the budget, the figure shows that major 
health programs are still projected to claim a larger share of GDP over 
time, growing at a faster rate than Social Security. The projected decline 
relative to the economy of other noninterest spending, which includes 
national defense, may also prove difficult to accomplish. 
Furthermore, over the long run, while population aging and the 
expansion of coverage under health care reform are also important 
factors, much of the growth of federal health care spending is about 
increases in spending on a per beneficiary basis, what the CBO calls 
“excess cost growth.” Projecting out to the year 2040, the CBO attri-
butes 45 percent of the growth of major health programs relative to 
GDP to excess cost growth (CBO 2015, p. 25).1 
One response to these projections, in line with the Hall and Jones 
(2007) findings, is that if they prove to be correct we must simply find 
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the necessary revenue, because we place a high and increasing value 
on the improvements in health made possible by rising health spend-
ing. Such a response seems to underplay the political difficulties of sig-
nificantly increasing the share of GDP taken in taxes, as well as the 
competing pressures to increase other forms of spending, such as on 
defense, homeland security, education, and infrastructure. 
In addition, there is a widely shared view that we are not getting 
enough from the resources we currently devote to health care—that we 
ought to be able to slow the growth of health spending without signifi-
cant sacrifice. The United States spends far and away the largest share 
of GDP on health care of any country, yet it lags behind other advanced 
countries in such health indicators as life expectancy and infant mortal-
ity. Researchers at Dartmouth College and others have also found large 
differences in health spending per capita by region within the United 
States that are difficult to explain, and little or no indication that higher-
spending regions achieve superior outcomes by spending more (Fisher 
et al. 2003a,b). 
Understanding all the reasons for international and interregional 
differences is challenging and remains an active area of research. 
Nonetheless, in light of political realities and our budgetary situation, it 
seems safe to conclude that one way or another, the growth of per capita 
spending on health care will be bent downward relative to its long-run 
trend. 
This chapter is not about predicting how we will reduce the growth 
of health care spending, nor is it an argument for a single magic solu-
tion that we should adopt to eliminate the problem. Reducing spend-
ing growth in a sensible way will surely involve a number of different 
strategies. I will focus on something I and many others think is one 
important component of the appropriate solution: changing the way that 
providers of health care are paid. More specifically, I will argue that 
we should move away from payment on a fee-for-service basis toward 
more “global” payment methods, paying provider organizations risk-
adjusted but largely prospectively set amounts per enrollee. 
Medicare is a leader in pursuing this sort of payment reform, through 
its experimentation with accountable care organizations (ACOs). Given 
Medicare’s involvement as a government program, it is interesting to 
ask whether a movement toward global payment inevitably leads to 
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whether it can be a step toward a more effective market-based system 
with a stronger role for competition and consumer choice. The issues 
get rather complex, but as I will discuss, I am somewhat optimistic that 
competition among ACOs (and other sorts of health insurance arrange-
ments) is possible, and is indeed the most promising approach to mak-
ing the market work better. 
Bending the cost curve will continue to be very challenging. At the 
end of the chapter, I briefly discuss one issue I believe we will need to 
confront. Even if a well-designed competitive system is successful at 
eliminating truly wasteful spending, keeping the growth of spending at 
an acceptable level will require that we recognize and accept that not 
all care that offers any benefit, regardless of cost, should be provided. 
BACKGROUND: HEALTH CARE MARKETS AND 
FEE-FOR-SERVICE 
As a general rule, markets work well when consumers are freely 
spending their own money and can reasonably judge the quality of 
what they are buying. In that setting, producers compete to produce the 
things that consumers want, and to survive they must sell them at the 
lowest sustainable prices. A perennial question in health care econom-
ics is whether health care is different from other forms of economic 
activity in ways that have important implications for how well markets 
can work. 
Early on, Kenneth Arrow (1963) clarified some of the most impor-
tant peculiarities of health care markets, arising from the unpredictabil-
ity of medical needs and the imbalance of technical knowledge between 
providers and consumers of care. Perhaps the most fundamental imped-
iment to a textbook competitive market is that consumers want to be 
insulated from financial considerations when they are making deci-
sions about health care for themselves or their loved ones, especially 
when the stakes are high and the circumstances are already stressful. In 
part this is ordinary risk aversion—a willingness to pay something (an 
insurance premium) to be protected from uncertain but potentially large 
bills that could arise from circumstances beyond one’s control. But it 






are often made. It is perfectly rational, for example, to not want to think 
about money when making decisions about a spouse with cancer. As a 
result, while there can be an important role for consumer choice and 
consumer incentives in health care, consumers cannot be expected to 
constrain wasteful spending at the point of service in the same way they 
do in other markets. 
While the rise of managed care in the 1990s promoted experimenta-
tion with different methods of payment to health care providers, fee-for-
service remains the predominant way that they are paid. Alternatives to 
fee-for-service are most likely to be used by health maintenance orga-
nizations (HMOs), which cover a relatively small share of the popula-
tion. For example, in 2015 only about 20 percent of Medicare enrollees 
were covered by HMOs (Jacobson et al. 2015). Among workers with 
employer-sponsored insurance, only 24 percent were in either HMOs or 
related but less restrictive point-of-service plans (Claxton et al. 2015). 
And even HMOs often use fee-for-service methods to pay providers. 
Fee-for-service is the way we pay most other service providers that 
we deal with, be they lawyers, plumbers, or hairdressers, so why is it 
a problem in health care? A key difference with health care is that we 
are typically not the ones paying at the point of service, or we are pay-
ing only a small fraction of the total bill. Our doctors have a financial 
incentive to recommend more services as long as payment exceeds the 
marginal cost of production, and if we are insured we have little or no 
financial incentive to question their advice. 
Other issues might have more to do with the way fee-for-service 
medicine is currently practiced and administered than with the method 
itself. Spending time with patients to evaluate their needs, counsel them 
about making lifestyle changes, or coordinate care among other doctors 
is generally not as well rewarded as running tests and performing pro-
cedures. Some valuable services are often not remunerated at all, such 
as a doctor communicating with a patient by phone or e-mail, or a nurse 
talking to a pharmacist about a patient’s medications. 
Perhaps we don’t need to abandon fee-for-service, we just need to 
fix it, to pay for the right things at the right rates. But what would an 
ideal fee-for-service system look like? Congress and Medicare admin-
istrators devoted a lot of effort to answering that question back in the 
1980s, when they worked to create a more rational system of payments 
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(Hsiao et al. 1988) that arrived at the Resource Based Relative Value 
Scale (RBRVS), which was implemented in the early 1990s and, with 
modifications, is still in use today (Ginsburg 2012). The intent of the 
RBRVS is that payments for services be proportionate to the costs of 
producing them. The goal seems to be to create an environment that 
is “neutral” with regard to incentives, to let physicians’ decisions be 
guided by clinical considerations rather than economic ones. 
But the “cost” of a service is by no means unambiguously defined 
or easily measured. For example, for services that require equipment 
with high fixed costs, such as magnetic resonance imaging exams, the 
average cost per unit of service depends heavily on the volume of ser-
vices, and average cost may diverge considerably from the economi-
cally relevant marginal cost. What cost should we be trying to match 
in setting a payment rate? The minimum average cost achieved by a 
provider operating at optimum capacity is one possible target (assum-
ing we can determine what it is), but paying only that much might also 
undesirably limit patient access in geographic areas that cannot support 
the volume of services necessary to bring costs down to that level.2
Paying more creates a profit opportunity that can lead to excessive use. 
To take another quite simple example, what is the cost of sending an 
e-mail to a patient? An e-mail requires some time and effort, which 
represents a real cost, but the amount of effort is hardly uniform across 
messages. Any flat rate per e-mail would leave payment unrelated to the 
effort expended. 
Those involved with RBRVS know that it is difficult technically— 
and politically—to set payments in a neutral way (Ginsburg 2012). For 
example, the apparent bias in the payment system toward procedures 
and away from evaluation and management services—an issue that the 
RBRVS was intended to address from the beginning—remains a con-
cern. I submit that in any fee-for-service system there will inevitably 
be services that are profitable at the margin and therefore encouraged, 
and other valuable services that cost more than they return in payment. 
Furthermore, even if we could be neutral, a fee-for-service system 
has other shortcomings. If doctors can expect to be paid the reasonable 
cost of whatever services they provide, they have no positive financial 
incentive to maintain and improve the patient’s health in the least costly 
way. When they are being paid for each service and the patient is not 






(or even zero) benefit care. One of the things that many doctors may 
like about fee-for-service is that it allows them to act as independent 
practitioners and doesn’t require them to collaborate too closely with 
anyone else, but that is really a weakness from a social perspective. It 
is difficult to create incentives for collaboration under fee-for-service. 
In a New York Times article, Bogdanich and McGinty (2011) pro-
vide an instructive example. When a patient undergoes a chest CT scan, 
it is very common for some hospitals to perform two scans consecu-
tively, one without dye and the other with dye injected for contrast into 
the patient’s veins. Radiologists say there is very rarely a clinical reason 
for doing consecutive scans, but in some hospitals when a chest scan 
is done, a second one follows more than 80 percent of the time. The 
aggregate amounts of money involved make this example almost trivial 
in the big picture of health care spending, and the extra payment may 
not have been the primary motivation for doing the second scan, but 
fee-for-service payment certainly does not discourage the practice. Of 
greater concern in this instance is that performing a second CT scan 
exposes the patient to additional radiation. 
Fee-for-service payment systems can be made more rational, and 
government and private payers seek to do that all the time. Extra pay-
ments or penalties can be added for meeting or not meeting certain per-
formance goals. Guidelines can be written that define the conditions 
under which particular services are reimbursable. Major capital invest-
ments can be subject to regulatory approval. But this also illustrates part 
of the problem with fee-for-service. Because of the perverse financial 
incentives that it creates, it requires these sorts of additional regula-
tions—or one might say, micromanagement by payers—if spending 
growth is to be limited. 
PAY FOR OUTPUT, NOT INPUT: BUNDLING 
To an economist, the things that are reimbursed under a fee-for-
service system—the well-baby visit, the flu shot, the MRI, or even the 
surgical repair of a damaged knee—are more like inputs than outputs. 
Individuals care about maintaining and improving health, and health 







Payment Reform and “Bending the Curve” 59 
more directly for outputs, then it seems preferable to do that. Paying for 
output appropriately should then make it possible to leave the decisions 
about inputs to the knowledgeable professionals and limit the amount 
of bureaucratic interference. 
The principle of paying for output rather than input makes sense, 
but there are plenty of practical complications. A fundamental question 
is, what output should we pay for? One important idea that I will touch 
on only briefly is bundling by episode of care (Komisar, Feder, and 
Ginsburg 2011), which goes beyond payments for individual services 
to make a single payment for a package of care. Limited forms of bun-
dling are already common in our system. For example, the diagnosis-
related group payment system for inpatient hospital care that Medicare 
began using in the 1980s makes a single payment to a hospital for an 
admission based on the patient’s diagnosis. Making a single payment to 
an obstetrician to cover prenatal care, delivery, and postpartum care is 
another kind of bundle. These examples stop short of bringing all pro-
viders of care (such as physicians and hospitals) into the same bundle, 
so they do not create incentives for collaboration across providers or 
for combining all the elements of care in an efficient way, as a more 
inclusive bundle might do. 
One key issue with bundling is how to define an episode. Medi-
care is in the early stages of an initiative mandated by the Affordable 
Care Act called Bundled Payments for Care Improvement (BPCI). For 
the most part, BPCI defines episodes around certain types of inpatient 
admissions. It is working with several different bundling models, but 
some go well beyond the diagnosis-related group hospital payment sys-
tem, in a positive direction, by defining the episode to begin prior to 
hospitalization and to extend for a period of time afterward, and by 
including all types of care in the same bundled payment (Cassidy 2015). 
Some of the basic questions about bundling, such as how to deal 
with differences in severity across patients and how to reward quality 
of care, arise also with more global payment, which I will discuss next. 
For now I will suggest three reasons why bundling by episode seems 
less than ideal as the predominant way of paying for care. First, not all 
care can be readily grouped into episodes. Analyzing Medicare data, 
Cutler and Ghosh (2012) find that even if every inpatient stay and the 
outpatient services related to it are classified as part of an episode, only 






and related point is that episode-based payment does not by itself create 
incentives to keep patients healthy so that episodes are avoided. Indeed, 
it may create financial incentives to organize care—or at least the way 
that care is reported—so as to increase the number of episodes. Third, 
if we wish to have a system in which incentives to optimize quality and 
cost are generated through the exercise of consumer choice, as in more 
standard market settings, episode-based payment may not be the best 
way to do so.3 
COMPREHENSIVE CARE AS THE BASIS FOR PAYMENT 
Good health is the output that we ultimately care about the most. 
We want the best care when episodes of ill health happen, but prevent-
ing them would be even better. Therefore, we might contemplate going 
beyond payment for episodes of care and consider making a single pay-
ment to an organization responsible for all of an individual’s care. 
This idea of paying health care organizations on a “capitation” 
basis, a fixed amount per person covered, is not new. Early examples of 
“prepaid group practice” in the United States go all the way back to the 
1930s, and the most successful one developed into Kaiser Permanente, 
a health plan that today has more than 10 million enrollees nationwide. 
During the 1990s, payers and providers experimented rather extensively 
with capitation as a basis for payment, but a backlash against managed 
care led to a decline in its use in favor of a return to fee-for-service. 
The backlash came from both consumers and doctors. For consum-
ers, the big concern is that if providers incur costs but gain no addi-
tional revenue by providing more services, then they have an incentive 
to skimp on quality and to withhold costly but valuable care. For doc-
tors, the main concerns depend on whether it is they, either individually 
or in groups, who are accepting capitation payments. If they are, then 
they may be taking on a great deal of risk for things that are beyond 
their control. What happens if a doctor enrolls a set of patients and an 
unusual fraction of them suffer costly illnesses or injuries despite the 
doctor’s best efforts? Then the aggregate payment, which was expected 
to be adequate under normal circumstances, will not be sufficient to 
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With a large enough group of enrollees who are representative of 
the population from which they are drawn, the more or less random 
events that lead some people to incur high medical expenditures and 
others low can be expected to average out. Indeed, the ability to pool 
risks in a large population is what makes it possible for an insurance 
company to offer coverage at a price that people are willing to pay, 
without the insurance company itself being subject to excessive risk. 
But the population of patients that a single doctor, or even a group of 
doctors, is capable of serving may not be large enough to reduce the risk 
to an acceptable level. 
Doctors and groups of doctors are understandably reluctant to 
accept capitation payment, especially full capitation, which makes 
them responsible for all the costs of a patient’s care. If they work with 
an HMO or other organization that is itself accepting capitation pay-
ment and pays the doctors using fee-for-service, their concern becomes 
one of excessive pressure or interference from the HMO to limit costs. 
The Accountable Care Organization Idea 
Capitation remains a dirty word among many health care providers, 
and for many consumers the title HMO has negative connotations. A
somewhat different idea and a new term has emerged among those who 
want to see providers accept responsibility for comprehensive care for 
defined populations. The title “Accountable Care Organization” (ACO) 
even made its way into the language of the Affordable Care Act.4 
Section 3022 of the ACA discusses a Medicare Shared Savings 
Program that “promotes accountability for a patient population and co-
ordinates items and services under parts A and B, and encourages invest-
ment in infrastructure and redesigned care processes for high quality 
and efficient service delivery.” The act goes on to say that “groups of 
providers of services and suppliers . . . may work together to manage and 
coordinate care for Medicare fee-for-service beneficiaries through an 
accountable care organization.” In 2015, 424 groups were participating 
as Medicare ACOs serving over 7.8 million beneficiaries (Cavanaugh
2014). 
Advocates of ACOs take great pains to differentiate the concept 
from other forms of capitation payment. Four factors make ACOs dif-










is usually an organization created and run by health care providers—no 
insurer middleman must come between Medicare and the clinicians or 
between the clinicians and enrollees; 2) payment involves the central 
idea of shared savings, which means that it is not in fact entirely fixed 
prospectively; 3) the amount of payment also depends on hitting certain 
quality targets; and 4) the Medicare enrollees linked to an ACO retain 
free choice of provider—they are not limited to receiving services from 
providers who are part of that ACO. 
Many aspects of how Medicare’s model of ACOs works are dis-
cussed elsewhere in more detail (for example, Berenson and Burton 
[2011]). I will focus on only a few points here, and in a somewhat sim-
plified way. As noted above, an ACO participating with Medicare agrees 
to be accountable for the care of a population of Medicare enrollees. In 
the current model, enrollees do not actively choose an ACO but rather 
may be linked to one based on where they get their primary care. If 
the doctor providing the largest dollar amount of a particular enrollee’s 
primary care (based on fee-for-service billings) is part of an ACO, then 
that enrollee is linked to that ACO. 
The idea of shared savings warrants further explanation. Medicare 
sets a target amount of payment for the population covered by the ACO, 
but it actually continues to pay the ACO on a fee-for-service basis. The 
“savings” is the difference between the target and the total fee-for-
service payments. Mathematically, a simple form of this system would 
look like this: 
(4.1) R = TOTFFS + α × (TAR – TOTFFS), 
where R is total revenue for the ACO, TOTFFS represents total fee-for-
service payments, TAR is the target, and α is the “sharing rate.” Note 
that in this formula the savings could be negative—if the fee-for-service 
billings exceeded the target—in which case the ACO would need to pay 
back a share (α) of the payments in excess of the target.5 
Equation (4.1) may be rewritten as 
(4.2) R = α × TAR + (1 − α) × TOTFFS , 
which shows that this payment mechanism is actually a combination 
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one extreme (α = 1) it is pure capitation, at the other (α = 0) it is pure 
fee-for-service. 
The hope, of course, is that the possibility of receiving shared sav-
ings will motivate the decision makers in the ACO to be more respon-
sible for the costs of care, and to do things to reorganize care to reduce 
costs while maintaining or improving quality. So how is the decision 
about prescribing a particular service different in an ACO than as a fee-
for-service practitioner? Under fee-for-service, the marginal financial 
gain or loss for providing a service is the difference between the fee and 
the marginal cost (MC) of providing the service, or simply 
(4.3) Fee − MC. 
As long as this expression is positive there is a financial incentive 
to provide the service. Things become more complicated in an ACO. 
There is still the fee, and the marginal cost is still incurred, but a share of 
the fee is taken back, and then there may be indirect effects. If providing 
better preventive care keeps a patient out of the hospital, for example, 
it reduces other costs that the organization would have incurred, but it 
also reduces fees that would have been earned on those other services. 
We can amend Expression (4.3) to read 
(4.4) Fee − MC − α × Fee + indirect effects, 
recognizing that the indirect effects can themselves be complicated. If 
α is large (close to 1), then the fee for the service and for any services 
indirectly affected becomes less important, and financial incentives 
are more about direct costs of a service relative to costs that might be 
avoided by providing it, as would be the case in a true capitated system. 
An ACO should want to provide a service for which it is not directly 
reimbursed, as long as larger costs are thereby avoided. 
While Expression (4.4) applies to the ACO as a whole, aligning 
the incentives of those actually making decisions about resource use, 
often individual doctors, is another matter. If clinicians continue to be 
paid mainly by fee-for-service, even if part of the fees are initially with-
held, it will be no easy matter to get them to care about indirect savings 
they may create for the organization. It probably cannot be done well 




viders who are only minimally integrated. Successful ACOs will truly 
integrate providers across medical specialties with a shared purpose to 
coordinate care more effectively, and they will invest in shared infor-
mation technology and in systems of data analysis to help them better 
understand their own performance. 
ACOs: Regulation or Competition? 
Having explained the basic ACO idea, I now discuss where it might 
take us if it catches on in a big way. Is the ACO model compatible 
with a greater reliance on market forces, with provider performance 
disciplined by the exercise of consumer choice, or is it better viewed 
as a form of incentive-based regulation? Given the growing interest in 
ACOs, along with ongoing discussion of the proper role of markets in 
health care, this is an important question in the debate over health care 
reform. 
Because of the way ACOs are being implemented in Medicare, 
enrollees do not actively choose them. Enrollees can get linked to ACOs 
based on where they get their primary care, and in that way they can 
exercise a choice. It is certainly possible that an enrollee would choose 
a doctor because she belongs to an ACO with a reputation for high qual-
ity. But that choice has no implications for the enrollee’s premium or 
for the services covered, nor is the enrollee limited to receiving services 
only from providers who are part of that ACO. Thus, the ACO’s motiva-
tion for concern about costs (as opposed to quality) comes entirely from 
the incentives created by the payment mechanisms implemented by the 
regulator (Medicare). The possibility of using cost reductions to lower 
premiums and thereby attract more enrollees does not come into play. 
ACO models are also attracting interest in private insurance mar-
kets (Higgins et al. 2011). One might suppose that if the model is being 
used in the private sector it must be part of a market approach. But 
consider the most prominent private example, the Alternative Quality 
Contract (AQC), created by Blue Cross Blue Shield (BCBS) of Mas-
sachusetts (Song et al. 2012). Groups of providers that participate in the 
AQC are similar in many ways to Medicare ACOs: they agree to accept 
responsibility for the comprehensive care of a group of enrollees, they 
can share in savings if they can keep total fee-for-service billings below 
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The populations they are responsible for come from enrollees in the 
Massachusetts BCBS HMO. Each HMO enrollee must choose a pri-
mary care provider. If the provider is part of a group that is participat-
ing in the AQC, the enrollee is linked to that group. As in Medicare, 
an enrollee might well choose a doctor because he is part of a group 
with a reputation for high-quality care. But again, this choice has no 
implications for the premium the enrollee pays or the services covered. 
Thus, as in Medicare ACOs, incentives to control costs for groups par-
ticipating in the AQC come from the payment model set up by BCBS. 
A group that does a superior job of controlling costs and could therefore 
afford to set lower premiums is precluded from using lower premiums 
to attract more enrollees. 
So it seems that the ACO model, at least as it is currently being 
implemented by Medicare and in the AQC, is more a tool for chang-
ing provider incentives within a regulated system than a vehicle for 
empowering consumer choice. Can it be adapted in a way that would 
increase the role of consumers? I submit that it can, and that doing so 
would involve combining ACOs with an earlier idea called managed 
competition, most closely associated with economist Alain Enthoven 
(1993). 
A Digression on Managed Competition 
The aim of managed competition is to focus consumer choice 
around health plans rather than asking them to shop for individual ser-
vices. Choice should then be organized in such a way that health plans 
set their own premiums, while individuals choosing among plans face 
the full difference in premiums between a higher- and lower-priced 
plan. Enthoven (1993) argued that in a properly designed competi-
tive system, the health plans that would win out would be largely self-
contained groups of providers: “Managed competition occurs at the 
level of integrated financing and delivery plans, not at the individual 
provider level. Its goal is to divide providers in each community into 
competing economic units and to use market forces to motivate them to 
develop efficient delivery systems” (p. 29). These “integrated delivery 
systems” would, in other words, look a lot like what we now call ACOs.6 
There are several other important aspects of how competition is 





cants during open enrollment periods. It must charge the same pre-
mium to all applicants for the same coverage (or only limited varia-
tion, perhaps by enrollee age, is allowed). The set of covered services 
and copayments are limited to a small number of different packages, to 
make consumer comparisons easier. 
But because of prior differences in health status, some enrollees will 
cost much more to cover than others, regardless of what the health plan 
does. A key adjunct to these rules, therefore, is that payments to health 
plans be “risk adjusted,” which means that plans that attract a sicker 
mix of enrollees are paid more, and plans that enroll a healthier mix are 
paid less. Without such risk adjustments, plans have strong incentives 
to do whatever they can to attract relatively healthy enrollees and avoid 
sicker ones, a frequent criticism of the way competition among health 
plans has traditionally operated. Risk adjustment is intended to help 
focus plan efforts on delivering the best product rather than on attract-
ing the most profitable population. Risk adjustment is also a matter of 
fairness to plans and of making the managed competition approach 
acceptable to them. If plans are attempting to deliver high quality at a 
reasonable cost, they should not be penalized if they happen to attract a 
relatively unhealthy population. 
The ideas of managed competition have been influential in U.S. 
health policy, and the ACA takes additional steps toward implementing 
them. Medicare already incorporates many of managed competition’s 
features in two of its programs: Medicare Advantage (Medicare Part C) 
and the prescription drug benefit (Part D). Medicare Advantage (MA) is 
Medicare’s program of capitation contracting with managed care plans, 
which has been around in different forms and under different names 
since the 1980s; the prescription drug benefit has only been available 
since 2006. Both programs have two key features: 1) Medicare makes 
risk-adjusted payments to participating health plans, and 2) plans make 
competitive bids that affect the premiums enrollees face; thus, plans can 
use their bids as a mechanism to attract enrollees. 
The premium-setting processes and risk adjustment mechanisms 
are complicated in both programs (Duggan, Healy, and Morton 2008; 
Song, Cutler, and Chernew 2012). I will merely sketch the process used 
in MA. Each plan bids a premium it will accept for a person of aver-
age risk. These bids are compared with a county-specific benchmark 
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the difference is added to the enrollee’s premium. As a result, the total 
premium received by the plan is equal to its bid. If the bid is below 
the benchmark, then the plan receives its bid plus 75 percent of the 
difference. However, the extra payment above the bid is to go back to 
enrollees in reduced premiums or added benefits. Medicare also adjusts 
the premium it pays to each plan based on the risk profile of the plan’s 
enrollees, increasing the premium for a plan that attracts above-average 
risks and decreasing it for one with below-average risks. These risk 
adjustments are based on the enrollees’ demographic characteristics and 
on diagnoses reported on their Medicare claims in the past year. 
I would not suggest that the experience with either of these pro-
grams offers an unqualified endorsement for the merits of the managed 
competition model. If MA were really working well, it would be saving 
Medicare money relative to the traditional system, but that has not been 
the case. On the contrary, the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission
has found that in recent years Medicare paid MA plans amounts that 
were significantly higher than it would have paid for the same enrollees 
in traditional Medicare. That made MA plans a target for rate reduc-
tions to help finance the coverage expansions contained in the ACA. As 
for Medicare Part D, it has in some ways performed better than critics 
expected (Duggan, Healy, and Morton 2008), but researchers analyz-
ing actual plan choices have raised serious questions about the ability 
of many enrollees to choose plans in their own best interest (Abaluck 
and Gruber 2011; Heiss et al. 2013). These two programs demonstrate, 
nonetheless, that it is possible to use competitive bidding processes in 
Medicare—in other words, to allow participating health plans to set 
their own premiums—and it is fair to say that risk-adjustment mecha-
nisms are getting more sophisticated over time.7 
The ACA took a step toward broader application of the managed
competition model by mandating the creation of “health insurance 
exchanges,” institutions whereby individuals without employer-
sponsored coverage or small businesses can shop for coverage, begin-
ning in 2014.8 These insurance exchanges have important managed 
competition features. For example, subsidies to individuals do not 
depend on the plan chosen, so that individuals bear the additional costs 
of choosing a more expensive plan. The exchanges also use risk adjust-
ment to blunt incentives of plans to seek out the healthy and avoid the 





aged competition is U.S. Representative and current House Speaker 
Paul Ryan’s plan to convert Medicare to a program of “premium sup-
port,” giving enrollees a fixed dollar amount that they could supple-
ment as they wish and letting them shop for coverage. Ryan’s original 
2011 proposal would in effect have ultimately moved all enrollees into 
MA, but more recent versions of the plan retain traditional Medicare 
as an option that enrollees could choose (Feldman, Coulam, and Dowd 
2012).9 
Fitting ACOs into Managed Competition 
Returning now to payment reform and in particular to ACOs, I would 
argue that the Medicare ACO model is not so different from the man-
aged competition approach used in MA. If these two models are to con-
verge, one important step is that enrollees must actively choose ACOs 
rather than merely be linked to them. One can understand the political 
motivation for making the introduction of ACOs as innocuous as pos-
sible for the Medicare population, but if we want consumer choice to 
help drive provider performance on both cost and quality, being served 
by an ACO must be a choice and it must have some consequences.10
The enrollee should bear some cost in more limited access to providers, 
but the possibility of benefit through reduced premiums should also 
open up.11 
The spending target for an ACO is initially being set by trending 
forward actual Medicare spending on the ACO’s enrollees in the prior 
three-year period. Setting targets in this way is a form of risk adjust-
ment—an ACO with enrollees who have used a lot of care in the past 
will have a higher target than one with enrollees who have used less 
care—and not so dissimilar to what is done in MA.12 One could imagine 
altering the process of target setting to make it even more similar. An 
ACO could bid its own target for covering an enrollee of average risk, 
which would determine the premium that enrollees would pay, and then 
that bid amount could be risk-adjusted to determine the spending target 
that applied to that ACO. 
The shared savings aspect of the ACO model does make it a little 
different from prospective payment as it operates in MA. We can high-
light the difference by recalling our earlier equation for the revenue that 
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(4.1) R = TOT  + α × (TAR − TOT ).FFS FFS 
A key issue is the value of α. With purely prospective payment,
α = 1, and once the target is set it is irrelevant what fee-for-service pay-
ments would have been. In the ACO model α can be a smaller number, 
such as 0.5, in which case revenues depend also on what they would 
have been under fee-for-service. Allowing revenues to depend also 
on TOTFFS provides another form of risk adjustment, this one retro-
spective, in addition to that built into the determination of the target. 
Because enrollees’needs for services can be predicted only imperfectly 
based on information available prospectively, it will turn out that some 
ACOs will have enrollee populations that are sicker and more costly 
than expected, for reasons beyond the ACOs’ control. 
The drawback to setting α < 1 is that it weakens the incentive to 
control costs and perpetuates to some degree the perverse incentives 
present in fee-for-service payment, because providing more services 
still adds to revenue. But there are important benefits to having shared 
savings and risks. They reduce the immediate financial benefit from 
withholding care that is present with purely prospective payment, 
which should be reassuring to enrollees. As noted, shared savings also 
reduce the risk faced by ACOs, which increases their willingness to 
participate, especially for smaller entities with more limited ability to 
themselves spread risk over large enrollee populations. Thus, the use of 
shared savings rather than purely prospective rates can be compatible 
with a market-based approach.13 
The dependence of payments to ACOs on quality targets is also 
a departure from traditional capitation methodology, but Medicare is 
also introducing quality-based bonuses for MA plans, so this is not a 
fundamental difference. What about extending the ACO model outside 
Medicare to the nongovernment insurance market? Can it be done in a 
way that also relies on consumer choice to motivate provider groups to 
compete on both cost and quality? I am hopeful that it can, with health 
insurance exchanges used to manage the process. 
I earlier noted a difficulty with the AQC model in Massachusetts. 
Enrollees attributed to a participating provider group are drawn from 
those in the BCBS HMO. But as in the Medicare ACO model, the 





of covered services and available providers do not depend on the group 
to which they are linked. While enrollees may be drawn to a group on 
the basis of its reputation for quality, they get no direct benefit from 
choosing one that successfully controls costs. This situation could be 
remedied by having each provider group participating in the AQC act 
like a mini-HMO. Each group could have its own premium and its own 
set of in-network providers, and enrollees could choose among them. A
shared savings approach, rather than relying only on prospectively set 
premiums, would reduce the risk borne by provider groups and make 
them more willing to participate in this sort of arrangement, as well as 
easing the fears of consumers about incentives to hold back care. 
The obvious next question, though, is why would we need BCBS to 
mediate between consumers and provider groups? Why shouldn’t con-
sumers just choose the ACO directly? An entity is still needed to man-
age and administer the process, but for the most part a health insurance 
exchange is better suited to this task than a health insurer like BCBS. 
One important reason is that risk adjustment, which shifts premium 
revenues from insurance plans (or ACOs) that enroll relatively healthy 
populations to those that enroll more of the sick, should ideally be car-
ried out over a pool that is as broad and representative as possible. The 
ACA did not extend health insurance exchanges beyond individual and 
small-firm coverage to the much larger pool of those insured through 
employment in large firms, but in the future we could move in that 
direction. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
I began the chapter with a generally accepted claim that, at least 
in principle, the United States needs to bend the curve of health care 
spending rather substantially and rather soon. The greatest urgency 
comes from the burden of health care on government budgets, but any 
solution is likely to involve our entire health care system. Consumers 
and providers both must therefore be open to significant changes in the 
way our system works. Changing provider incentives by moving away 
from fee-for-service payment is one important step. Fee-for-service 
not only encourages the provision of any services that are profitable 
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for providers without regard to their effectiveness, it contributes to the 
fragmented nature of our system and does not promote a focus on main-
taining and improving health in the most cost-effective way. 
The ACO idea—paying organizations of providers at largely pro-
spective rates to be accountable for the care of defined populations— 
has a great deal of appeal. I have argued further that this approach can 
be consistent with using competitive bidding to set payment rates and 
relying on consumer choice to motivate ACOs to compete on both qual-
ity and cost. In essence, this is adapting the ACO model to the familiar 
idea of managed competition. We would need to move away from hav-
ing individuals passively linked to ACOs and instead make membership 
an active choice, with consequences for premiums and provider net-
works. At the same time, in order to make managed competition more 
acceptable to somewhat smaller provider groups and to consumers, risk 
adjustments would be carried out not only prospectively but also retro-
spectively, as is already done in the Medicare prescription drug benefit. 
In other words, a shared savings model would be used rather than pure 
prospective payment. Making payments to ACOs (or other forms of 
health plans that consumers could alternatively choose) contingent on 
quality measures can also be a part of this model. 
There are many important questions about whether the model I 
have outlined is a viable approach to significantly bending the curve 
of rising spending while promoting improvements in quality. In Medi-
care Advantage, for example, the managed competition model does not 
have a great track record of success (but the situation may be improv-
ing). Can incentives be made strong enough to motivate real change in 
the way medical practice is organized, real integration, without plac-
ing provider groups at too much risk (Frakt and Mayes 2012)? Is it 
reasonable to think that informed consumer choice can motivate good 
behavior by providers of something as complex as health coverage? 
Can we develop methods of risk adjustment that are fair to health plans 
and that eliminate the incentive to seek out certain types of enrollees 
while trying to avoid others? Will competition prove “workable” in the 
sense that combinations of providers will be unable to exercise exces-
sive market power relative to consumers (Berenson et al. 2012; Quealy 
and Katz 2015)? The idea is promising enough that we should continue 






In concluding the chapter, I want to briefly discuss one other issue 
that is relevant to how far we can potentially get in controlling health 
spending through a market-based strategy. I will first talk about it in a 
simplified, very abstract way, and then relate things in a more practi-
cal way to Medicare Part D. Let the curve in Figure 4.3 represent the 
relationship between health spending and health if resources were being 
used in the most effective way—a kind of “production function” relat-
ing inputs to output in an efficient manner. Points B and C, for exam-
ple, are both on the production function; moving from B to C involves 
increasing spending—giving up more of other things—to get improved 
health. 
Many analysts say that we do not have to think about trade-offs 
between health and other things because the poor incentives built into 
our system actually leave us at a point like A, beneath the produc-
tion function. If so, improving incentives might reduce spending and 
improve health simultaneously, moving us, for example, from A to B. 
But if we can get to point B, the question of where we want to be along 
the curve must ultimately involve trade-offs.14 
In other market situations, when purchasing cars, televisions, or cell 
phones, for example, people face trade-offs between cost and quality all 
the time. Generally, we are happy to let them make their own decisions. 
Ability to pay matters, people with higher incomes drive nicer cars, but 
we are typically fine with that as an intrinsic part of a free enterprise 
system. Applying the same logic to health care, we might think of the 
curve in Figure 4.3 at the level of one individual, and of the points along 
the curve as different insurance packages that have both different pre-
miums and levels of coverage, including different sets of services that 
are covered. We hope that market forces will eliminate packages that 
lie below the curve. Then individuals can choose where along the curve 
they want to be, say, at point B or C. Naturally, the wealthier will find it 
easier to pay for C and will be more likely to choose it. 
But are we as a society willing to live with that? Will a Medicare 
program that explicitly lets the rich buy access to services that the poor 
cannot afford be acceptable, or will it be seen as inappropriate ration-
ing? As things stand, the Medicare program does not explicitly consider 
costs when it makes decisions about whether new services will be cov-
ered. Similarly, the ACA established the Patient-Centered Outcomes 
Research Institute to study the comparative effectiveness of different 
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medical interventions, but it prohibited Medicare from using analyses 
of cost per quality-adjusted life year to make coverage decisions. 
The example of Medicare Part D is instructive. Part D drug plans 
are not required to cover every drug. In many therapeutic classes, a plan 
can give preferred status (assign lower copayments) to certain drugs 
relative to others that are close therapeutic substitutes. This gives a plan 
leverage to negotiate with drug manufacturers for lower prices, the sav-
ings from which (one hopes) would as a result of competition largely 
be passed along to enrollees in lower premiums. However, the ability 
of plans to differentiate themselves through the set of drugs they cover 
is limited. They are required to cover at least two drugs in every thera-
peutic class, and “all or substantially all” drugs in six protected classes 
(immunosuppressants, antidepressants, antipsychotics, anticonvulsants, 
HIV antiretrovirals, and cancer). As Duggan, Healy, and Morton (2008) 
discuss, these restrictions limit the ability of plans to negotiate with 
manufacturers over prices. They also limit a plan’s ability to keep pre-
miums low by choosing not to cover certain high-cost drugs of limited 












A similar issue arises with respect to insurance plans offered in 
health insurance exchanges. When individuals are mandated to have 
insurance coverage, some minimum standard of what constitutes cred-
itable coverage must be set. The more inclusive that standard, the less 
scope there is for individuals to make trade-offs to get lower premiums. 
Similarly, the set of services that an ACO is accountable for provid-
ing must be defined. The main point is that eliminating truly wasteful 
spending from the system (getting from point A to the curve in Figure 
4.3), as difficult as that is to achieve, will not be enough to limit spend-
ing growth to an acceptable level in the long run. As a society we must 
be willing to face the possibility that small benefits in health care may 
sometimes come at too high a cost. 
Notes 
1. By “excess cost growth,” the CBO means the amount by which the growth of 
health spending per capita, adjusted for changes in the age composition of the 
population, exceeds the growth of the economy’s capacity to produce on a per 
capita basis. 
2. The Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (MedPAC) advises Congress about 
Medicare and generally does excellent work. Chapter 2 of its June 2011 report 
(MedPAC 2011) is entitled “Improving Payment Accuracy and Appropriate Use of 
Ancillary Services.” It is interesting that the chapter refers to “payment accuracy” 
more than 25 times but never defines what “accuracy” means. 
3. Porter and Teisberg (2007) would disagree. See Note 6.  
4. Although many researchers have contributed to the development of this idea, the 
person most associated with it is Elliot Fisher, a physician and researcher at Dart-
mouth. Fisher says that the term emerged originally in discussion between him 
and Glenn Hackbarth, former chair of MedPAC. Health policy discussions abound 
with three-letter abbreviations. In this chapter, the most prominent and easily con-
fused are ACO, for Accountable Care Organization, and ACA, for Affordable 
Care Act, the short title of the health care reform passed in 2010. Adding to the 
confusion, I will later discuss the AQC, or Alternative Quality Contract, a way 
of contracting with ACO-like entities developed by Blue Cross Blue Shield of 
Massachusetts. 
5. Although I will frame the discussion around Equation (1), Medicare has in fact 
introduced several variations of the ACO model, including Pioneer (for organi-
zations that are more prepared to take on risk based on prior experience with 
doing so) and two tracks in the Shared Savings Program (Berenson and Burton 
2011). All of them involve a range in the neighborhood of the target where α = 0, 
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Shared Savings Program, α = 0 in the first three years whenever TOTFFS exceeds 
the target—the organization initially bears no downside risk. In 2015 Medicare 
announced that organizations in track 1 would be allowed to stay there for an addi-
tional three years. It also established a track 3 for organizations willing to accept 
greater risk. 
6. Porter and Teisberg (2007) offer a different vision of competition. They argue 
that medical providers are best organized into “integrated practice units” focused 
around particular “medical conditions and cycles of care.” These entities would 
be well positioned to accept bundled payments for episodes or “cycles” of care. 
Arguably, rather than relying on single entities responsible for all types of care, 
organizing groups around particular conditions could lead to gains from greater 
specialization and more opportunity for choice. But how these ideas could be inte-
grated into a model of insurance and cost-conscious consumer choice does not 
seem to be well worked out. One could imagine an insurance plan that in return 
for a premium covers primary care and also provides in effect a set of vouchers 
for treatment of particular conditions as they arise. If you have diabetes, are diag-
nosed with breast cancer, or experience severe low back pain, you have a voucher 
that covers standard quality care for that condition over a defined episode or for 
some defined period of time. If you want to use a group that charges more than the 
voucher covers, you pay the difference. I am not aware of any real-world exam-
ples of such a model of health insurance. For further discussion see Enthoven, 
Crosson, and Shortell (2007). 
7. Brown et al. (2014), however, find that MA insurers may be a step ahead of the 
program administrators. They find that even after Medicare made changes in 2004 
to better capture differences in risk across enrollees, MA plans were still attract-
ing relatively healthy enrollees conditional on measured risk. On the other hand, 
working with a larger data set, Newhouse et al. (2014) do not replicate those find-
ings, and on the whole they are more optimistic about the future of managed com-
petition in MA. 
8. Participation in the exchange for small businesses has been much slower to 
develop than exchange participation by individuals (Galewitz 2015). 
9. The original Ryan plan for Medicare was strongly criticized by Democrats. For 
example, in his acceptance speech for the 2012 presidential nomination, Presi-
dent Obama, referring to the Ryan plan, said, “I will never turn Medicare into a 
voucher.” However, much (though certainly not all) of the criticism of the plan had 
to do with the way that the premium support (or voucher) amount would be set and 
updated over time, with critics arguing the plan would shift very substantial costs 
to enrollees. In principle, the level of premium support is a separable issue from 
the concept itself. 
10. One analyst stated, accurately, that “proponents of the shared savings model have 
designed an approach that attempts to upset or dislocate no one” (Berenson 2010). 
11. Improving consumer incentives is not the only reason for asking that enrollees in 
an ACO be limited to the set of providers affiliated with it. An ACO faces addi-
tional risk that it will have little ability to control if it is accountable for Medicare 
services that an enrollee receives from providers outside the ACO. 
   
  
 







12. Risk adjustment in MA is based on enrollee demographic characteristics and past 
diagnoses rather than directly on past spending, but the weights applied to the 
variables that go into the risk adjustment are based on how those variables pre-
dict spending in traditional Medicare. Setting a target based on the past spending 
experience of a group’s own enrollees could have the perverse effect of penalizing 
groups that were already managing care efficiently by giving them lower targets. 
13. After-the-fact risk adjustment (or shared savings and risks, which essentially is 
the same thing) is already present in Medicare Part D. If a prescription drug plan’s 
expenses for drugs are more than 5 percent above or below its target based on 
risk-adjusted premiums, Medicare shares in the cost overrun or the savings (Dug-
gan, Healy, and Morton 2008). A similar approach is being used during the first 
three years of operation of health insurance exchanges under the ACA, although 
funding has been less than insurers anticipated (Blase 2015; Cunningham 2012). 
Interestingly, however, in Part D and in the insurance exchanges the insurance 
plan accepts full risk in the vicinity of the target (α = 1), whereas with ACOs the 
opposite is the case, α = 0 in the vicinity of the target (see also Note 5). 
14. Over time the entire curve shifts upward as a result of advances in knowledge 
(although other factors, such as worsening diets, may work to shift it down). But 
new knowledge also extends the relatively flat part of the curve by expanding our 
capacity to spend large amounts of money for small expected benefits. 
References 
Abaluck, Jason, and Jonathan Gruber. 2011. “Heterogeneity in Choice Incon-
sistencies among the Elderly: Evidence from Prescription Drug Plan 
Choice.” American Economic Review 101(3): 377–381. 
Arrow, Kenneth J. 1963. “Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical 
Care.” American Economic Review 53(5): 941–997. 
Berenson, Robert A. 2010 “Shared Savings Program for Accountable Care 
Organizations: A Bridge to Nowhere?” American Journal of Managed Care
16(10): 721–726. 
Berenson, Robert A., and Rachel A. Burton. 2011. “Accountable Care Organi-
zations in Medicare and the Private Sector: A Status Update.” Washington, 
DC: Urban Institute. 
Berenson, Robert A., Paul B. Ginsburg, Jon B. Christianson, and Tracy Yee. 
2012. “The Growing Power of Some Providers to Win Steep Payment 
Increases from Insurers Suggests Policy Remedies May Be Needed.” 
Health Affairs 31(5): 973–981. 
Blase, Brian. 2015. “New Data Shows Large Insurer Losses on Obamacare 
Plans.” Forbes, October 12. http://www.forbes.com/sites/theapothecary/
2015/10/12/new-data-shows-large-insurer-losses-on-obamacare-plans/








Payment Reform and “Bending the Curve” 77 
Bogdanich, Walt, and Jo Craven McGinty. 2011. “Medicare Claims Show 
Overuse for CT Scanning.” New York Times, June 18, A:1. 
Brown, Jason, Mark Duggan, Ilyana Kuziemko, and William Woolston. 2014. 
“How Does Risk Selection Respond to Risk Adjustment? Evidence from 
the Medicare Advantage Program.” American Economic Review 104(10): 
3335–3364. 
Cassidy, Amanda. 2015. “Health Policy Brief: Bundled Payments for Care 
Improvement Initiative.” Health Affairs, November 23. http://www
.healthaffairs.org/healthpolicybriefs/brief.php?brief_id=148 (accessed 
December 18, 2015). 
Cavanaugh, Sean. 2014. “ACOs Moving Ahead.” The CMS Blog. http://blog
.cms.gov/2014/12/22/acos-moving-ahead/ (accessed December 18, 2015). 
Claxton, Gary, Matthew Rae, Michelle Long, Nirmita Panchal, Anthony 
Damico, Kevin Kenward, and Heidi Whitmore. 2015. “Employer Health 
Benefits: 2015 Annual Survey.” Menlo Park, CA: Henry J. Kaiser Founda-
tion and Chicago: Health Research & Educational Trust. 
Congressional Budget Office. 2015. “The 2015 Long-Term Budget Outlook.” 
Washington, DC: Congressional Budget Office. https://www.cbo.gov/
publication/50250 (accessed September 4, 2015). 
Cunningham, Rob. 2012. “Health Policy Brief: Risk Adjustment in Health 
Insurance.” Health Affairs, August 30. http://www.healthaffairs.org/health
policybriefs/brief.php?brief_id=74 (accessed December 21, 2015). 
Cutler, David M., and Kaushik Ghosh. 2012. “The Potential for Cost Savings 
through Bundled Episode Payments.” New England Journal of Medicine
366(12): 1075–1077. 
Duggan, Mark, Patrick Healy, and Fiona Scott Morton. 2008. “Providing Pre-
scription Drug Coverage to the Elderly: America’s Experiment with Medi-
care Part D.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 22(4): 69–92. 
Enthoven, Alain C. 1993. “The History and Principles of Managed Competi-
tion.” Health Affairs 12 Suppl: 24–48.
Enthoven, Alain C., Francis J. Crosson, and Stephen M. Shortell. 2007. “‘Rede-
fining Health Care’: Medical Homes or Archipelagos to Navigate?” Health 
Affairs 26(5): 1366–1372. 
Feldman, Roger, Robert Coulam, and Bryan Dowd. 2012. “Competitive Bid-
ding Can Help Solve Medicare’s Fiscal Crisis.” AEI Health Policy Outlook, 
no. 2, February. Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute. 
Fisher, Elliott S., David E. Wennberg, Therese A. Stukel, Daniel J. Gottlieb, F. 
L. Lucas, and Étoile L. Pinder. 2003a. “The Implications of Regional Varia-
tions in Medicare Spending. Part 1: The Content, Quality, and Accessibility 









———. 2003b. “The Implications of Regional Variations in Medicare Spend-
ing. Part 2: Health Outcomes and Satisfaction with Care.” Annals of Inter-
nal Medicine 138(4): 288–298.
Frakt, Austin B., and Rick Mayes. 2012. “Beyond Capitation: How New Pay-
ment Experiments Seek to Find the ‘Sweet Spot’ in Amount of Risk Provid-
ers and Payers Bear.” Health Affairs 31(9): 1951–1958. 
Galewitz, Phil. 2015. “Small Businesses Snub Obamacare’s SHOP Exchange.” 
Kaiser Health News, November 5. http://khn.org/news/small-businesses
-snub-obamacares-shop-exchange/ (accessed December 21, 2015). 
Ginsburg, Paul B. 2012. “Fee-For-Service Will Remain a Feature of Major 
Payment Reforms, Requiring More Changes in Medicare Physician Pay-
ment.” Health Affairs 31(9): 1977–1983. 
Hall, Robert E., and Charles I. Jones. 2007. “The Value of Life and the Rise in 
Health Spending.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 122(1): 39–72. 
Heiss, Florian, Adam Leive, Daniel McFadden, and Joachim Winter. 2013. 
“Plan Selection in Medicare Part D: Evidence from Administrative Data.” 
Journal of Health Economics 32(6): 1325–1344.
Higgins, Aparna, Kristin Stewart, Kristin Dawson, and Carmella Bocchino. 
2011. “Early Lessons from Accountable Care Models in the Private Sector: 
Partnerships between Health Plans and Providers.” Health Affairs 30(9): 
1718–1727. 
Hsiao, William C., Peter Braun, Daniel Dunn, Edmund R. Becker, Margaret 
DeNicola, and Thomas R. Ketcham. 1988. “Results and Policy Implica-
tions of the Resource-Based Relative-Value Study.” New England Journal 
of Medicine 319(13): 881–888. 
Jacobson, Gretchen, Anthony Damico, Tricia Neuman, and Marsha Gold. 2015. 
“Medicare Advantage 2015 Spotlight: Enrollment Market Update.” Menlo 
Park, CA: The Henry J. Kaiser Foundation. https:// http://kff.org/medicare/ 
issue-brief/medicare-advantage-2015-spotlight-enrollment-market-update/ 
(accessed December 18, 2015). 
Keehan, Sean P., Gigi A. Cuckler, Andrea M. Sisko, Andrew J. Madison, Sheila 
D. Smith, Devin A. Stone, John A. Poisal, Christian J. Wolfe, and Joseph M. 
Lizonitz. 2015. “National Health Expenditure Projections, 2014–24: Spend-
ing Growth Faster than Recent Trends.” Health Affairs 34(8): 1407–1417. 
Komisar, Harriet L., Judy Feder, and Paul B. Ginsburg. 2011. “Bundling” Pay-
ment for Episodes of Hospital Care. Washington, DC: Center for American 
Progress. 
Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (MedPAC). 2011. Medicare and the 






Payment Reform and “Bending the Curve” 79 
Newhouse, Joseph P., Mary Price, J. Michael McWilliams, John Hsu, and 
Thomas G. McGuire. 2014. “How Much Favorable Selection Is Left in 
Medicare Advantage?” NBER Working Paper No. 20021. Cambridge, MA: 
National Bureau of Economic Research. 
Porter, Michael E., and Elizabeth Olmsted Teisberg. 2007. “How Physicians 
Can Change the Future of Health Care.” Journal of the American Medical 
Association 297(10): 1103–1111. 
Quealy, Kevin, and Margot Sanger Katz. 2015. “The Experts Were Wrong 
about the Best Places for Better and Cheaper Health Care.” New York Times, 
December 15. http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/12/15/upshot/the
-best-places-for-better-cheaper-health-care-arent-what-experts-thought
.html?rref=upshot&_r=0 (accessed January 12, 2016). 
Song, Zirui, David M. Cutler, and Michael E. Chernew. 2012. “Potential Con-
sequences of Reforming Medicare into a Competitive Bidding System.” 
Journal of the American Medical Association 308(5): 459–460. 
Song, Zirui, Dana Gelb Safran, Bruce E. Landon, Mary Beth Landrum, Yulei 
He, Robert E. Mechanic, Matthew P. Day, and Michael E. Chernew. 2012. 
“The ‘Alternative Quality Contract,’ Based on a Global Budget, Lowered 











The Potential Effects 
of the Affordable Care Act 
on Disability Insurance and 
Workers’ Compensation 
Marcus Dillender 
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The passage of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) represents one of 
the largest overhauls to the United States health care system since the 
introduction of Medicare and Medicaid. Among the reform’s many pro-
visions are an employer mandate, an individual mandate, an expansion 
of Medicaid, subsidies for low-income people to purchase coverage, 
and the establishment of health insurance exchanges. The ACA also 
reforms the individual market and implements many measures aimed at 
reducing medical costs. 
Despite its many changes to the health care system, the ACA largely 
ignores related social insurance programs that also provide health care. 
Two programs in particular—federal disability and workers’ compen-
sation—deal with people with medical issues and have overlapping 
agendas with health insurance. Disability insurance provides health 
insurance for people who are unable to work for over a year due to 
health concerns, while workers’ compensation insurance pays medical 
expenses for people injured at work. Unlike traditional health insur-
ance, both programs also provide cash assistance to beneficiaries. 
Although the ACA does not address these programs, it could have 
potentially major spillover effects on both federal disability and work-
ers’compensation. First, the ACA could affect the likelihood that people 
apply for these programs since health insurance may substitute for the 
types of services they provide. This would affect the number and types 
of people receiving benefits as well as overall costs. Second, the ACA














have, such as eliminating copays for preventive care and taxing expen-
sive, high-benefit plans. These features could result in healthier people 
or more cost shifting. Finally, the ACA implements many changes that 
alter medical resources. Since both disability and workers’ compensa-
tion tap into the same systems as health insurance, changes that affect 
the medical system more generally will affect these programs as well. 
This chapter discusses the implications that the ACA has for fed-
eral disability insurance and workers’ compensation insurance. I do not 
attempt to determine whether the net impact of the costs of these pro-
grams will be positive or negative, as there is much uncertainty about 
the implementation and impact of the ACA. Instead, I discuss various 
aspects of the ACA, federal disability insurance, and workers’ compen-
sation, and I consider the possible interactions between the ACA and 
these social insurance programs. 
THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT 
Implementation of the ACA began immediately after it was signed 
into law in 2010 and will continue until 2020. Table 5.1 summarizes 
various aspects of the law. 
The employer mandate requires that companies with 50 or more full-
time employees offer affordable coverage to their full-time employees 
or pay a penalty. The penalty for not offering health insurance is $2,000 
per employee after the first 30 employees. Employers’ plans must pay 
for at least 60 percent of covered health care expenses, and employees 
must pay no more than 9.5 percent of family income for the coverage. 
To prevent employers from offering plans that meet these requirements 
but do not meet employees’ needs, the ACA also assesses firms that 
offer coverage a separate penalty of $3,000 for each employee who 
receives subsidized coverage through the exchanges. 
The individual mandate requires nearly everyone to have health 
insurance or pay a penalty. The penalty for not having health insurance 
eventually rises to the maximum of $695 per uninsured person or 2.5 
percent of household income over the filing threshold. To avoid the 
penalty, nonexempt individuals must maintain minimum essential cov-
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sponsored coverage, or coverage purchased through the individual 
marketplace. Everyone is subject to the mandate except the following 
groups: people with incomes below 100 percent of the federal poverty 
level, people not required to file income taxes, people with religious 
objections, American Indians, undocumented immigrants, and incarcer-
ated persons. 
In addition to requiring that individuals purchase insurance, the 
ACA also established health insurance exchanges. These marketplaces 
opened in 2013 and allow people to compare plans from the individual 
market on a single website. The ACA issued several reforms for the 
individual market as well, including requiring insurers to accept all who 
apply for coverage, restricting the number of factors that could be used 
for pricing, and requiring certain coverage. To make insurance more 
affordable for people whose employers do not offer insurance and who 
are ineligible for Medicaid, the ACA provides subsidies for those mak-
ing up to 400 percent of the federal poverty level. 
In addition to subsidizing coverage for people not eligible for Med-
icaid, the ACA originally required that states expand Medicaid so that 
all households with incomes below 133 percent of the federal poverty 
level would qualify. The federal government would pay for the full cost 
of these newly eligible people in the first three years and no less than 
90 percent thereafter. However, in June 2012, the Supreme Court ruled 
that the federal government could not require states to expand their 
Medicaid coverage; thus, the expansion of Medicaid is optional (Kaiser 
Family Foundation 2012). As of July 2014, 26 states and the District of 
Columbia have opted to expand Medicaid (Kaiser Family Foundation 
2014). 
The ACA also implements a variety of measures aimed at reducing 
Medicare costs. It has established the Independent Payment Advisory 
Board (IPAB), which will make recommendations to cut Medicare costs 
if they grow larger than the per capita GDP plus one percentage point. 
If Congress fails to pass an alternative proposal with the same cost sav-
ings, the IPAB recommendations will become law. The IPAB can also 
make nonbinding recommendations about private health spending. In 
addition to the IPAB, the ACA also encourages physicians and hospi-
tals to form accountable care organizations (ACOs), which are sets of 
providers that bear responsibility for the cost and quality of care deliv-
ered to Medicare patients. Any Medicare savings from this coordinated 









Penalty for not buying 
Subsidized insurance 
Employers with 50 or more full-time employees must offer a health insurance plan to all full-
time employees or pay an annual penalty.a,b 
30 or more hours per weekb 
Two types of penalties: 
•	 Must pay $2,000 per full-time employee (after first 30 employees) for not offering any 
insurance options 
•	 Must pay $3,000 for not offering affordable coverage, for all employees receiving a tax credit 
for insurance purchased on exchangea,b 
Insurance plan must pay for at least 60% of covered health care expenses for a typical population, 
and employees must pay no more than 9.5% of family income for employer coverage.a 
All people must purchase health insurance or pay a penalty. 
The penalty is the greater of 
•	 For 2014, $95 per uninsured person or 1% of household income over the filing threshold 
•	 For 2015, $325 per uninsured person or 2% of household income over the filing threshold 
•	 For 2016 and beyond, $695 per uninsured person or 2.5% of household income over the filing 
threshold.b 
For anyone earning up to 400% of poverty level whose employer does not offer health insurance, 
covers less than 60% of the actuarial value, or whose employee share exceeds 9.5% of income.a 
   85 
Exemptions Income below 100% of the federal poverty level; not being required to file income taxes; having 
religious objections; having a coverage gap shorter than three months; or being an American 
Indian, undocumented immigrant, or incarcerated person.a 
Medicaid 
To qualify Expanded so that people with a household income below 133% of the poverty level will qualify.a 
Individual market 
Can charge different Family structure, geography, age, and tobacco use.a 
premiums based on 
Guaranteed issue Yesa 
Marketplaces created State Exchanges, which allow individuals and small businesses to compare and purchase private 
insurance that meets coverage standards.a 













care would be shared with providers. Additionally, the ACA reduces 
Medicare payments to hospitals with high rates of potentially prevent-
able readmissions. In doing so, it alters hospitals’ incentives to provide 
high-quality and cost-effective care on the first admission. Finally, the 
ACA increases the government’s resources to fight fraud, which could 
save money, since the Congressional Budget Office estimates that each 
additional dollar spent on fraud prevention reduces $1.75 of Medicare 
spending (Zuckerman 2010).
As they were intended to do, these reforms have increased health 
insurance coverage. By June 2014, around 10.3 million more adults 
had health insurance because of the ACA (Sommers et al. 2014). This 
number is expected to grow over the next several years. The Congres-
sional Budget Office and the Joint Committee on Taxation predict that 
the ACA will result in 19 million people having insurance in 2015 who 
otherwise would not. They expect this number to increase to 26 million 
by 2017 (Congressional Budget Office 2014). The anticipated cost of 
the ACA net of any savings is $1,383 billion for 2015–2024. The vast 
majority of these costs come from increased spending on Medicaid, as 
well as subsidies for people purchasing insurance in the marketplace. 
Schoen et al. (2011) estimate that the ACA could lead to a 70 percent 
decrease in the underinsurance rate, while Hill (2012) estimates that 
the ACA will reduce out-of-pocket spending for people with individual 
insurance. 
FEDERAL DISABILITY INSURANCE 
Basic Program Information 
Federal disability insurance pays benefits to people under the full 
retirement age who are unable to work because they have a medical 
condition that is expected to last at least one year or result in death. 
Disabled people are potentially eligible for two different programs: 
Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) and Supplemental Security 
Income (SSI). The SSDI program provides benefits to individuals who 
have paid into the Social Security system and meet certain minimum 
work requirements, and the SSI program is means tested and does not 
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have work or contribution requirements, but it restricts benefits to indi-
viduals with certain asset and resource limitations (Moulta-Ali 2013). 
With SSDI, the benefit amount is related to the disabled worker’s 
former earnings in covered employment. The average benefit amount 
as of 2012 was $1,130 for disabled workers (Social Security Admin-
istration 2013). SSDI recipients can receive health insurance coverage 
through Medicare but only after a two-year waiting period that begins 
the day they qualify for benefits. After a disabling event, individuals 
must wait at least five months before receiving cash benefits. 
The SSI program pays a flat cash benefit to aged, blind, and dis-
abled individuals who have very limited income and assets. The benefit 
amount for SSI as of 2012 was $698 for eligible individuals and $1,048 
for eligible couples (Social Security Administration 2014a). Individuals 
on SSI receive health insurance through the Medicaid program. Unlike 
SSDI recipients, SSI recipients receive cash benefits and health insur-
ance immediately upon qualifying for benefits. As of 2012, around 86 
percent of the people receiving SSI benefits were disabled (Center on 
Budget and Policy Priorities 2014). 
Figure 5.1 shows the number of SSDI recipients, including depen-
dents and the money spent on SSDI over time. The number of people on 
federal disability has swelled in recent decades. In 1970, approximately 
2.7 million people, or about 1.3 percent of the population received 
SSDI. By the end of 2012, approximately 10.9 million people, or 3.5 
percent of the population, received SSDI. Total SSDI benefits paid in 
2012 were $137 billion (Social Security Administration 2013). Autor 
and Duggan (2006) find that this rapid increase in the number of people 
receiving SSDI can be attributed to congressional reforms to disability 
screening that enabled workers with low mortality disorders to more 
easily qualify for benefits, a rise in the after-tax SSDI benefit, and an 
increase in female labor force participation, which expanded the pool 
of eligible workers. 
Figure 5.2 shows SSI applicants and new recipients over time. 
While the number of people newly receiving SSI because of their age 
has decreased slightly over time, the number of new disabled recipi-
ents has increased. As of 2012, around 8.3 million people received SSI, 
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SOURCE: Social Security Administration (2014c). 
Social Security and Medicare are both funded from a 15.3 percent 
payroll tax on earnings that is split equally between employees and 
employers. Of the 15.3 percent, 1.8 percent of the payroll tax goes into 
the disability trust fund to pay for SSDI, and 2.9 percent goes toward 
Medicare; the rest of the tax goes in the Old Age and Survivors Insur-
ance Fund (Moulta-Ali 2013). SSI is financed through the general rev-
enue of the United States. Medicaid, which SSI recipients receive, is 
funded jointly by state and federal government. 
The ACA’s Potential Effect on Disability Insurance 
The ACA will likely exert two countervailing forces on people’s 
decisions to apply for disability insurance. Applicants to both SSDI 
and SSI face uncertainty about whether or not they qualify for benefits, 
and they may have to wait long periods of time for their disability sta-
tus to be determined. During this time, applicants cannot work. Since 
employer-sponsored insurance has traditionally been better than the 
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Disabled applicants Disabled new recipients 
Aged applicants Aged new recipients 
SOURCE: Social Security Administration (2014d). 
high-quality, affordable health insurance to apply for disability cover-
age. However, the insurance exchanges and subsidized coverage from 
the ACA promise affordable health insurance outside employment. 
Similarly, the ACA mandates that insurance companies accept all who 
apply, which will increase coverage options for those with a disabil-
ity. Improving coverage options for those with a disability could free 
workers from employment lock, thereby reducing the costs of apply-
ing for disability coverage. This would cause the number of disability 
applications to rise, especially those for SSDI, since those applicants 
will have to wait an additional two years after receiving benefits before 
they receive Medicare coverage. On the other hand, a lack of good 
health insurance alternatives to employer-sponsored health insurance 
is one reason people apply for SSDI. By creating good health insurance 
opportunities apart from employer-sponsored coverage and Medicare, 
the ACA lowers the benefit of applying for disability. This could result 






Two papers empirically examine which effect dominates. Gruber 
and Kubik (2002) study how health insurance factors into the likeli-
hood that people apply for SSDI using Health and Retirement Study 
data. They find that people who have access to insurance from a source 
other than their own employers, such as insurance through a spouse’s 
employer or retiree coverage, are 26–74 percent more likely to apply for 
SSDI benefits than those without such alternative sources of coverage. 
Maestas, Mullen, and Strand (2014) study what happened to dis-
ability applications after the Massachusetts health insurance reform, 
which has a structure that is very similar to the ACA. They find that 
disability applications increased in Massachusetts relative to neighbor-
ing states in the first year following health insurance reform. After the 
first year, there was no statistically significant effect of the reform on 
total applications. These results suggest that there may have been pent-
up demand for disability benefits for people who had been working 
with impairments. Despite finding no evidence of long-term changes in 
the aggregate, they find important county-level heterogeneity. They find 
that SSDI and SSI applications increased in counties with high levels of 
health insurance coverage prior to the reform and decreased in counties 
with low levels of coverage. Since Massachusetts had higher insurance 
coverage than the rest of the country before its health insurance reform, 
Maestas, Mullen, and Strand conclude that the ACA may lead to a net 
decrease in disability insurance applications. 
Just as the need for health insurance has resulted in some people 
being tied to employers, it can lead to some people being tied to dis-
ability insurance. Coe and Rupp (2013) examine how access to health 
insurance for disabled individuals in both the nongroup market and 
Medicaid affects the exit from disability. They find that SSI beneficia-
ries with some Medicaid expenditures are more likely to exit disability 
when they have more health insurance options available to them, as are 
SSDI recipients who do not have access to supplemental health insur-
ance outside Medicare. 
Gruber and Kubik (2002) suggest that the ACA would lead to an 
increase in disability applicants. However, results from the Massa-
chusetts reform suggest that the ACA will likely affect certain people 
and areas differently than others. The results of Coe and Rupp (2013) 
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allow them to return to work, which would reduce the number of people 
receiving disability benefits. 
The ACA has the potential to affect disability insurance in ways 
not directly related to altering claiming incentives, such as through the 
ACA provisions that aim to reduce Medicare costs. These provisions, 
which were discussed in the second section of the chapter, directly 
affect SSDI beneficiaries, since Medicare is their health insurance. 
Many speculate that the IPAB may eventually cut Medicare reimburse-
ment rates for doctors (Vaida 2012). While this would reduce costs 
to the Medicare program, it may also make it more difficult for SSDI 
recipients to receive medical care, since doctors may be less likely to 
accept Medicare patients. Cutting costs and improving care are goals of 
ACOs and reasons for not reimbursing preventable readmissions. Both 
these measures have the potential to decrease costs while improving the 
care that SSDI recipients receive. 
In addition to decreasing the costs of applying for SSDI, improving 
health insurance options during the two-year waiting period may also 
increase the health care access of SSDI recipients. The two-year wait-
ing period is often a concern, since SSDI recipients have health issues. 
Riley (2006) studies health insurance and health care access during the 
waiting period and finds that 26 percent of SSDI beneficiaries lacked 
health insurance during this period. He also finds that SSDI beneficia-
ries without health insurance had more problems accessing health care 
than those with health insurance. Weathers and Stegman (2012) and 
Michalopoulos et al. (2012) study a Social Security program that pro-
vides health insurance coverage to SSDI beneficiaries while they await 
Medicare eligibility. Weathers and Stegman find that these accelerated 
benefits increased mental health and physical health one year after 
enrollment. Although they find no evidence of changes in mortality, 
they point out that this increased health could lower costs once people 
are on SSDI. Michalopoulos et al. find that the accelerated benefits pro-
gram resulted in people having fewer unmet medical needs and reduced 
out-of-pocket spending on medical care. They also find that accelerated 
benefits enrollees were more likely to search for work. These results 
indicate that the ACA may cause SSDI recipients to be healthier and 










By providing greater access to health care, the ACA may make it 
easier for people to obtain the documentation necessary to prove they 
have a disability. As part of the application for disability, applicants 
need to provide medical records about their disabilities, as well as con-
tact information for all the relevant health care professionals, laboratory 
and test results, and the names of medicines they take (Social Security 
Administration 2014b). Making the documentation of a disability easier 
could result in more people applying for coverage or an increase in the 
acceptance rate among those who apply for benefits. 
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION 
Basic Program Information 
Workers’ compensation pays all medical bills for individuals with 
work-related injuries and diseases. Unlike federal disability, workers’
compensation is a state-level program. Therefore, all workers’ compen-
sation programs are a little different from each other. In some states, 
private insurance companies administer workers’ compensation, while 
in others, the states are the sole providers of insurance. For workers 
who miss more than three to seven days of work, workers’ compensa-
tion also replaces lost wages through indemnity benefits. The injured 
workers’ weekly benefits are a function of their weekly earnings and are 
subject to state-level maximums. In all states except Texas and Okla-
homa, workers’ compensation insurance is mandatory for employers. 
Injured workers receiving indemnity benefits usually first receive 
temporary total disability (TTD). They receive these benefits until they 
are able to return to work or are evaluated for permanent disability ben-
efits. They will be evaluated for permanent disability benefits after they 
have reached the state limit for temporary benefits or the physician has 
determined they have reached “maximum medical improvement.” Per-
manent disability benefits comprise two separate types of benefits: per-
manent total disability (PTD) and permanent partial disability (PPD). 
PTD and PPD benefits in that injured workers receive benefits based 
on their average weekly wages subject to the state maximum. Workers 
stop receiving benefits when they have healed, returned to work, or 
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reached the state maximum number of weeks for PTD eligibility. With 
PPD benefits, workers are generally given a partial impairment rating 
or assigned a fixed schedule of benefits. People are typically allowed to 
work while receiving PPD benefits. (See McInerney and Simon [2012] 
for a more thorough discussion of different benefit types and Hunt 
[2004] for a discussion of the adequacy of those benefits.) 
In 2011, nearly 126 million workers were covered by workers’ com-
pensation insurance (Sengupta, Baldwin, and Reno 2013). Employers 
paid over $77 billion for coverage, and workers received over $60 bil-
lion from the system. The majority of workers’ compensation cases— 
around 76 percent—are medical-only cases and do not involve payments 
for missed work. Figure 5.3 shows workers’ compensation spending on 
medical and wage replacement over time. Spending for wage replace-
ment has been falling since the early 1990s, while medical spending has 
continued to rise. The share of medical benefits as a percentage of the 
total benefits paid for workers’ compensation has risen from around 30 
percent in the early 1980s to approximately 50 percent in 2011. 
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The ACA’s Potential Effect on Workers’ Compensation 
The ACA will change the incentive to claim workers’ compensation 
by expanding health insurance coverage, which reduces the benefit of 
filing for workers’ compensation, regardless of whether the injury is 
work related. People without health insurance have an increased incen-
tive to claim that their medical issues are work related even if they 
are not so that workers’ compensation will pay the bills. Thus, having 
health insurance may lower the incidence of people misclassifying non-
work-related injuries. If an injury occurs at work, health insurance may 
still deter workers from filing a claim for workers’ compensation if it is 
costly, and there are several reasons to believe that it is. First, employ-
ers may dissuade their employees from filing workers’ compensation 
because they fear it will increase their premiums. Second, injured work-
ers might not want to deal with the associated paperwork, or they may 
fear that they will be called on to prove that their injury was caused 
by work, which is not always easy to do. Filing with health insurance, 
meanwhile, requires no burden of proof. Third, there may be a stigma 
associated with filing a workers’ compensation claim. 
According to some studies, a large percentage of workers do not 
file a workers’ compensation claim because they have health insur-
ance. Biddle and Roberts (2003) surveyed Michigan workers identified 
by physicians as likely having work-related injuries. Of these injured 
workers, only 30 percent filed for workers’ compensation. Of the 70 
percent who did not file for workers’ compensation, 36 percent said that 
having health insurance was the reason. However, Lakdawalla, Reville, 
and Seabury (2007) show that people with health insurance are gener-
ally more likely to receive workers’ compensation. They hypothesize 
that large firms may be more likely to provide workers with information 
about workers’ compensation and to encourage them to use it. 
Heaton (2012) studies the impact of Massachusetts’s health insur-
ance reform on workers’ compensation by projecting how many emer-
gency room bills would have been paid for by the state’s workers’
compensation system in the absence of the 2006 reform based on 2005 
Massachusetts data. Heaton finds that the health care reform resulted in 
workers’ compensation paying for 5–10 percent fewer emergency room 
medical bills. He finds similarly sized decreases for both the overall 
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In Dillender (2015a), using administrative medical claims data 
from Texas, I study the effect of health insurance on young adults filing 
workers’ compensation claims. I compare individuals just before and 
after they turn 26, the age at which young adults lose access to dependent 
coverage under the ACA. This approach yields estimates of the causal 
effect of health insurance on workers’ compensation filing. I find that 
immediately after people turn 26, initial claims filed for injuries with 
easy-to-delay reporting increase, while the overall amount of medical 
treatment that workers’ compensation pays for increases by 8 percent. 
Despite these increases, overall workers’ compensation medical costs 
do not increase dramatically for 26-year-olds because the majority of 
this increased care is for less expensive services. These results suggest 
that health insurance affects workers’ compensation filing, particularly 
at the intensive margin, but not necessarily for the types of services that 
drive medical costs. 
Overall, the empirical studies suggest that workers’ compensation 
will pay for less medical care once more people have health insurance. 
In Dillender (2015a), I find evidence that the claiming behavior of peo-
ple with minor medical needs is influenced by having health insurance. 
This would suggest that the overall savings to workers’ compensation 
would be modest. Heaton (2012), however, finds evidence that people 
with greater medical needs respond to health reform, which suggests 
that the cost savings to workers’ compensation could be large. Thus, 
while the evidence strongly suggests that the ACA will decrease the 
likelihood that health care is paid for by workers’ compensation, the 
size of the cost savings to workers’ compensation is difficult to assess. 
Also, if people with more severe medical issues respond to workers’
compensation, indemnity claims may also respond by falling slightly 
as a result of the ACA; however, no research has explored if and how 
indemnity claims are affected by health insurance. 
By influencing some people to file claims with health insurance 
instead of workers’ compensation, the ACA may result in cost savings 
to the workers’ compensation system. However, the ACA may also 
change the type of insurance plans people have by encouraging the use 
of more high-deductible plans—for example, with a 40 percent excise 
tax on health plans with individual premiums above $10,200 and fam-
ily premiums above $27,500 starting in 2018 (Zuckerman 2010). Since 

















claims onto workers’ compensation, which will still provide first-dollar 
coverage. 
The changes to Medicare discussed previously also have implica-
tions for workers’ compensation, especially if the IPAB curtails Medi-
care costs by cutting reimbursement rates. Many states tie workers’
compensation reimbursement rates to Medicare reimbursement rates. 
By cutting Medicare reimbursement rates, the ACA would also lower 
workers’ compensation reimbursement rates in many states unless state 
governments react by changing their laws. Thus, the ACA will lower the 
amount of money spent on medical care. However, this may cause pro-
viders in these states to be less likely to accept workers’ compensation 
patients since they will receive less money for treating them. Even in 
states that do not tie their reimbursement rates to Medicare, changes in 
Medicare rates may affect workers’ compensation. Auerbach, Heaton, 
and Brantley (2014) argue that when Medicare pays physicians less, 
it may cause physicians to increase prices for other payers or provide 
more services to other patients that provide higher margins. If Medicare 
no longer pays providers for certain readmissions, it may have the same 
effect if it decreases physicians’ profits from Medicare patients. 
Auerbach, Heaton, and Brantley (2014) also argue that the ACA
could change the composition of the labor force. A large literature in 
economics finds that the need for health insurance has induced people 
to participate in the labor force (Antwi, Moriya, and Simon 2013; Blau 
and Gilleskie 2001; Buchmueller and Carpenter 2012; Dillender 2015b; 
Nyce et al. 2013; Strumpf 2010). Prior to the ACA, there were few 
good health insurance options for the near elderly outside employment. 
Auerbach, Heaton, and Brantley argue that the exchanges and subsidies 
will allow older people to retire sooner, which may reduce costs, since 
older workers typically take longer to recover from injuries and require 
more treatment. 
POTENTIAL EFFECTS OF THE ACA ON BOTH PROGRAMS 
As both disability insurance and workers’ compensation insurance 
tap into the same medical resources that health insurance does, they 
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system more generally. One potential impact of the ACA is to improve 
the health of the general population. Research typically finds that health 
insurance improves health (Card, Dobkin, and Maestas 2009; Doyle 
2005; Finkelstein et al. 2012), and Courtemanche and Zapata (2014) 
find that people reported being in better health as a result of the Massa-
chusetts reform. The ACA also has a focus on prevention by eliminating 
copayments for preventive services and including an annual wellness 
visit as a part of Medicare. This has the potential to lower the likelihood 
that people become disabled or suffer an injury while at work. 
The ACA has various strategies to make medical treatment less 
expensive, such as with the Patient-Centered Outcomes Research Insti-
tute, which focuses on identifying effective treatments. The ACA also 
implements rules that establish electronic health records, which could 
also reduce costs while improving care. By identifying effective treat-
ments and digitizing medical records, the ACA has the potential to 
lower costs for medical care paid under both disability insurance and 
workers’ compensation. 
A potential issue with the dramatic increase in insurance coverage 
promised by the ACA is that it will put more stress on existing medi-
cal resources. Hofer, Abraham, and Moscovice (2011) point out that 
there was already a shortage of primary care doctors before the ACA
and suggest that the increased demand from the ACA could increase 
the shortages. Huang and Finegold (2013) find that certain areas will 
be hit hard by an increase in demand, while other areas will be able 
to meet the demand. They estimate that 7 million people live in areas 
where demand for primary care may exceed supply by 10 percent after 
the ACA. Physician shortages may increase wait times for injured and 
disabled people before they can receive medical care. 
CONCLUSION 
By overhauling the health insurance system and making many 
broad changes to medical care, the ACA promises to change the health 
care landscape. In this chapter, I describe the changes taking place 
because of the ACA, as well as their implications for two major social 















siderable evidence that suggests that expanding health insurance could 
affect claiming behavior for both disability and workers’ compensation. 
For disability insurance, some evidence suggests that expanding health 
insurance may have countervailing effects on overall disability cover-
age. For workers’ compensation, the evidence points to health insur-
ance covering some of the costs that workers’ compensation insurance 
was previously paying. 
Apart from affecting claiming behavior, the ACA will likely affect 
these social insurance programs in other ways as well. The ACA’s many 
cost-saving measures will likely have spillover effects for both disabil-
ity insurance and workers’ compensation, especially those measures 
that aim to identify the most effective treatments. The aspects of the 
ACA that aim to improve population health may also result in fewer 
work-related injuries and less disability, thereby saving money for both 
programs. One negative aspect of the ACA for both of these programs 
may be that the increase in insurance coverage puts more strain on med-
ical resources, which could make seeing a doctor more difficult. 
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The most controversial part of the Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act (ACA) is the mandate that individuals purchase health insur-
ance. The individual mandate is justified on economic grounds to avoid 
an adverse selection death spiral in the individual health insurance mar-
ket. The constitutionality of the individual mandate was challenged in 
court, with the plaintiffs arguing that the government could not compel 
individuals to participate in a market. However, the Supreme Court nar-
rowly upheld the constitutionality of the individual mandate, allowing 
that part of the ACA to continue to be implemented gradually. 
Lost from much of the public discourse about the ACA was that a 
major component of the original act—one that encouraged a special 
form of health insurance but not through a mandate—was dropped by 
the government and will not be implemented. The Community Liv-
ing Assistance Services and Supports Act would have created a mar-
ket for long-term care insurance, called the CLASS program. The 
goal was to provide assistance to working-age individuals who had 
difficulty performing daily activities and required long-term care ser-
vices. The CLASS program was decidedly different from the ACA’s 
approach to standard health insurance because it was to be voluntary 
and entirely self-financed; no one questioned its constitutionality. It was 
also extremely important politically in getting the entire ACA passed 
because it improved the Congressional Budget Office’s (CBO) 10-year 
economic forecast for the entire act. 
Despite the lack of controversy surrounding its constitutionality, 






and marketing of the CLASS program in the fall of 2011 (Gleckman 
2011). The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) dis-
banded the CLASS program office, and the then-secretary Kathleen 
Sebelius stopped efforts to design the program. Congress has no plans 
to rescue it. 
Why was the CLASS program dropped? What economic challenges 
did it face, given that it was not challenged on constitutional grounds? 
What is the proper role of government in providing an insurance mar-
ket? This chapter addresses these questions. 
BACKGROUND ISSUES 
The greatest financial uncertainty for the elderly is not for food, 
pharmaceuticals, or even inpatient care, it is for long-term care (Norton, 
Wang, and Stearns 2006). The financial burden of long-term care (either 
nursing home care or home health care) can be large because insurance 
coverage is often modest, and because care can continue for a decade 
or more. Medicare insurance is quite complete for inpatient care, outpa-
tient care, and pharmaceuticals, especially when considering Medigap 
and Medicaid policies that help with copayments and deductibles. But 
Medicare coverage of long-term care is quite limited and requires sub-
stantial cost sharing. This leaves long-term care as the greatest expen-
diture risk. 
It is hard to predict years in advance who will need nursing home 
care. Some may die before they need care; others will lose their spouses, 
their health, and then their independence. When there is high finan-
cial risk and difficulty in predicting who will need benefits, there is an 
opportunity for private insurance. 
Despite the apparent demand for long-term care insurance for the 
elderly, there are many reasons private long-term care insurance is sel-
dom sold. This has been discussed extensively in the literature (see, 
e.g., Brown and Finkelstein [2007, 2011]; Frank [2012]; and Norton 
[2000]). Here is a brief summary of the most important reasons the 
private insurance market is small. Adverse selection means that those 
who are most likely to need long-term care are most likely to want to 
buy it; insurance companies may target individuals who statistically are 
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least likely to need it. Moral hazard is also often a problem in insurance 
markets. For long-term care there is both standard moral hazard and a 
version proposed by Pauly (1990), in which elderly people do not buy 
insurance so that their children, the presumed future decision makers, 
will not put them in a nursing home. Loading (administrative) costs are 
high because most sales are made to individuals and because adverse 
selection requires background and health checks. Medicaid is a close 
substitute for part of the population who would qualify for Medicaid 
quickly. Insurance companies now offer capped daily benefits, instead 
of paying a fraction of the cost (like most other health insurance), 
because of the difficulty in predicting future nursing home costs (Cutler 
1996). This reduces the insurance value of the product and lowers its 
desirability. Some elderly people greatly underestimate their own risk 
of needing long-term care, again lowering demand (Frank 2012). Given 
all these reasons combined, it is perhaps a wonder anyone buys long-
term care insurance. 
The target population for the CLASS program was working-age 
adults who face a small risk of disability during their working years. 
This population is younger on average than those who first consider 
purchasing long-term care insurance. While the specifics of financial 
uncertainty and lack of insurance are slightly different than for the older 
population insuring against the need for nursing home care, the main 
themes apply to this younger population. If someone becomes disabled 
to a degree that they cannot work or live independently, then she faces 
enormous financial risks. Having a steady supply of cash could make 
the difference between remaining independent at home and going to an 
institution, but currently there is not an adequate private market for this. 
Presumably, the same issues of adverse selection, moral hazard, load-
ing, competition from close substitutes, and misperceptions also apply. 
An alternative to formal long-term care (nursing home and home 
health care) is informal care, unpaid care that is typically provided by 
close relatives (Grabowski, Norton, and Van Houtven 2012). Studies 
have shown that receiving informal care can reduce formal home health 
and nursing home use and cost (Van Houtven and Norton 2004, 2008). 
Informal caregivers may not only help keep loved ones out of nursing 
homes, they also may enjoy time with their relatives and set a good 
example for the next generation. However, there can be costs too. The 
caregiver may need to quit his job or work reduced hours, and the care-
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giver’s own health may suffer during the course of helping others (Coe 
and Van Houtven 2009; Do et al. 2014). 
When there is no private market for something that some people 
clearly desire, there may be room for the government to step in and 
create a market. Justification would depend on whether the government 
can overcome existing market failures. Given this background, there is 
clearly room for discussion about the possible role of government in 
creating a market for long-term care insurance. 
THE CLASS ACT 
The CLASS Act was Title VIII of the ACA. The purpose was to 
provide a cash benefit for nonmedical care and for support to help peo-
ple live in the community. The cash benefit could have been used to 
purchase home health care, to reimburse relatives for their time, or to 
purchase other support. One goal was to keep people out of expensive 
nursing homes and thereby keep them in their homes, where they are 
generally happier. Another goal was to reduce government expenditures 
on long-term care. For critical summaries of the CLASS Act, see Miller 
(2011) and Wiener (2012). 
The CLASS program was one form of consumer-directed long-
term care services and was related to the policy of cash and counsel-
ing, which provides both cash to needy elderly persons with no strings 
attached and also counseling about effective ways to spend the cash. 
Again, the goals of cash and counseling programs were to keep people 
in their homes and lower the cost of long-term care. Cash and coun-
seling demonstration programs in three states began in 1998 (Doty, 
Mahoney, and Sciegaj 2010) and are now used in several states (San 
Antonio et al. 2010; Simon-Rusinowitz et al. 2010) and in several other 
countries (Low et al. 2012; Nadash et al. 2012). 
The two key features of the CLASS program were in stark con-
trast to the standard health insurance policy in the ACA: it was volun-
tary and self-financed. Because no one would have been compelled to 
buy it, there was no debate over the constitutionality of the policy. Of 
course, this was potentially a great weakness of the CLASS Act—if not 
 
 
The Community Living Assistance Services and Supports Act  107 
enough healthy people signed up for it, it would not have been finan-
cially sustainable. 
Being self-financed, the CLASS program would not have been 
subsidized from general tax revenues; all benefits would have been 
paid from premiums. Furthermore, the program was required to be 
financially sustainable for at least 75 years. This politically important 
requirement imposed tough conditions on running the program. Long-
run financial solvency is hard to maintain, as will be discussed below. 
There were several other important provisions about benefits in the 
CLASS Act. Premiums were to be used for consumer-directed services, 
meaning that the consumer would decide how to spend the money, sim-
ilar to cash and counseling programs. For example, the money could 
have been used to pay for informal care by a son or daughter. The ben-
efit, by statute, had to be at least $50 per day, but it could also have 
been adjusted by the level of disability. There were no lifetime limits 
on benefits. Additional benefits included advocacy and financial advice. 
The CLASS program insurance had no underwriting, meaning 
that premiums were not adjusted for risk, such as for health status or 
chronic conditions; all persons of the same age paid the same premium. 
A healthy person in a low-risk job would pay the same premium as a 
chronically disabled person who is waiting for the end of the vesting 
period to start collecting benefits. Therefore, the actuarial value of the 
insurance is high for a person with a high risk of needing the insurance, 
and low for a person with low risk. The low actuarial value for persons 
with low risk contributes greatly to the problem of adverse selection 
because demand for such insurance depends on the actuarial value of 
what is being purchased. 
Eligibility for receiving benefits from the CLASS Act had two con-
ditions, beyond signing up and paying premiums. First, a person would 
have to pay into the system for at least five years before being eligible 
to receive any benefits. This was an extraordinarily long vesting period 
for individual insurance and was necessary because of concerns about 
adverse selection. The other condition for eligibility is that during the 
vesting period the person had to be working. However, the definition of 
working had a low bar—annual earnings of at least $1,200. Even work-
ing at minimum wage, it would take fewer than four hours per week to 







Despite the length of the written legislation, the ACA left many 
important details to be worked out after passage. The HHS secretary 
was charged with determining many specific details within the broad 
parameters outlined in the ACA. For example, eligibility was to be 
determined primarily by disability level, but the details of what that 
level would be (such as activities of daily living or mental health) were 
up to the secretary. Eligibility could have also potentially changed if the 
person did in fact enter a nursing home or hospital or become Medicaid 
eligible. For example, if the one goal of the CLASS Act were to reduce 
admissions to nursing homes, why should someone receive the cash 
benefit after admission? By law, the benefit level needed to be at least 
$50 per day. The cash benefits could have been adjusted for the level 
of disability. Also unspecified was whether there would be differences 
by financial need at the time, by family status or geographic location. 
Although the premiums were not allowed to be risk adjusted, it was 
left open whether premiums would be adjusted for income (or wealth), 
student status, or marital status. The big unknown was the price elastic-
ity for premiums—if it was high, then small increases in the premium 
would have large detrimental effects on enrollment, revenues, and long-
run financial stability. 
Had the CLASS Act been implemented, it would have been rolled 
out on a timetable roughly similar to the rest of the ACA. The HHS sec-
retary was due to release rules for eligibility and enrollment in January 
2012. By October 2012 the secretary was to announce benefit design 
and premiums. People could have begun purchasing insurance by 2014. 
However, in the fall of 2011, the secretary announced that the CLASS 
program would not be implemented (Gleckman 2011). 
The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) scores every proposed 
piece of legislation over a 10-year horizon to see what the net finan-
cial effect will be on the national budget. A positive score means that 
the legislation will save more money than it will spend. Because of 
proposed expansions to Medicaid and subsidies to purchase individual 
health insurance, there was concern that the overall score for the ACA
would be negative. The CLASS Act was existing legislation that could 
be added to the rest of the ACA. Most importantly, it was sure to have a 
positive score over a 10-year period. The act’s five-year vesting period 
ensures that people pay in for many years before receiving benefits. 
So, over a 10-year horizon (especially with a few years of start up at 
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the beginning), the CLASS Act was sure to improve the overall CBO 
score. This is one way that the act became important politically in the 
development of the ACA. 
The CBO had to make reasonable assumptions about how the pro-
gram would be run, such as that the average monthly premium would 
be $123 and that the average daily benefit would be $75. It assumed 
modest reductions in Medicaid payments on long-term care, and also 
that the program would remain solvent over a 75-year period. With 
those assumptions, the CBO estimated that the CLASS Act alone would 
reduce the federal deficit by $74 billion over 10 years. This was roughly 
half of the total projected savings of $138 billion for the entire ACA. 
ECONOMIC PROBLEMS 
The CLASS program faced formidable economic challenges. The 
goal was to create an insurance product that provided needed services 
to the general public while also remaining financially viable in the long 
run. The legislation set certain parameters—particularly on benefits, 
eligibility, and underwriting—that made it impossible to succeed. In 
this section I review the economic challenges with designing such a 
system and why the program was doomed to fail. 
The first question is, why should the government be involved in this 
market at all? Why not leave it to the private sector? If it were possible 
to sell an insurance product to the general population and make money 
(the basic terms and conditions of the CLASS Act), the private market 
would figure out how to do it. And if the private market cannot sell an 
insurance product at a profit under these terms, the government would 
need to think hard about whether a public solution could work when a 
private solution cannot. 
There is a modest-sized private market for long-term care insur-
ance, but it is now shrinking. To be clear, this private market is aimed at 
providing insurance for the elderly against the risk of paying for nursing 
home care and home health care. This risk grows rapidly after age 70. 
The CLASS Act, in contrast, aims to provide services for working-age 
adults who become disabled, although the benefits could continue into 
old age. Therefore, while most of the issues are similar, the target audi-
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ence for typical private long-term care insurance is slightly different 
than for the CLASS program. 
Given the large and variable out-of-pocket expenditure risk faced 
by working-age adults, why is the private market so small? There are 
many reasons why insurance markets can fail. I review in more detail 
the list of reasons for the failure of the long-term care insurance mar-
ket discussed before, and I further explore to what extent these reasons 
apply to the CLASS program. The two general problems for nearly all 
insurance markets are adverse selection and moral hazard. Adverse 
selection is a problem for private long-term care insurance if the bad 
risks are more likely to try to purchase insurance. An individual is likely 
to know more about her own health and health behaviors than the insur-
ance company, such as risk of injury at work, family medical history 
(how long did her parents and other relatives live, and what were the 
causes of death?), household income and wealth, and family relation-
ships (would a daughter be likely to provide informal care?). Adverse 
selection problems are mitigated somewhat by the long time horizon 
(what will happen to health, behaviors, and family status in 30 years?) 
and by the fact that, given demographics, the insurance company knows 
the actuarial risks extremely well. “Moral hazard” refers to a change in 
behavior after a person purchases insurance because the price of care is 
lower for an insured person. Unlike insurance for nursing home care, 
where few people desire to live in such a facility, for the working-age 
population cash benefits have high value. 
For the CLASS program market, both adverse selection and moral 
hazard were likely to be even bigger problems than for the elderly long-
term care insurance market. Any working-age adult with a chronic dis-
ability would have immediately signed up for the program. This prob-
lem was clearly foremost in the minds of the legislators who drafted 
this legislation because of the five-year vesting period, an astonishingly 
long time for any form of insurance. Moral hazard would also be a big 
problem because the benefit could be used in a wide variety of ways, 
including giving the cash to family members. Who would not want such 
a benefit? 
There are cases where private markets break down, leaving a role 
for government intervention (Norton and Newhouse 1994). In such 
cases, government policy may have had the ability to surmount these 
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way to overcome moral hazard is to require broad participation. The 
ACA mandates insurance purchase (or a fine) to ensure broad participa-
tion of all, including the healthy, thereby combating adverse selection. 
However, participation was strictly voluntary for the CLASS program. 
Therefore, the government did not use any coercive means to combat 
adverse selection and relied instead on marketing campaigns to encour-
age enrollment by the relatively young and healthy. The restriction on 
underwriting makes adverse selection even worse. By not pricing the 
insurance to reflect expected costs (other than age), it is then relatively 
inexpensive for those chronically ill and relatively expensive for those 
who are healthy. This pricing encourages purchase by those most likely 
to use it and discourages purchase by those least likely to use it. There 
is a reason that insurance companies want to adjust premiums to reflect 
expected costs. When that pricing strategy is not allowed, it encourages 
adverse selection and will quickly undermine the financial viability of 
the insurance. 
One way that the CLASS program would probably have had a com-
petitive edge over private market rivals is through loading, or adminis-
trative overhead, which adds to the premium and makes the insurance 
attractive only to those who are quite risk averse. The load for private 
long-term care insurance has been estimated to be about 32 percent 
(Brown and Finkelstein 2011). It is high because it is mostly sold to 
individuals, with brokers receiving high commission fees. The govern-
ment presumably could have sold the insurance with lower overhead, 
which lowers the premium and raises the value of the insurance, thereby 
increasing demand. 
An additional challenge to the CLASS Act insurance was that it 
would have competed with a variety of products that are partial sub-
stitutes. Social Security pays disability benefits to people who have 
worked but now have a medical condition expected to last at least a 
year. Worker’s compensation pays benefits to workers injured on the 
job. Medicaid provides both health insurance and long-term care insur-
ance to people who meet their state’s eligibility requirements, and those 
can include working-age adults with disabilities who have low incomes. 
And many people who need care assume (often correctly) that they can 
rely on their spouse, family, or extended family to provide long-term 
care services if they are ever needed. Alternative forms of insurance 
lower the demand for another substitute insurance product. 
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The long time span from initial purchase to ultimate use of ben-
efits causes several problems for this insurance market. One of these is 
nondiversifiable intertemporal risk (Cutler 1996; Norton 2000). Long-
term care insurance is usually for the future, not the upcoming year, 
as with regular health insurance. There are two big unknowns about 
expenditure risk in, say, 30 years: probability of use and price. The risk 
of probability of use can be diversified over a large general population. 
The price risk (what will the cost of home health care be in 30 years?) 
cannot be diversified across the population; large price increases affect 
everyone. Insurance companies do not like to take on nondiversifiable 
risk. Several decades ago, long-term care insurance companies switched 
from paying a percentage of fees (like most regular health insurance) to 
paying a flat daily fee. The capitated per diem limits the insurance com-
pany’s exposure to the risk of price inflation. However, it also greatly 
reduces the value of purchasing insurance and hence lowers demand. 
The CLASS Act offers a capitated per diem benefit (perhaps adjusted 
for disability level). This means that the insurance protects against the 
extensive margin of any use but not the risk of intensive margin of the 
amount of use. That is, if the benefit is $50 per day and you need $200 
to live independently, you are not protected for the extra $150. 
Another problem with the long time horizon is that over an extended 
period, some people may lapse their premium payments. This could be 
due to the loss of the means to pay, a change in mind about the value 
of continuing to purchase the insurance, or simple forgetfulness. For 
private long-term care insurance, lapse in payment is a wonderful thing. 
When someone lapses, they forfeit past payments, which become pure 
profits to the company. Lapsed policies have been an important part of 
the business model of selling long-term care insurance. When a policy 
lapses, then the individual has to start over, like a new customer, at a 
higher price appropriate for her current age. In fact, one reason many 
insurance companies are no longer selling new long-term care insur-
ance policies is that the lapse rates have declined, squeezing margins. 
Politically, the federal government could not encourage lapses as a way 
to keep the CLASS program solvent. The CLASS Act had a provision 
to allow a person to reenroll at a higher premium after lapsing, but 
there was a tricky balance. Minimizing lapses reduces financial viabil-
ity. Also, if the policy on lapses is too weak, allowing people to skip 
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To be successful, the CLASS program would have needed many 
healthy low-risk people to enroll. One way to increase enrollment 
would have been to encourage employers to offer the insurance as part 
of the benefit package. Getting the word out through large employ-
ers, and having people make decisions about the CLASS program at 
the same time as other benefit decisions, would undoubtedly increase 
enrollment. Another way to increase enrollment through employers 
would have been to offer it as an opt-out benefit. That is, the default 
would be to have employees signed up, although an employee could 
opt out by actively making a choice. Studies of benefit choice have 
shown that employees tend to go with default choices and tend to stick 
with past choices (Madrian and Shea 2001). An opt-out system offered 
through employers would dramatically increase enrollment; however, it 
is not clear whether employers would want to encourage employees to 
take up this insurance. 
The legal status of premiums paid by the employee and collected 
by the employer complicates employers’ ability to offer CLASS pro-
gram insurance. Legally, if an employee has Social Security and other 
federal benefits deducted from their paychecks, then they get credit for 
having paid them; the employer is responsible for turning the premi-
ums over to the IRS. If the employer is negligent in paying the IRS, 
then the employee is not held responsible. However, the legal status of 
the CLASS program premiums was different. Unless the IRS modified 
its rules, an employer could have collected premiums for the CLASS 
program and not turned them over, and the employee would be held 
responsible. Presumably the IRS could have amended its policies, but 
that did not happen. 
Finally, there was the big unanswered question about what would 
happen if, down the road, the CLASS Act was later declared financially 
unstable. Suppose, for example, that the CLASS Act went into effect, 
and for its first 20 years was deemed financially solvent in the long run. 
But then, for some unfixable reason in the twenty-first year it was no 
longer financially solvent over the 75-year time horizon, as required 
by Congress. What would happen to everyone’s premiums? Would 
people get them back? Would they get them back with interest? Forfeit 
everything? I asked several policymakers that question and never got 
an answer. No one wanted to talk about that possibility. Yet, I think the 
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ity of the CLASS Act. Why should I invest in something that is known 
to be financially risky if I do not know what will happen to my invest-
ment? If the CLASS Act promised to reimburse all enrollees, it would 
make the initial investment in the insurance more financially attractive. 
CONCLUSION 
In summary, the CLASS Act offered an insurance policy that was 
extremely expensive for relatively healthy people and thereby discour-
aged enrollment due to adverse selection. It did not protect against one 
major form of risk (risk of future price inflation), and it was unclear 
what would happen to paid premiums if the program were to be declared 
financially unstable in the long run. Having lower loading would not 
make up for the other fiscal problems. Given the constraints, the CLASS 
Act could never be financially solvent or fiscally responsible. 
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The Role of Private Health 
Insurance in the Medicare Program 
M. Kate Bundorf 
Stanford University 
Medicare, the federal program that provides health insurance for 
aged and disabled people, is popular in the United States. While the 
majority of Americans report that they prefer spending cuts to higher 
taxes to reduce the government deficit, fewer than one in five support 
major reductions to Medicare (Kaiser Family Foundation 2011). But 
Medicare is expensive. In 2012, program expenditures totaled $574 bil-
lion—over $12,000 for each person enrolled (Lew et al. 2013). Medi-
care spending as a share of gross domestic product (GDP) is forecasted 
to increase from 3.6 percent in 2012 to 5.8 percent by 2035 as growth in 
Medicare spending continues to outpace growth in GDP. Between 2008 
and 2012, approximately half of the growth in Medicare spending was 
driven by increasing utilization per beneficiary, and half was driven by 
rising enrollment due to the aging of the population (Chandra, Holmes, 
and Skinner 2013). 
Devoting a greater share of resources to health care is not in itself 
necessarily problematic. Most economists believe that technologi-
cal change has been the key driver of the persistent rise in health care 
spending both in the United States and in other countries (Fuchs 1996), 
and technological innovation in areas such as cardiovascular care, neo-
natal intensive care, and the treatment of mental health conditions has 
dramatically improved health and well-being for many (Cutler 2004). 
In other words, health care spending is often “worth it” in the sense 
that the benefits we gain from health care services exceed their cost. 
Higher spending on health care is also a natural consequence of rising 
income. As people become wealthier, they devote a greater share of 
their incomes to health care as the incremental value they receive from 
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In the context of the Medicare program, however, current spending 
levels are problematic for two reasons. First, Medicare is financed pri-
marily through taxes, and program spending is a key driver of the $1.2 
trillion U.S. federal budget deficit. Between 1973 and 2012, the per-
centage of the federal budget devoted to Medicare increased from 3.7 
percent to 15.6 percent, and Medicare, Medicaid, and Social Security 
account for the vast majority of the projected growth of federal spend-
ing over the next decade (Congressional Budget Office 2013). 
A more fundamental issue, however, is whether the current amount 
spent on Medicare produces enough value. A large body of litera-
ture documenting differences across geographic areas in the use of
Medicare-financed services points to substantial inefficiency in the 
delivery of Medicare-financed services (Institute of Medicine 2013). 
Area-level spending differences do not appear to be explained by dif-
ferences in health status of beneficiaries (Fisher et al. 2003; MedPAC 
2011), and beneficiaries in high-use areas do not appear to be more 
satisfied with their care or have better patient outcomes (Baicker and 
Chandra 2004; Fisher et al. 2003; Skinner, Staiger, and Fisher 2006). 
Based on these types of studies, researchers have estimated that 20–30 
percent of Medicare spending provides little to no improvement in 
health (Institute of Medicine 2011). In short, not only does there exist 
enormous opportunity to provide Medicare-financed services more effi-
ciently, but reducing the rate of growth of Medicare spending is essen-
tial for fiscal stability. 
Very few Medicare beneficiaries rely solely on the traditional 
Medicare program for insurance coverage. Because Medicare has 
relatively high deductibles and cost sharing for covered services and 
does not include long-term or dental care, most beneficiaries supple-
ment their Medicare coverage with additional private or public insur-
ance. State Medicaid programs provide publicly financed supplemen-
tal coverage for approximately 20 percent of beneficiaries with low 
incomes and modest assets, and approximately 30 percent of ben-
eficiaries receive supplemental insurance from a former employer, 
although employer-sponsored retiree coverage is expected to decline 
dramatically since the number of employers offering retiree health 
insurance to current workers has declined sharply in recent years
(Kaiser Family Foundation 2012). 
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Those without coverage from either Medicaid or former employers 
rely on highly regulated private insurance markets. Medicare Part C, 
or Medicare Advantage (MA), is a voluntary, private replacement for 
traditional Medicare, whereas Medigap is a private, individual policy 
that supplements Medicare. These two systems—private insurance 
supplementing and private insurance replacing a publicly funded ben-
efit—represent alternative models for how public and private insurance 
interact. This chapter examines these different approaches and identi-
fies the implications for Medicare reform. 
MEDICARE: THE BASICS 
Medicare provides health insurance for adults aged 65 and over and 
for younger people with disabilities, permanent kidney failure (end-
stage renal disease), or amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (Lou Gehrig’s dis-
ease). In 2012, Medicare covered 60 percent of the population—42.1 
million aged 65 or older and 8.5 million disabled—and program expen-
ditures totaled $574.2 billion (22 percent of national health spending) 
(Kaiser Family Foundation 2012; Lew et al. 2013). Prior to Medicare’s 
establishment in 1965, roughly half of older adults in the United States 
had health insurance; now, nearly all have coverage (Moon 1996). The 
federal program is funded primarily through taxes and is administered 
by the Centers for Medicaid and Medicare Services (CMS), which func-
tions as a public insurer, paying for services from private providers on 
behalf of Medicare beneficiaries. In 2012, Medicare covered 16 percent 
of the population and financed 22 percent of national health spending. 
Medicare is technically composed of four distinct parts, referred to 
as parts A–D. Parts A and B, which were established when Medicare 
was enacted in 1965, were modeled after the typical types of insurance 
coverage available in the private market at the time. Part A, the Hospital 
Insurance program, covers inpatient hospital services, skilled nursing 
facilities, hospice care, and some home health care. In 2013, Medicare 
beneficiaries paid a deductible of $1,184 for the first 60 days in the 
hospital and $296 per day in coinsurance for days 61–90. For years in 








time reserve days” with coinsurance of $592 per day. After the reserve 
days are used, beneficiaries pay all costs of additional hospital inpatient 
care. Part B, part of the Supplementary Medical Insurance program, 
covers physician, outpatient, home health, and preventive services. In 
2013, the deductible for Part B services was $147, and beneficiaries 
paid 20 percent of the Medicare-approved amount for most physician 
services. 
Part A is funded by a payroll tax, and most people do not pay a 
premium when they enroll. Part B, in contrast, is funded by general 
tax revenues and beneficiary premiums. The monthly premium in 2013 
was $104.90 for most beneficiaries but was higher for beneficiaries 
with incomes exceeding $85,000 for those filing individual income tax 
returns and $170,000 for those filing jointly. The vast majority of peo-
ple who enroll in Part A also enroll in Part B, likely because the value 
to the beneficiary of the benefits is high relative to the cost and because 
the process of enrolling is administratively straightforward (Remler and 
Glied 2003). In this chapter, we refer to the combination of Parts A and 
B as “traditional Medicare.” 
Part C, also known as the Medicare Advantage program (MA), 
allows beneficiaries to enroll in a private health insurance plan as an 
alternative to the traditional Part A and Part B benefits. A participating 
private plan agrees to provide Medicare-covered services for beneficia-
ries and receives a payment from Medicare on behalf of each enrollee. 
Part D, a highly subsidized outpatient prescription drug benefit, 
was established by the Medicare Modernization Act of 2003. The ben-
efit is delivered exclusively by private insurers, and beneficiaries must 
actively enroll in a private plan in order to obtain coverage. Insurers 
may offer Part D benefits as stand-alone plans or as part of an MA plan. 
Part D plans also charge beneficiaries premiums for enrolling, and the 
premiums vary across plans. Enrollee premiums are waived, however, 
for very low-income beneficiaries, and higher-income beneficiaries 
must pay an additional monthly premium. Although Part D is clearly an 
important component of Medicare coverage, in this chapter we focus 
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MEDICARE AND PRIVATE HEALTH INSURANCE 
Traditional Medicare coverage, the combination of Parts A and B, 
is characterized by broad access to health care providers and relatively 
high cost sharing. Most health care providers participate in Medicare, 
and beneficiaries with Parts A and B are free to seek care from any 
physician, in contrast to most private plans serving the under-65 mar-
ket, which restrict coverage to a limited set of providers. Due to its 
relatively high cost sharing, however, the Medicare basic benefit is sub-
stantively less generous than typical employer-sponsored coverage, and 
the cap on benefits for inpatient care exposes beneficiaries to significant 
financial risk (MedPAC 2011). On average, Medicare covers 64 percent 
of beneficiary spending on health care services for noninstitutionalized 
beneficiaries, and annual out-of-pocket liabilities average over $15,000 
for the top 2 percent of spenders (MedPAC 2011). 
Relatively few beneficiaries, however, are exposed to the cost-
sharing provisions of the basic benefit, since most have supplemental 
insurance. The Medicare program offers two models of how private insur-
ance interacts with publicly funded coverage: insurance supplementing 
publicly funded coverage (Medigap) and insurance replacing publicly 
funded coverage (MA). For both types of coverage, private plans com-
pete for enrollees in markets highly regulated at the federal level. 
Medigap 
A market for private insurance supplementing Medicare quickly 
emerged after the introduction of Medicare in 1965, and state regulation 
soon followed in response to marketing abuses by some insurers and 
concerns over the ability of Medicare beneficiaries to make informed 
decisions about private coverage (Cafferata 1985). Many states intro-
duced laws requiring minimum standards for nongroup Medigap poli-
cies in the 1970s, and in 1980 Congress passed legislation encouraging 
greater state-level regulation through a system of voluntary certification 
of Medicare supplemental policies (Government Accountability Office 
1986; McCall, Rice, and Hall 1987; McCall, Rice, and Sangl 1986). 
The Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1990, which shifted much of 





to the federal level and made requirements mandatory rather than vol-
untary, created the basic regulatory framework under which the market 
currently operates (Fox, Rice, and Alecxih 1995). The act mandated 
standardized benefits by restricting the sale of insurance supplement-
ing Medicare to a set of 10 predefined plans, identified as plans A–J, 
and created a six-month open enrollment period for 65-year-olds 
newly entering the program, requiring guaranteed issue and prohib-
iting the use of health information in rate setting during this period 
(McCormack et al. 1996). The set of standardized plans that insurers 
are allowed to offer has changed somewhat over time, and, with the 
introduction of Medicare Part D, plans covering prescription drugs are 
no longer sold. 
Medigap insurance helps beneficiaries pay for some of the health 
care costs that traditional Medicare does not cover. Table 7.1 describes 
the types of Medigap plans that insurers are permitted to sell. The plans 
cover primarily the coinsurance and deductibles associated with Parts A
and B. In particular, all plans are required to cover Part A coinsurance, 
as well as up to 365 additional hospital days after Medicare-covered 
hospital days have been used. All plans also cover either all or some of 
the coinsurance or copayments for Medicare Part B services. The most 
popular plans, C and F, also cover the Part A and Part B deductibles. 
Medicare Advantage 
The main alternative to Medigap insurance is a Part C private plan 
(Medicare Advantage). The Medicare Advantage program was estab-
lished by the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 and 
aimed to both expand the types of coverage available to Medicare 
beneficiaries and lower Medicare spending (McGuire, Newhouse, 
and Sinaiko 2011). The act authorized Medicare to contract with pri-
vate plans to provide Medicare-covered services for beneficiaries and 
allowed Medicare enrollees to replace traditional Medicare with cover-
age from a qualified private plan. Participating plans sign an annual 
contract with the CMS, agreeing to provide benefits to beneficiaries 
and receive a capitated payment from the CMS for each beneficiary 
who enrolls. Historically, the CMS linked plan payments to the level 
of Medicare spending among fee-for-service enrollees in a geographic 
area, setting payments at 95 percent of the adjusted average per capita 
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Table 7.1  Medigap Plans 
Medigap benefits (%) 
Medicare Part A coinsurance and hospital costs 
up to an additional 365 days after Medicare 
benefits are used up 
Medicare Part B coinsurance or copayment 
Blood (first 3 pints) 
Part A hospice care coinsurance or copayment 
Skilled nursing facility care coinsurance 




































































Medicare Part B deductible 100 100 
Medicare Part B excess charges 




100 100 100 
a Plan F also offers a high-deductible plan. If you choose this option, you must pay for Medicare-covered costs up to the deductible amount 
of $2,110 in 2013 before your Medigap plan pays anything.
b For Plans K and L, after you meet your out-of-pocket yearly limit and your yearly Part B deductible ($147 in 2013), the Medigap plan 
pays 100% of covered services for the rest of the calendar year. The out-of-pocket limit for Plan K is $4,800; for Plan L it is $2,400. 
c Plan N pays 100% of the Part B coinsurance, except for a copayment of up to $20 for some office visits and up to a $50 copayment for 








cost in the county and adjusting the payment for each enrollee for cer-
tain demographic characteristics (Pope et al. 2004). 
Plans must provide a minimum level of benefits equivalent to that 
of Medicare and often provide additional benefits, such as lower cost 
sharing and additional covered services. As in the under 65 market, 
most MA plans contract with a limited set of providers in a given area. 
Thus, when choosing between the traditional Medicare program and an 
MA plan, beneficiaries are generally exchanging lower cost sharing for 
restrictions on provider access. While plans may charge beneficiaries a 
premium for enrolling, within a given service area, the premium must 
not vary by beneficiary characteristics. 
The Balanced Budget Act of 1997 and subsequent legislation made 
a variety of changes to the program, including allowing types of plans 
other than HMOs to participate, changing the plan payment formula 
to encourage plans to enter in historically low-payment geographic 
areas, and requiring the CMS to improve its risk-adjustment meth-
ods (McGuire, Newhouse, and Sinaiko 2011). The act also extended 
the federal open enrollment period for Medigap plans to beneficiaries 
involuntarily disenrolling from MA plans under certain conditions such 
as the withdrawal of a plan from the market. 
HEALTH INSURANCE AND THE USE OF MEDICAL CARE 
This section discusses some basic principles in the economics of 
insurance design, and the next section will apply these concepts in the 
context of private insurance interacting with the Medicare program. 
While the main purpose of insurance is to protect consumers from finan-
cial risk associated with poor health, it can also affect patient incen-
tives when seeking treatment. Getting sick or having an accident can be 
unpredictable, and the associated medical care is often very expensive. 
A person purchasing health insurance exchanges an upfront premium 
payment for compensation for medical care expenses if she gets sick 
in the future. People who are risk averse benefit from the reduction in 
uncertainty in their future financial resources. 
When patients are fully reimbursed for their medical care spend-
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the cost of care when choosing among alternative treatments. In other 
words, by reducing the price of using medical care, insurance creates 
incentives for patients to use more care and more expensive care (Pauly 
1968). Economists refer to this phenomenon as “moral hazard”—
people behave differently when they have insurance than when they do 
not. The theoretical problem associated with moral hazard is not just 
that patients use more care, but that they use care that is costly relative 
to its benefits. 
The Rand Health Insurance Experiment, a large randomized, con-
trolled trial of the effects of health insurance on health care utilization 
and spending conducted in the 1970s, demonstrated that this effect is 
quantitatively important (Newhouse 1993). The study investigators ran-
domly assigned people to health insurance plans with differing levels of 
cost sharing and then carefully tracked the quantity and type of medical 
care they used. People randomized to a 95 percent coinsurance plan—in 
other words, those who paid for nearly all their health care expenditures 
out of pocket—had 39 percent lower health care spending than those 
randomized to a “free care” plan that provided full coverage (Aron-
Dine, Einav, and Finklestein 2013). While the Rand Health Insurance 
Experiment is considered the “gold standard” for estimating the effects 
of insurance coverage on the use of medical care owing to its rigor-
ous study design, a large body of subsequent research using alternative 
methods reinforces the basic finding that more generous insurance cov-
erage leads to greater utilization of medical care. 
While moral hazard is simply the result of people responding to 
the financial incentives created by insurance, this type of behavior ulti-
mately drives up health care spending. Because health insurance premi-
ums reflect expected spending on covered services, increased utiliza-
tion due to moral hazard is ultimately passed back to consumers in the 
form of higher premiums. In the case of private health insurance mar-
kets, higher premiums due to moral hazard make health insurance less 
affordable, resulting in fewer people purchasing coverage (Chernew, 
Cutler, and Keenan 2005). In the case of publicly financed care, the 
incremental cost is ultimately borne by taxpayers in the form of higher 
taxes or lower government spending on other types of services. 
Because spending on low-value services ultimately makes coverage 
less attractive to consumers, private insurers have incentives to develop 





ciently. One mechanism to control moral hazard in the use of insured 
health care is to require payments on the part of patients at the point 
of service. In other words, instead of fully reimbursing patients for the 
services they use, an insurer requires the patient to pay a portion of the 
amount billed by the provider at the point of service. The objective of 
this type of coinsurance or copayment is to reduce the use of low-value 
care by creating incentives for patients to consider the cost as well as 
the benefits of care when making treatment decisions. 
Patient cost sharing, however, raises two types of concerns. First, it 
erodes the amount of protection that insurance provides. In other words, 
for consumers who initially purchased health insurance to protect them-
selves from financial risk, cost sharing at the point of service reintro-
duces financial risk associated with the use of health care. The opti-
mal level of cost sharing balances these opposing effects (Zeckhauser 
1970); patients give up some risk protection in exchange for lower 
premiums, reflecting less moral hazard in utilization. The second con-
cern is that patients may not effectively discriminate between low- and 
high-value services when responding to cost sharing. Indeed, the Rand 
Health Insurance Experiment found that patients did not effectively dis-
criminate between more and less appropriate care when reducing uti-
lization (Newhouse 1993), and several studies have documented that 
patients with chronic conditions often discontinue the use of essential 
drugs in response to cost sharing, sometimes resulting in higher subse-
quent rates of hospitalization (Swartz 2010). In response, analysts have 
proposed differentiating the cost sharing for particular services based 
on the benefits relative to the costs. In particular, services for which the 
benefits are high relative to the costs would have low- or no-cost shar-
ing (Fendrick et al. 2001). 
Another mechanism that insurers use to influence utilization pat-
terns is the structure of their relationships with providers. This type of 
mechanism, which is often referred to as managed care, includes a range 
of activities that are intended to influence how physicians, hospitals, 
and other types of providers deliver care. For example, hospitals and 
physicians can be paid in many different ways, ranging from a fee for 
each service they provide to a capitated payment for each patient under 
their care for a given time period. Fee-for-service payment, when the 
fee exceeds the marginal cost of care, creates incentives for hospitals 
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providers have incentives to do less. While these examples represent 
two extremes, more generally, insurers can influence provider behavior 
by designing payment systems that reward them financially for certain 
types of activities and penalize them for others. Insurers may also use 
nonfinancial mechanisms, such as giving physicians feedback on the 
utilization patterns of their patients relative to those of their peers or 
monitoring how their treatment patterns compare to clinical guidelines. 
Insurers adopting managed care mechanisms also usually contract with 
a subset of providers in a particular market. 
Although the goal of managed care is to provide higher-quality and 
lower-cost care by discouraging the use of low-value services, similar 
to cost sharing, managed care mechanisms can pose some risks for con-
sumers. The incentives that plans use to reduce the use of low-value care 
may also reduce the use of high-value care or create incentives for plans 
to avoid high-cost patients. In addition, while greater standardization 
of care processes may reduce the use of low-value services, it may also 
limit the extent to which plans accommodate differences across enroll-
ees in either their clinical characteristics or their preferences for care. 
Most private insurance plans use a combination of managed care 
and patient cost sharing to control moral hazard. When Medicare was 
enacted in 1965, the benefit resembled that of typical private health 
insurance at the time, relying primarily on patient cost sharing to con-
trol utilization, and the basic design of the coverage has changed rela-
tively little since the program was established. The commercial market, 
in contrast, has changed dramatically since 1965, moving toward less 
patient cost sharing, more restricted provider networks, and greater use 
of managed care techniques. In 2011, the vast majority of the under-65 
population was enrolled in a plan adopting restricted provider networks 
and incorporating at least some techniques of managed care (Claxton 
et al. 2011). 
THE EFFECTS OF PRIVATE PLANS ON 
MEDICARE SPENDING 
As the programs are currently designed, both types of private insur-




rather than alleviated—Medicare’s spending issues. The mechanism by 
which they increase spending, however, differs. 
Medigap 
Medigap increases Medicare spending by covering the cost sharing 
of the traditional Medicare benefit. Insurers must offer coverage that 
conforms to 10 prespecified plans, and each plan is required to cover 
the Part A coinsurance as well as expenditures that exceed the benefit 
cap; most plans cover the Part B coinsurance and copayments (Table 
7.1). The most popular plans, C and F, also cover the Part A and Part B 
deductibles. Thus, people with Medigap face little to no out-of-pocket 
payments for their Medicare-covered services. 
While this benefit structure addresses an important weakness in the 
design of the traditional benefit, the coverage ceiling for inpatient care 
that exposes beneficiaries to significant financial risk, it also insulates 
beneficiaries from the financial consequence of their treatment deci-
sions. For example, without Medigap insurance, a beneficiary would 
pay 20 percent of the price set by Medicare for a physician’s office visit. 
With Medigap, however, the beneficiary is not required to make any 
out-of-pocket payment. The reduction in price, in theory, causes benefi-
ciaries to use more care, although the magnitude of the effect depends 
on how responsive patients are to prices. 
An important difference between primary and supplemental insur-
ance is who bears the cost of the incremental utilization. When benefi-
ciaries respond to lower out-of-pocket prices by using more care, the 
majority of the incremental expenditure is financed by the Medicare 
program, not the private insurer. Consider the example of the office 
visit discussed above. The private insurer covered only 20 percent of 
the price of the visit, while the Medicare program financed 80 percent. 
Thus, the premium charged by the private insurer reflects only a portion 
of the incremental expenditures generated by supplemental insurance, 
making Medigap look cheap to beneficiaries relative to the value of the 
services they receive. Private insurers usually prohibit enrollees from 
obtaining supplemental insurance for this reason. 
While a number of studies have examined how supplemental insur-
ance affects Medicare expenditures, the estimates of the magnitude of 
the effect vary from none to a 37 percent increase in Part B spending. 
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The range of estimates is perhaps not surprising, however, since the 
studies vary in many ways, encompassing different time periods with 
different regulatory environments and varying in the degree to which 
they distinguish Medigap from employer-sponsored retiree coverage 
and whether they adequately control for differences in health status 
between those who do and do not obtain coverage (Atherly 2001). 
Taken as a whole, however, the literature suggests that Medigap likely 
increases Medicare spending by approximately 15–25 percent. 
In summary, while Medigap insurance provides beneficiaries with 
important financial protection, particularly given that beneficiaries are 
exposed to the possibility of very high out-of-pocket spending owing 
to a benefit cap for Part A services, it also counteracts the incentives 
for cost control in the design of the Medicare benefit. The incremental 
spending caused by supplemental insurance is financed in large part by 
the Medicare program. 
Medicare Advantage 
Although Medicare Part C was established to lower Medicare 
spending, the program instead has historically increased it, mainly 
because of the difficulty of setting payments for private plans in ways 
that both encourage enrollment and generate savings for Medicare 
(McGuire, Newhouse, and Sinaiko 2011). In the program’s early years, 
the key issue was whether Medicare adequately adjusted the payments 
to private plans to reflect the health status of those choosing to enroll. 
When the program was established, the CMS set the payment to private 
plans at 95 percent of the average of Medicare spending for benefi-
ciaries enrolled in traditional Medicare. Enrollment in an MA plan is 
voluntary, however, and those choosing to enroll have been, on aver-
age, in better health and thus less costly to insure than those choosing to 
remain in the traditional program. Initially, the CMS adjusted payments 
to plans using only a limited set of demographic characteristics, includ-
ing age, sex, whether the beneficiary was also enrolled in Medicaid, 
whether the beneficiary was institutionalized, and whether the benefi-
ciary was employed with employer-sponsored insurance (Pope et al. 
2004). These characteristics, however, explained only a small portion 
of variation across beneficiaries in the annual expenditures—about 1 









enrollees exceeded what the cost would have been had the enrollees 
remained in the traditional program (Newhouse et al. 1989). Brown et 
al. (1993) find that it was indeed having that effect. Despite evidence 
that managed care plans reduced health care spending, particularly for 
less healthy enrollees, Medicare costs in the 1990s were 5.7 percent 
higher than they would have been in the absence of the MA program, 
owing to favorable selection. 
In response to these concerns, the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 
mandated that the CMS use a risk-adjustment methodology that incor-
porated enrollee health status when setting plan payments. In 2000, the 
CMS began risk adjusting payments using information on inpatient 
diagnoses (MedPAC 2005; Weissman, Wachterman, and Blumenthal 
2005). Subsequent legislation mandated that by 2004 the CMS base 
its risk adjustment on data from both inpatient and ambulatory set-
tings. This payment methodology was introduced gradually, with risk-
adjusted payments representing 30, 50, and 75 percent of a blended 
rate in 2004, 2005, and 2006, respectively, and payments to plans were 
based entirely on a risk-adjusted rate beginning in 2007. While studies 
of the effect of the risk-adjustment methodology largely agree that the 
introduction of the payment methodology was associated with greater 
enrollment of less-healthy beneficiaries into MA plans (Brown et al. 
2012; McWilliams, Hsu, and Newhouse 2012; Morrisey et al. 2012; 
Newhouse et al. 2012), the ultimate effect on Medicare spending is less 
clear. One study suggests that the more refined risk-adjustment system 
created greater scope for profitable favorable selection relative to pay-
ments. MA plans ultimately enrolled beneficiaries who were low cost 
relative to the payment formula with the result that overpayments to 
MA plans actually increased (Brown et al. 2012). Other research, how-
ever, has found that this dynamic had dissipated by 2008 (Newhouse et 
al. 2012). 
In the later years of the program, the level of the average payment 
to MA plans, rather than the extent to which adjustments to the pay-
ment adequately compensated plans for difference in enrollee health 
status, became the primary focus of concerns over whether the MA pro-
gram was increasing Medicare spending. In addition to requiring more 
detailed risk adjustment, the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 changed 
the payment formula to address differences between urban and rural 
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The act set payment floors that essentially delinked county-level pay-
ments from historical spending levels. To offset the increase in Medi-
care expenditures due to the payment floors, which primarily affected 
rural counties, the legislation limited the rate of increase in payments 
in nonfloor counties. However, the payment floor had little effect on 
encouraging plans to enter rural counties, and the payment ceiling led 
plans in affected counties to reduce the generosity of the benefits they 
offered enrollees. As a result, the number of plans participating in MA
and the number of beneficiaries enrolled declined dramatically between 
1998 and 2002 (Figure 7.1). 
Aiming to enhance the role of the private sector in Medicare, the 
Medicare Modernization Act of 2003 reversed this trend by increasing 
the average plan payment. The act stipulated that Medicare would pay 
the highest of an urban or rural floor payment, 100 percent of risk-
adjusted per capita spending in Medicare, a minimum update over the 
prior year of 2 percent or traditional Medicare’s national expenditure 
growth rate, and a blended payment (McGuire, Newhouse, and Sinaiko 
2011). This formula guaranteed that average payment rates were at 
least as high as traditional Medicare spending in a particular county 
and locked in higher payments, even for counties experiencing rela-
tively low-cost growth in the traditional Medicare program by linking 
the payment update to growth in national spending. MedPAC (2006) 
estimated that 2004 payments to MA plans averaged 107 percent of 
expected Medicare fee-for-service costs, not accounting for potential 
favorable selection. In 2006, Medicare instituted a system of plan bid-
ding in which the CMS sets county-level benchmark payments and 
plans submit bids in response to the benchmarks. For plans submitting 
bids exceeding the benchmark, beneficiaries are responsible for pay-
ing the difference between the bid and the benchmark when enrolling. 
Plans bidding under the benchmark receive 75 percent of the difference 
as a rebate but must return the rebate to the beneficiaries in the form of 
additional benefits. Even after the implementation of the bidding sys-
tem, MedPAC estimated that payments to MA were 111 percent of tra-
ditional Medicare costs (MedPAC 2006). 
Figure 7.1 shows trends in plan participation and beneficiary enroll-
ment in MA plans over time. Both enrollment and plan participation 
increased until the late 1990s, when plans began to exit the program in 
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1997 and enrollment declined correspondingly. The payment increases 
generated by the Medicare Modernization Act of 2003 reversed the 
trend, with plan participation slowly increasing in early 2000 and then 
growing rapidly through 2009. Enrollment in MA plans increased 
correspondingly. 
The history of the relationship between MA payment rates and plan 
participation and enrollment in MA plans demonstrates the tension 
policymakers face when trying to use the program both to provide ben-
eficiaries with more choices and to control Medicare spending. When 
payments in urban areas rose less quickly during the late 1990s in order 
to contain program expenditures, plans dropped out of the program, 
the generosity of the benefits they offered declined, and enrollment 
declined correspondingly (Figure 7.1). When plan payments increased 
in the mid-2000s, plan participation and enrollment in the program 
increased, but so did Medicare spending. According to McGuire, New-
house, and Sinaiko (2011), satisfying both these goals would require 
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THE FUTURE OF PRIVATE PLANS IN MEDICARE 
What role should private plans play in Medicare’s future? To date, 
Medigap and MA have exacerbated rather than alleviated Medicare’s 
financing challenges by raising program costs. Yet, the more funda-
mental challenge is not simply to lower the rate of growth of program 
spending, but to provide Medicare-financed services more efficiently— 
to spend less but maintain or even improve quality of care. Achieving 
this objective, however, will require a significant change in how Medi-
care interacts with both providers and beneficiaries at the point of ser-
vice. In the private insurance market, these relationships have evolved 
dramatically over time with the implementation of more sophisticated 
systems of patient cost sharing and the development of alternative ways 
of contracting with providers. The Medicare program, in contrast, has 
remained a relatively passive purchaser, paying providers mostly on a 
fee-for-service basis and providing few incentives for beneficiaries to 
consider both quality and cost when seeking care. 
The Medicare program could achieve this transition through two 
types of approaches. First, it could reinvent itself as a more proactive 
purchaser of health care. In this scenario, the program would essentially 
be reformed from the inside by redesigning provider payment methods 
to promote the delivery of high-value care and restructuring the benefit 
package to engage patients more fully in considering both cost and qual-
ity of treatment decisions. The program has already taken steps in this 
direction in recent years, particularly in its relationships with provid-
ers, through the development of quality reporting systems and pay-for-
performance for particular types of services (Tanenbaum 2009). The 
ACA contains a number of provisions that continue this approach 
(James 2012). Perhaps the most well-known example is the establish-
ment of Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs), which are groups of 
providers that agree to be held responsible for a defined group of ben-
eficiaries and are rewarded financially if the Medicare expenditures for 
the group are lower than projected. The act also introduced a program 
designed to reduce potentially avoidable hospital readmissions. Under 
the current fee-for-service system, hospitals have little financial incen-
tive to invest in after-discharge follow-up care, which would prevent 
future admissions, since they do not benefit financially from these activ-
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ities, and even potentially forego the profit associated with the future 
admission. Hospitals are now financially penalized for high readmis-
sion rates (Joynt and Jha 2013). 
Medicare is the largest purchaser of health services in the country, 
and its size makes this approach more feasible, since the program has 
the purchasing leverage to drive substantive change in provider practice. 
For example, after Medicare adopted prospective payment for inpatient 
hospital admission in the 1980s, many private insurers soon followed, 
negotiating prices based on the diagnosis-related group definitions used 
by the CMS. While Medicare’s sheer size may be an advantage in cre-
ating incentives for providers to adopt new payment methods or other 
types of innovations, such as electronic medical records, its role as a 
governmental organization creates other types of barriers. While some 
express concern over whether a government-run monopoly can be ade-
quately incentivized to produce services efficiently, another important 
difference between public and private insurers is the political pressure 
they face. In addition to the enrollees who rely on the program for their 
health care, Medicare is beholden to a variety of stakeholders because 
of the size of the program relative to the overall economy. Medicare 
administrative decisions can have dramatic financial consequences for 
physicians, hospitals, pharmaceutical companies, device manufactur-
ers, local governments, and others, leading to continuous congres-
sional involvement in the program as representatives respond to their 
particular set of constituents. Kessler (2012) proposes that Medicare’s 
vulnerability to congressional micromanagement makes the program 
fundamentally unable to make the difficult decisions that would be 
required to relentlessly focus on the delivery of high-value care. Per-
haps the most visible example of how politics affects the operation of 
the program is the development of physician reimbursement policy. As 
part of the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Congress reformed physi-
cian payment policy by linking fee increases to an expenditure target in 
order to contain physician expenditures (Congressional Budget Office 
2006). However, every year since 2003, Congress has blocked the for-
mula from taking effect, since it would substantially reduce physician 
fees, potentially threatening beneficiaries’ access to care (Jacobs 2013). 
Although many policymakers agree that the formula needs to be fixed 
to create a more stable, long-term payment policy, there has not yet 
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The primary alternative to “reform from within” is to restructure 
Medicare as a marketplace of government-subsidized, regulated pri-
vate plans, a model often referred to as “premium support.” Rather than 
receive an open-ended guarantee to cover all medically necessary ser-
vices, beneficiaries would instead receive a fixed payment in the form 
of a voucher for a defined set of services and could direct the payment to 
the private plan of their choice (MedPAC 2013a). While this approach is 
attractive from a government budgeting perspective because it provides 
policymakers with more control over Medicare spending through con-
trol of the voucher size, its theoretical rationale is based on the potential 
benefits of competition among health plans as a mechanism to promote 
efficient utilization of care. A voucher would expose beneficiaries to 
the higher costs of more expensive plans, introducing price sensitivity 
at the point of insurance purchase. Competition among plans for enroll-
ees, in turn, would create incentives for plans to develop mechanisms to 
control cost and increase quality of care. This is an important deviation 
from the existing Medicare program because it rewards beneficiaries
for using care more parsimoniously through their choice of a lower-
premium plan. This approach also creates the opportunity for varia-
tion across plans in both the generosity of benefits and the structure of 
delivery system, allowing for better customization of care for individual 
preferences. From a political economy perspective, premium support 
shifts the responsibility for implementing managed care mechanisms 
from the public to the private sector, creating less opportunity for politi-
cal interference in plan management (Kessler 2012). 
Opponents of premium support raise two types of concerns. First, 
while the intent is to harness the power of competition to provide more 
effective care, plans may compete in less socially beneficial ways, such 
as by trying to enroll beneficiaries in better health or by withholding 
access to beneficial care. While the policy response to the potential 
for risk selection is to adjust payments to plans to reflect differences 
among enrollees in their expected costs, whether existing systems of 
risk adjustment adequately ameliorate these incentives remains an open 
question (Brown et al. 2012; McWilliams, Hsu, and Newhouse 2012). 
In the case of concerns over “stinting,” the policy response is to pro-
vide consumers with information on plan quality. This would provide a 
mechanism for the market to reward high-quality plans in the form of 






the availability of this type of information has increased dramatically in 
recent years, there is still some uncertainty over whether this approach 
would adequately address these types of concerns. 
The other concern from the perspective of beneficiaries is the extent 
to which premium support shifts responsibility for financing health 
care from taxpayers to beneficiaries. This depends primarily on how 
the level of the voucher is set. The amount the government contributes 
could be chosen administratively, as it has been traditionally done in 
the MA program, or it could be determined through a market process
(MedPAC 2013b). If the level of the voucher is set administratively, then 
a key issue is how the voucher is adjusted over time. Because increases 
in health care costs typically exceed inflation, linking the level of the 
voucher to the rate of growth of the economy as a whole would transfer 
an increasing portion of financing of health care costs to beneficiaries 
over time. Voucher amounts linked to growth in health care spending, in 
contrast, provide greater protection for beneficiaries against health care 
cost growth. An alternative is to set the level of the voucher through a 
competitive process. In Medicare Part D, plans submit bids for cover-
ing beneficiaries, and the subsidy is calculated as a share of the aver-
age national bid. Linking the subsidy to a market-determined level of 
health care spending protects beneficiaries from market trends specific 
to health care. 
Medicare beneficiaries have had a private alternative to the tradi-
tional benefit for nearly 20 years, however, so why has Medicare Part 
C not been more successful in generating greater value from Medicare-
financed services? The current program suffers not necessarily from 
the inability of private plans to provide care more efficiently but from 
the lack of incentives for beneficiaries to seek out more efficient alter-
natives. One reason is that MA plans are limited in the ways in which 
they are able to transfer any savings they generate to beneficiaries. In 
particular, they may not pay beneficiaries to enroll. Instead, they must 
transfer any cost savings they generate to beneficiaries in the form of 
additional benefits. This results in the provision of products and ser-
vices of relatively low value to beneficiaries and lessens plans’ incen-
tives to provide care more efficiently. Another reason is that MA plans 
currently compete not against just traditional Medicare but against the 
combination of Medicare and supplemental insurance. As discussed 
earlier, however, much of the incremental utilization associated with 
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supplemental insurance is financed by the Medicare program, making 
premiums for supplemental coverage low relative to the benefits it pro-
vides. The relative attractiveness to beneficiaries of traditional Medi-
care plus Medigap, which is financed primarily by taxpayers, makes 
MA plans less attractive. 
Not only does the availability of Medigap coverage limit enrollment 
in MA plans, but it also weakens the likely effectiveness of “reform 
from within” by essentially taking patient cost sharing off the table as 
a mechanism to influence utilization of care. For example, the financial 
incentives of ACOs, while intended to create incentives for these orga-
nizations to provide care more efficiently, also create a tension between 
beneficiaries and providers. The savings associated with lower utiliza-
tion of care ultimately benefit providers and taxpayers rather than ben-
eficiaries themselves, since they have little to no cost sharing and thus 
do not experience a decline in their out-of-pocket spending. Helchem et 
al. (2013) propose a “shared-savings supplement” in which beneficia-
ries would receive a cash payment for choosing a lower cost option to 
restore patient incentives in the face of supplemental insurance. 
The implication of the interrelationships between Medigap and 
the traditional program is that effective reform of the Medicare pro-
gram will also require reform of the Medigap market. The tension in 
reforming this market, however, is how to provide beneficiaries with 
catastrophic risk protection while limiting the extent to which that pro-
tection promotes inefficient use of care. One potential approach is to 
restructure the cost sharing associated with traditional Medicare. For 
example, MedPAC has recommended redesigning the traditional Medi-
care benefit by creating an out-of-pocket maximum for cost sharing, 
maintaining the Part A and B deductibles (and possibly combining 
them into a single deductible), replacing coinsurance with copayments 
for most services, and allowing the secretary to adjust the cost sharing 
for specific services based on their value to patients (MedPAC 2012b). 
With this type of restructuring, the basic benefit would provide benefi-
ciaries protection from large expenditures but retain incentives for them 
to avoid low-value care. 
While improving the benefit design of the traditional Medicare pro-
gram would likely reduce demand for supplemental coverage, reform 
of the Medigap market may be necessary as well. In general, Medigap 





which the incremental costs associated with the purchase of supple-
mental insurance are borne by taxpayers rather than beneficiaries. In 
particular, policymakers could restrict Medigap plans from providing 
first-dollar coverage or require them to apply copayments for certain 
services. Alternatively, they could tax plans providing first-dollar cov-
erage or charge Medicare beneficiaries a fee if they purchase supple-
mental insurance, where the tax or the fee reflected the incremental cost 
the coverage generates for the Medicare program. 
CONCLUSION 
To date, private health insurance has done little to improve the effi-
ciency of the delivery of Medicare-financed services and has actually 
increased Medicare spending. Medigap insurance has aggravated the 
inefficiencies associated with traditional Medicare coverage, and while 
MA plans have the potential to improve the efficiency of service deliv-
ery, the design of the Part C benefit limits the ability of plans to pass 
these efficiencies on to enrollees, and the availability of Medigap cover-
age further dilutes the incentives of beneficiaries to enroll in plans that 
provide care more efficiently. While private plans have the potential to 
be part of solutions to Medicare’s budget challenges, this would require 
reform to the traditional Medicare program, the supplemental insurance 
market, and the MA program. 
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